

The Channel

The McGill University
Department of English Undergraduate Journal
Volume 9 | 2015-2016

The Channel

"Difference"

The McGill English Department Undergraduate Journal
Volume 9 | 2015-2016

Dear Reader...

Thank you for your interest in The Channel, the English Department of McGill University's undergraduate paper publication. We are proud to present the 2015-2016 edition, with the theme of "difference". The editors have curated a collection of papers dealing with diversity, identity, and divergences. We were delighted to read dozens of papers representing what difference means to McGill English students, and the selections showcased in this journal are among the most intriguing, compelling, and unique imaginings of this theme.

The Channel exhibits outstanding undergraduate work from the three English streams: Literature, Cultural Studies, and Drama & Theatre. We are dedicated to offering our readers a representative sample of the excellent ideas and hard work the Department of English churns out year-round. From childbirth in modernist poetry, to the issues of multi-racial identity performance, to Paul Simon's representation of cultural polyphony in *Graceland*, this edition offers a diversity of topics to match its theme.

My immense thanks go out to our amazingly talented editors, contributors, and designers, who worked tirelessly to bring The Channel Volume 9 to fruition. An additional thanks to DESAs Clara Nizard, Lauren Wildgoose, and Madeleine Cruickshank, for their guidance, experience, and (most importantly), funding acquisition.

Enjoy!
Sarah Kemp
Head Editor, The Channel Undergraduate Review

P.S. Feel free to contact us at channelundergraduatereview@gmail.com with any questions, concerns, or comments! We love hearing from you.

Visit our website: http://englishjournal.mcgill.ca/ to learn more about The Channel and access previous issues.

Contents

Contributors

Ford Donovan
Ford Donovan is a fourth year Honours English Literature student. When he's not fine-tuning his Thesis (don't worry, he's sparing us the incredibly cerebral details of the project), Ford enjoys deconstructing and improving the theories of Michel Foucault. Ford admits, though, that he actually hasn't had much time to read anything recently due to "other commitments," opting instead to just "Wikipedia random stuff and hope for the best."
Ford is honoured to be published in this year's edition of The Channel. He plans on pursuing his Master's in English at McGill as well as a career in music journalism, and has thoroughly enjoyed the privilege of writing about himself in the third person.

Shanti Gonzales
Shanti Gonzales is an Honours Drama and Theatre student, a music teacher for babies, and an actor/director–in short, she is a little nuts. Her thesis project will be a performance invoking the experience of being brown(squared)–multiracial with no whiteness in the mix, Shanti is Indian-Mexican-American, raised by her extended African-American family in Boston. In her free time, she slaps the acoustic guitar, practices brown girl magic in her home/cave on the plateau, does arts and crafts, and naps professionally.

David Helps
David Helps is an Honours History student with a minor in English Literature. Within English, his research interests include representations of space, theories of reading as social practice, and transnationalism. He is currently completing his Honours independent research tutorial on the role detective pulp magazines played in the rise and legitimization of modern police-work in the United States.

Zain Mian
Zain R. Mian is interested in world literatures, translation, and literary theory. He is currently writing his honours thesis, which examines the intersection of history and fiction in present-day Pakistan. He also works on the Noon Meem Rashed Archive at McGill and enjoys, amongst other things, listening to the hour-long qawwalis of Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan on repeat.

Amy Miller
Amy Miller is a U3 Honours Literature major cobbling together a degree in contemporary Indigenous and Inuit literature, particularly that of the Canadian North. She likes good beer, large dogs, and CBC radio, and will be returning home to Saskatchewan come spring.

Lauren Wildgoose
Lauren Wildgoose is a fourth year English Literature student with a minor in French. Her academic interests fall all over the map, but with some definite loyalty to modernist poetry and medieval studies.

Scribo Ergo Sum // I Write, Therefore I am: A Call for Performativity in the Writing of Intersectionality

By Shanti Gonzalez

As a young scholar beginning my journey into the world of cultural theory and performance studies, I was excited. Finally, I would get to read theory that grew from roots in real, tangible experience. Theory that represented things I knew to be true.

The most thrilling part of my undergraduate degree has been finding that there are words for the feelings I have known my whole life. Indeed, there are words that someone else has written: that someone else feels the same way and has inscribed it in a way that legitimized the feeling, and me by extension. And we twenty-somethings just *love* to feel legitimized.

However, as I found my hunger for theory growing (reflected in my growing loan list from the library), I began to notice something that made me a bit uncomfortable. I could not quite articulate the feeling, but I began to feel an increasing disconnect from the theories that were supposed to represent experiences that I knew. I am an Indian-Mexican woman. I devour feminist writing and theories of race. But I have noticed that only recently have people been writing about the intersection between these two identifiers. It is fantastic that intersectionality is entering identity politics, but I could not quite shake the feeling that it was *still* forgetting something important.

I began to look at the authors who wrote about intersectionality, and found that most of them were women. More than that — they were almost all white women. Of course they were, I thought. Feminism has until this point been very Eurocentric. But why were white women theorizing on something they did not know in their bodies? What I mean by that is: for me, there are two very different ways of knowing – in the mind, and in the body. The mind is what tells you

that 2+2=4, or processes the subject-verb agreement of the words on the page. The body is what tells you that you feel lonely, or that you feel whole, or that there is danger.

Cultural theory is concerned with inscribing embodied experience – making things known in the body accessible to the minds of others. In *Black Skins White Masks*, Frantz Fanon makes it crystal clear that only the black man can write to the lived experience of the black man. So, then, why can a white woman theorize on the experience of intersectionality? I suppose I am speaking more specifically of the intersectionality that involves non-white identity. Of course there is an intersectional experience in the white queer woman, but her intersectional experience is very different than that of a queer woman of color – yet both women fall under the same umbrella of intersectionality, which is then theorized about in broad strokes. Although white feminists have the best intentions, their theories on the intersectional experience of women of color can be reductive. Because the knowledge is not in their bodies, their minds take over, which leads to a theoretical disembodiment.

When intersectionality was not doing it for me, I turned to writings on the biracial and multiracial experience. Hybridity became my buzzword. And yet, I found myself disappointed again. Most discussions of hybridity involve an identity that is half or part white. Most hybrid authors have whiteness in their personal mix. As such, I saw that whiteness was still being centralized in the discourse – the parts that identified as, or could pass as white, and then the parts that could not. True, the hybrid experience is one of identifying with and against the various parts of oneself, but it also involves understanding the mix — the intersection.

Because hybridity involves so many different and conflicting sites of identification, it is intrinsically performative. As a lived experience, the hybrid identity iterates and re-iterates itself in wildly different ways. At any moment, the hybrid person makes a choice of how she wants to be seen, how she wants to perform for herself. It is important to remember that hybridity exists beyond the genetics (indeed, to keep it at the genetic level strikes me as a neo-colonial act, classifying people and their experiences based on their DNA). Hybridity is intrinsically connected with intersectionality. A hybrid experience also comes from the socio-economic position in which someone was raised. It comes from the people who surrounded this person as they grew up. It comes from the languages they do and do not speak. Hybridity is not just on the skin, but deep below and all around it as well.

This more complex experience – my experience – simply cannot be written in the way that it has been. The white feminist cannot theorize about it, in the way that theory becomes inaccessible and sterile. Capital-T Theory was first written by a white, male academy. Only recently were women allowed in and they were expected to conform to these white male expectations. Generally speaking, theory has until recently only been emotionless, prescriptive, and scientific. But when we are dealing in cultural theory – of inscribing body knowledge with our minds – this is inadequate.

I find that the writers who capture the intersectional experience in the most honest way are those who do not adhere to the expectations of the academy. They allow their feelings into the discourse. They allow their voice to be heard. Authors such as Gloria Anzaldúa, Frantz Fanon, Jamaica Kincaid – authors who have been criticized as being "too emotional" – they are the ones who capture intersectionality. The fact of the matter is, intersectionality is an experience and not a simple theory. Further, intersectionality is a performative experience and therefore must be expressed in performative writing.

Performative writing proves itself the more capacious and apt manner in which this experience can be communicated. It brings humanity into the discussion, which is crucial: the word "hybrid" sounds more like a scientific observation or a comment, erasing the humanity in hybrid experience. Performativity gives hybridity its humanity back. In the Kwanzaa tradition, this is what we call *kujichangalia*: self determination. Performativity allows its writers to call themselves out, to seize agency in declaring themselves, as opposed to being spoken for and defined by the Other. As such, the normalization of performative writing in the theoretical discourse has a unique power – it begins to tear down the hegemonic structures that have taught us how

to think. Lucky for us hybrids, performativity allows us the power to make ourselves, in live and in theory, no longer allowing others to make us in black and white on paper.

Alarcón states, "if queer discourse is to supersede the limits of feminism, it must be able to calculate multiple antagonisms that index issues of class, gender, and race, as well as sexuality." Indeed, in order to "supersede the limits" of all the existing –isms that structure our thinking, the discourse must be diversified, and complicated, by factoring in the "multiple antagonisms" at play in marginalized identities. However, the words "calculate" and "factoring" are problematic. Here we have an example of marginalization and oppression as viewed on a graph – we have all heard the term "axis of oppression," and Alcarón asks us to "index" these issues. This is the way in which we have been taught to think about these issues. Norma Alarcón is not white: she is a Chicana feminist. But here she becomes a part of the academic discourse which privileges logic over lived experience. Logic seeks to quantify; experience seeks to qualify.

When it comes to knowing in the mind versus knowing in the body, the academy privileges the former. We learn that very young. The kid who can write up matrices and algorithms is seen as smarter than the kid who can articulately express their feelings.

> Anzaldúa takes this a step further and applies gender: "*We all know that women read as men and women write as men, because that's how we were taught.* We were trained to read as men. Little girls read the books that boys read, but the boys never read the books with little girl heroines, and so women are taught to read westerns and spy novels and mysteries, and the 'serious' literature, but we also read 'women's literature,' watch soap operas, read romances, read women's mysteries. But men aren't taught to read women." (2009, pp. 170)

Education is coded male, and masculine knowledge is privileged over feminine. "Women are taught to read as men," and are correspondingly taught to think as men. Evidently, men think more "seriously": they are never emotional, as emotionality is always coded feminine and weak. In academia, writing is expected to be aloof, with little to

no voice in the style, presenting "only the facts." When I asked a male friend about why this is, he replied, "emotion complicates things. Emotion is not fair. Facts don't interfere with your feelings, facts allow you to think clearly." But what is thinking "clearly"? When is thinking ever completely separate from lived experience, from emotion? All knowledge is subjective – touched and shaped by the mind of the specific person thinking it.

Yet academia likes to pretend that it is above the subjectivity of the human mind. (Male-driven)[1] academia likes to try and get as close as it can to an objective truth.

A Wikipedia search on "objective truth" leads us to a reading list that is composed *entirely* of white men. This tells us two things. One, men love the idea of objectivity, of leaving bias and sentimentality behind them. Two, men have been and continue to be the knowledge-makers of the academy. For example, among the 266 most cited contemporary philosophers in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 90% are men (Park). According to the American Association of University Professors, women held only 37.5% of tenured positions in 2013. In Europe, women hold only 18% of full professorships (Vernos).

The statistics on race are much worse. In Canada, only 2.1% of all university teachers reported Aboriginal ancestry in 2006 (Canadian Association of University Teachers). The unemployment rate for visible minority female faculty in Canada is 7.6% (Canadian Association of University Teachers). Hispanic women in the United States held 2.5% of tenure-track positions and 2.3% of tenured positions (IPEDS). These statistics show us that it is white men who run the universities, who have the means to get published, and who then teach the next generation of thinkers how to think. Studies have shown that these professors are "significantly more responsive to Caucasian males than to all other categories of students, collectively" (Milkman, Akinola, and Chugh). As Sylvia Bettez puts it, "education not only reproduces but *constructs* inequity" (25).

As such, even non-male academics are still thinking like men.

1 The modifier "male" is much like the modifier "white:" when there is no modifier, it can be inferred. The only time a modifier precedes the noun is if it is describing something non-normative – a black doctor as opposed to a doctor, a female novelist as opposed to a novelist. So when talking about academia, we are almost always saying, "male-driven academia."

This mode of thinking proves reductive when theorizing about the intersectional experience of women of color. Adrienne Rich points out,

> "much feminist scholarship has been written as if black women did not exist, and many a women's studies course or text pays token reference, if any, to black women's lives and work. Even where racism is acknowledged... it is too often out of a desire to 'grasp' it as an intellectual or theoretical concept; we move too fast, as men so often do, in the effort to stay 'on top' of a painful and bewildering condition, and so we lose touch with the feelings black women are trying to describe to us, their lived experience as women" (281).

This desire to "grasp" a concept it is characterized as masculine. The effort to "stay on top of a painful and bewildering condition" speaks to the desire to take emotionality out of the equation –feelings are too complicated, and instead we must analyze the "condition" – the *dis-ease* – through a more sterile lens. Rich says it herself: this is "moving too fast, *as men often do*," and this rush leads writers "especially academically trained white women" (281) to "lose touch with the feelings" of women of color, to erase "their lived experience as *women*."

When writers "lose touch" in this manner, the intersectional discourse becomes susceptible to theoretical disembodiment and risks re-inscribing a lack of humanity for women of color. What, then, can be done to move away from the dehumanizing effects of theory? Jose Muñoz suggests that "the move to identify the radical impulse in developmental theories aims to recast the theories outside the parameters of positivism and enact their political performativity for circuits of belonging that do not conform to a crypto- universalism associated with the universal white subject" (5). In other words, Muñoz acknowledges the existence of a "radical impulse" – this impulse being a product of body knowledge as opposed to mind knowledge – pushing against theory that is made within the "parameters of positivism." Positivism is the philosophical theory which states that information derived from sensory experience and then interpreted through reason and logic constitutes the source of all authoritative knowledge (Macionis). He acknowledges the "political performativity," the identity-making within a complicated landscape of identity politics, which

must be enacted for the sake of those who do not identify with "the universal white subject." Muñoz critiques the very structures that have constructed and reconstructed inequity. With his words, he hails these non-normative subjects back into being.

What is wrong with allowing theory to remain embodied, to preserve its link to the lived experience that informs it? The link to the body often comes with emotion, and we have been taught that emotionality cannot be taken seriously. Sylvia Bettez frankly exposes the feeling toward emotion in a university class setting:

> Classmate: The author sounds really angry, so angry that her work is not accessible. I don't think she has to be that angry to get her point across. I didn't really like this reading.
> Me: Of course she's angry; she's talking about her life, about being discriminated against as a Black woman.
> Classmates: (stares of annoyance)
> Classmate: Still...
> Me: (silence) (19).

We have all heard this conversation in one form or another. To the student, the author's emotion is scary and off-putting. The student seems to be recommending that the author calm down in order to be rational. But what if her point *is* that she is angry? The student's response to Bettez is the one word "still..." yet the entire class is in agreement; Bettez is silenced. Emotionality here is seen as counter-productive. This student is tone policing, or "derailing a discussion by critiquing the emotionality of the message rather than the message itself" (Hugs). In this critique, tone policing allows privileged people "to define the terms of a conversation about oppression in order for that discussion to continue" (Hugs). Tone policing becomes yet another way that hegemony maintains control. It masquerades as wanting to remain objective to incite productive conversation, but the lasting effect and affect of systematized oppression is not an objective one.

Jamaica Kincaid, an Antiguan woman and author of *A Small Place*, exemplifies an author who has been consistently criticized for her emotionality. But she *claims* her anger. It is the difference

between "I am angry" and "she is angry." The "I" claims ownership. It evokes the human emotion. It performs. The "she" observation is distant. "She" becomes a fact on a page: one that can be scrutinized, analyzed, divided, and reduced. "She" becomes a "person like that," or, as Kincaid elaborates:

> You had always felt people like me cannot run things, people like me will never grasp the idea of Gross National Product, people like me will never be able to take command of the thing the most simpleminded among you can master, people like me will never understand the notion of rule by law, people like me cannot really think in abstractions, people like me cannot be objective, we make everything so personal. (36)

Who are the "people like me" Kincaid describes? They are constructions, ideas: characters whose identities are determined by the white tourist. These people are the Other to the hegemonic Self. These "rules" for the Other – "never grasping the idea of GNP," not being able to "think in abstractions"– highlight the widespread internalization of neo-colonial stereotype. The passage accumulates strength with repetition and culminates in Kincaid's direct confrontation of her critics. She equates criticisms of her emotionality to the reductive statement "people like me cannot be objective, we make everything so personal." Here, Kincaid highlights the issue: women of color "cannot be objective," and have no place in an environment of high-level thought.

It is also in this performance of self that Kincaid is able to communicate the crux of her piece – the pain she feels as a result of colonization in Antigua and the neo-colonial institution of tourism. She *does* have to be that angry in order to get her point across. Anger that comes from the lingering effect of an institution that dealt in "thingification," in turning people into objects (Cesaire). In her performativity – the voicing of her human emotion – Kincaid reclaims her personhood, and powerfully articulates her own experience of intersectionality.

Gloria Anzaldúa is another author who expresses her experience of intersectionality in this new performative style. She believes that "by sending our voices, visuals and visions outward into the world, we alter the walls and make them a framework for new windows and doors" (1995, xxv). This is a quote from her work entitled *Haciendo Caras*, which translates to "making faces". This piece interrogates the identity-making of Chicana women, especially queer Chicana women. A piece about identity-making is necessarily performative in its style. In fact, performativity can be understood as the capacity of speech and language not simply to communicate, but to construct and perform identity (Butler). In the *act* of writing, and of speaking, identities are made and made again. Anzaldúa asserts that by "sending our voices outward into the world," women of intersectional experiences make "new windows and doors" — new possibilities for thinking.

Anzaldúa also discusses the discomfort she feels when the white academy asks her to clarify her own hybrid identity for them:

> "Often I am asked, 'What is your primary identity, being lesbi an or working class or Chicana?' In defining or separating the 'lesbian' identity from other aspects of identity I am asked to separate and distinguish all aspects from one another. I am asked to bracket each, to make boundaries around each so as to articulate one particular facet of identity only. But to put each in a separate compartment is to put them in contradiction or in isolation when in actuality they are all constantly in a shifting dialogue/relationship." (Anzaldúa, 2009, 167)

Anzaldúa asserts that identity is *not* something that can be "separated" out or "bracketed." She must consider all her identities together. An intersectional experience cannot be simplified or distilled in order to make things simpler for someone else, just as it cannot be made simpler for the person living it. This is part of what makes intersectionality performative: "Judith Butler argued, 'Performativity conceptualizes the paradox of identity as apparently fixed but inherently unstable, revealing (gender) norms requiring continual maintenance" (Hey, 2006, p. 439). A complicated hybrid identity can be understood as containing "identities" *plural* (Bettez, Anzaldúa, and others use this again and again). These identities are "shifting," just as Anzaldúa remarks, and the subject is thus involved in a translocational positionality of identity. One moment she may be "feeling brown" (as Muñoz

might say), and another she may be feeling female, or queer. At any given moment, any combination of her identities may sound for her, and she has the power to perform any and all of them at a given time.

The hybrid woman asks herself questions upon questions: asking herself if she is speaking more black than she might have intended, whether this makeup makes her look too Indian, was that comment very queer, did his gaze linger too long? She is constantly interrogating her performances, aware of the fact that she is an "almost, but not quite" woman (Anzaldua, 1995). That is to say: when living in the Borderlands, one can not belong to one place or the other.

Anzaldúa, queen of the Borderlands, wonders why people ask her to choose a singular homeland. For example, why people would like to know her ideas about queerness, minus her race. She decides that "the difference is in my relationship to my culture; white culture may allow its lesbians to leave– mine doesn't" (Anzaldua, 2009, 164). This speaks to the curious circumstance in which whiteness is simultaneously omnipresent and invisible, whereas Latinidad is not something that can be left behind, in part due to visibility and in part due to the lived experience of the culture. There is a pride, a solidarity, in being latinx and it is not something easily left behind.

Anzaldúa's style of writing is fascinating because she is one of the few influential theorists whose writing sounds like speaking. We are trained to write differently from the way we speak – we are taught to write "properly." But who determines what "properly" is? Ah, yes, the white male academy. *Why* must we write differently than the way we speak? What about all the encoded cultural knowledge that exists in our speech? Anzaldúa preserves that knowledge. She not only maintains her colloquial, *human* tone, but also writes bilingually in English and in Spanish. She does not translate either way. She does this because this is the way she thinks – the way she interacts with the world around her. So it must be bilingual. She has been criticized for being inaccessible due to her use of Spanish, but her writing speaks of the nuances of the Spanish language that in turn inform her identities around gender, sexuality, and race. In asking her to translate the Spanish, one is asking her to leave her Latinidad at the door. She will not.

This embodied honesty is an example of inscribing her body knowing into theory. She takes the "street smarts" of her life, the way she can read her culture and those around her, and allows it to interact with her "book smarts." Although the academy obviously prefers certain methods to others, each way of knowing is invaluable to the way Anzaldúa interprets her experiences: "I consider myself standing in the Borderlands (the actual crossroads or bridge) of these two 'readings.' I may be able to read the situation in the street from the point of view of a streetwise person, and I can look at these abstract theoretical writings and be able to read them academically because of the schooling I've had" (Anzaldua, 172). As a result, Anzaldúa becomes bilingual in another way: she is fluent in both body knowing and mind knowing. She lives in the liminal space between the academy and the reality of the world. In voicing and valorizing this liminality, she legitimizes her own authority and proves her capacity to articulate her "Borderlands" experience of queer female latinidad.

Anzaldúa's strength to call herself out resonates in Kincaid, and in Muñoz. To declare oneself as queer or brown or female, to imagine the body for the voice on the paper – this is the ultimate act of claiming agency as a hybrid being. Sylvia Bettez comments that "[in university] I could not imagine claiming a mixed race identity because of the prevalence of binaries in society" (20). Because she feared or detested the idea being asked to bracket off her identities, which may be seen by others as a binary (white // brown), she could not claim her hybrid identity. Indeed, for a hybrid person of color, claiming one's identities is a fraught process. "Omi and Winant (1994) argued that race, as with gender, is one of the first observations noted in meeting a person. They assert that without a racial designation one is left without a complete identity because race identity is so integral to US society" (Bettez, 28). The race question is inescapable because race, unlike gender or sexuality, signifies immediately. We cannot escape the signifying power of our skin. Even when someone is "racially ambiguous," that still informs the constructed understanding of who they are via race. They are not white. And of course they will be asked the infamous, "so what are you?" The power, for a person of

color, especially a mixed race person, is going beyond signifying race and understanding how they *perform* race. In order to perform their hybridity, they must call themselves out, instead of allowing the gaze of the Other on their skin to do it for them.

In order to understand the power of calling *oneself* out, one must first revisit the Althusserian idea of "hailing:" the phenomenon of being called out, and in response, embodying the thing that was called. The caller, an Other, has marked the individual: written their identity for them. The "hailing" is in the phenomenon of calling, "hey, you!" What makes the individual turn around? In the act of turning, one has accepted the call and thus become the object of the call. In *Black Skins White Masks*, Fanon provides an example of this in his description of the "Look, a Negro!" phenomenon (93). Someone else (a child) hails him as Negro, and thus his identity (or, at the very least, the signifying power of his skin) becomes re-inscribed with all the previously existing meanings in the word Negro: different, dark, dangerous.

> Writers are often hailed by critics and peers:
> "the label in front of a writer positions her ... Oblivious to priv ilege and wrapped in arrogance, most writers from the domi nant culture never specify their identity ... If the writer is mid dle class, white, and heterosexual s/he is crowned with the 'writer' hat–no mitigating adjectives in front of it. They con sider me a *Chicana* writer, or a lesbian Chicana writer. Ad jectives are a way of constraining and controlling. The adjective before writer marks, for us, the 'inferior' writer, that is, the writer who doesn't write like them. Marking is always 'marking down.'" (Anzaldúa, 2009, 164).

When someone else gives the identifier, when someone else says, "She's a Latina/queer/lower class writer" – the identified person is stripped of their agency. They are reduced to the adjective in front of them, and marked "inferior" because they are unlike the majority of writers.

Had Anzaldúa left the space for someone else to say, "she's a Chicana writer," she would have allowed herself to be marked down. Instead, she immediately hailed herself as a Chicana lesbian writer.

What changes when one hails oneself? For Anzaldúa, "my labeling of myself is so that the Chicana and lesbian and all the other persons in me don't get erased, omitted, or killed. Naming is how I make my presence known, how I assert who and what I am and want to be known as. Naming myself is a survival tactic" (Anzaldua, 2009, 164). She performs as a way to fight against those who wish to erase her experience. Calling oneself out empowers the writer: it returns the identity-making power, the performative power, to the hybrid subject.

Writers such as Anzaldúa and Kincaid inscribe their lived cultural experience by allowing their own identities to perform in their writing. Bettez does a similar thing; her book *But Don't Call Me White* is a compilation of different anecdotes from women of color about their experience of being mixed race. Bettez allows the performativity of the stories to reveal these experience yet she frames her discussion in such a way that maintains legibility for the academy. These women powerfully assert, *this is who I am I will not change to fit the standards of the academy*. The reverse is preferable: the academy must change to fit the needs of the people it represents. Performativity allows writers to reclaim their power, legitimize the cultural truth encoded in the way in which they speak, and acknowledge the humanity of the body that wrote the words. As a young female thinker, a mixture of two browns (Indian and Mexican), raised by a black family in a predominantly white area, educated in an elite New England prep school and completing her bachelor's degree at a world-class Anglophone university in Montreal, my identity is shaped by all of these different and dissonant cultures. I want to see the human hands of these cultures reflected in their knowledge-making institutions. I want to feel the lived-ness of identity politics emerge from the writings that seek to interpret them.

Works Cited

Alarcón, Norma. "The Theoretical Subject(s) of This Bridge Called My Back and Anglo-American Feminism." *Studies in Chicano Literature, Culture, and Ideology Criticism in the Borderlands.* (1991): 28-40. Web.

Althusser, Louis. *Essays On Ideology.* London: Verson, 1984. Print.

Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.* New York: Routledge, 1999. Print.

Anzaldúa, Gloria. *Making Face, Making Soul = Haciendo Caras: Creative and Critical Perspectives by Feminists of Color.* Aunt Lute, 1995. Print.

Anzaldúa, Gloria. "To(o) Queer the Writer." *The Gloria Anzaldúa Reader.* Durham: Duke UP, 2009. Print.

Bettez, Sylvia. "Resisting Theoretical Disembodiment: Claiming Space in the Research and Theories Conversations." *But Don't Call Me White: Mixed Race Women Exposing Nuances of Privilege and Oppression Politics.* Rotterdam: Sense, 2012. Print.

Bilge, Sirma. "Developing Intersectional Solidarities: A Plea for Queer Intersectionality." Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, 18 Oct. 2011. Web. 28 Aug. 2015.

Canadian Association of University Teachers, "Table 2.12: Average Salaries of Full-time Permanent Women University Professors, College and Other Vocational Instructors and All Occupations," 2014-2015 CAUT Almanac of Post-Secondary Education in Canada (2015).

Césaire, Aimé. *Discourse on Colonialism.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000.

Fanon, Frantz. *Black Skins, White Masks.* New York: Grove, 2008. Print.

Kincaid, Jamaica. *A Small Place.* New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux. 1988. Print.

Hey, V. "The politics of performative resignification: translating Judith Butler's theoretical discourse and its potential for a sociology of education," *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 27(4): 439-457. 2006.

Hugs, Robot. "No, We Won't Calm Down – Tone Policing Is Just Another Way to Protect Privilege." *Everyday Feminism.* 07 Dec. 2015. Web. 07 Dec. 2015.

IPEDS, "Full-Time Instructional Staff, by Faculty and Tenure Status, Academic Rank, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender (Degree-granting institutions): Fall 2013," Fall Staff 2013 Survey (2013).

Macionis, John J. *Sociology.* Pearson Education Canada, 2014. Print.

Milkman, Katherine L. and Akinola, Modupe and Chugh, Dolly. "What Happens Before? A Field Experiment Exploring How Pay and Representation Differentially Shape Bias on the Pathway into Organizations" (December 13, 2014). Milkman, K.L., M. Akinola, and D. Chugh. "What Happens Before? A Field Experiment Exploring How Pay and Representation Differentially Shape Bias on the Pathway into Organizations." Journal of Applied Psychology, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2063742

Muñoz, José Esteban. "Feeling Brown, Feeling Down: Latina Affect, the Performativity of Race, and the Depressive Position." *Signs,* Vol. 31, No. 3, New Feminist Theories of Visual Culture (Spring 2006), pp. 675-688.

Rich, Adrienne. "Disloyal to Civilization: Feminism, Racism, Gynephobia." *On Lies, Secrets, and Silence: Selected Prose, 1966-1978.* New York: Norton, 1979. Print.

Vernos, Isabelle. "Research Management: Quotas Are Questionable." *Nature* 495.7439 (2013): 39. Web.

"North my love north": Natural Maps and National Myths in Henry Beissel's *Cantos North*

By Amy Miller

Henry Beissel's *Cantos North* – perhaps one of the only true Canadian epics ever written – is haunted by a particular refrain, one that encapsulates the poem's central theme. "North my love north," the speaker continually repeats, and with this utterance, the reader is introduced to Beissel's interpretation of centuries of national myth-making, centuries in which the Canadian North has been chiefly imagined as a space of national identity formation. However, Beissel's Canadian epic is different – and remarkable – in its critical revisions of this trope: while earlier contributors often make the mistake of (quite literally) white-washing the scene and erasing from view the experiences of the Indigenous peoples in Canada, Beissel incorporates their narratives, creating an entirely new vision of the literary North. This is not to say that Beissel entirely abandons all conventional aspects of the mythic North as it has been conceived in Canadian literary studies; in fact, his emphasis upon the individual's survival against the sublime, beautiful, and terrifying natural landscape fits perfectly into ideas of Canadian literary identity as theorized by scholars like Margaret Atwood and Sherrill Grace. However, Beissel's poem also ultimately constitutes a revision of these themes. Where traditional literary representations of the North are homogenous and univocal, explored most often from the perspective of an outsider, Beissel's North is utterly polyphonic. In giving voice not only to the people of the land, but the land itself, Beissel creates a vision of the literary North that is both new and nuanced, both a love song to the bounty of the natural landscape and an incredible vision of the plurality of perspectives upon which our country is built.

The poem begins with a metaphorical mapping, familiarizing the reader with the landscape that is to be explored over the course of the next twelve cantos. "Vast blank canvas of a land," the speaker states, "hung tattered at the top from fixed pole/ and stretched below along a single latitude/ taut into the framework of two oceans" (I.1-4). The careful reader will immediately recognize this sprawling landscape as Canada, but the speaker makes clear that this is not the Canada of Toronto or Montreal, nor is it the sweeping prairies or the Maritimes or even the Rocky Mountains; the Canada described – of "fierce white and random green geography" (I.23) – is, as the title suggests, that of the high North.

This Northern preoccupation is not at all unique, as Beissel plays upon a cultural tradition that locates the heart of Canadian identity in the uppermost regions of the country, despite the fact that very few Canadians live there, or even ever visit it. It is almost impossible to discuss the so-called "myth of the North" without drawing upon the work of one its foundational scholars, Sherrill Grace. Though her exploration of the Northern myth – much of which is contained in her book, *Canada and the Idea of North* – is both rigorous and complex, there are two main points upon which we may rely for the study of this poem. The first (and most critical) is that the North is, above all, not a real region but an imagined space, both a creation and inexplicable part of the Canadian mental landscape. The North is not a natural, real phenomenon, Grace writes, but has rather "accumulated a wide range of fascinating, contradictory associations, a set of familiar, compelling stories, a particular rhetoric and an aesthetic ... a constellation of stubborn stereotypes and seemingly intransigent exclusions" (15). These stereotypes are great and varied: they range from the idea of the landscape as barren, blank, and hostile – a desolate, snow-covered expanse in which man is always under threat of death – to the companion idea, that the North is a space devoid of people, save for those who chance to travel there.

It is the second stereotype that is the most culturally insidious, as it constitutes an active erasure of the indigenous peoples for whom the North has always been home. Too often in our literature – and in our lives – Canadians forget that the North is not only a space for self-discovery, but the homeland of people who have lived there since long before the first explorers ever set foot in North America. Portrayals of these peoples rarely make it into literary depictions of

the North, and when they do, they are often reduced to small roles or cheap caricatures, never given a true voice of their own. This has the effect of white-washing the North, making it a space of Southern fantasy and not lived reality. It is this stereotype against which Beissel writes back with the greatest rigor; while the indomitability of his Northern landscape is similar in texture to the stereotypes articulated by the Northern myth, Beissel's North is consciously atypical in its depictions of the North as peopled by Indigenous peoples and interlopers both.

In addition to the theories of Grace, another critical aspect of the mythic North – and its role in the definition of a national, literary, and cultural identity – is the at times overwhelming emphasis on survival. In the articulation and explication of this theme, it is impossible to ignore the work of Margaret Atwood, whose critical text *Survival* has become a seminal work in the Canadian literary discourse, particularly in how it examines the nordicity of Canadian consciousness and the tendency for Canadian literature to emphasize the struggle for survival against the landscape over all else. Our stories, Atwood writes, are filled with an "almost intolerable anxiety" – they are stories not of "those who made it but those who made it back, from the awful experience – the North, the snowstorm, the sinking ship – that killed everyone else" (2). Here, particularly in her articulation of the experience of man vs nature (or North), she is borrowing from Northrop Frye, whose theorization of a particularly Canadian "garrison mentality" – walling yourself off against the threats of the natural world – is one of the most influential characterizations of our national literature. However, Atwood adapts Frye in a way that is particularly useful to an assessment of *Cantos North* by emphasizing the totalizing permanence of this settler mentality. After each trial, the survivor has "no triumph or victory but the fact of his survival; he has little after his ordeal that he did not have before, except gratitude for having escaped with his life" (3). This idea, that one's greatest hope is to simply survive, becomes central to the speaker of Beissel's poem: canto after canto, we are given images of struggle, images of survival. And yet when we turn up at the end of the poem, even though we are presented with a fairly unified portrait of man and nature, there is no sense

that the survivor has gained the upper hand; rather, we are reminded of both the beauty and the indomitable will of the Canadian clime.

It is no surprise, then, given the themes expressed by Grace, Atwood, and Frye, that *Cantos North* is fecund with patterns of threat and survival. The second canto, "Survey Crew," introduces the landscape from the perspective of the outsider: those who "came from all directions/ to be free" from "all the evitable/ burdens of being human" and "found them/ waiting for [them] in ambush" (II.2-8). For those to whom it is unfamiliar, the natural world seems at all times a threat. The speaker's hands "itch and burn/ frostbitten," memories "burrow like gophers/ undermining prairies/ of belief," and even the sky "breaks out/ in a rash of stars" (II.12-17). The land is at once beautiful and barbarous: one is constantly pulled between these two perceptions.

Beissel depicts this narrative of struggle in new land in canto four, "Passage to Cathay," which is a compacted history of both literal and rhetorical attempts – successful and not – to claim the Northern territory for interlopers from other lands. It begins with Leif and the Northmen, who come to explore but find "no welcome and no worship here./ Green was heaven" (IV.16-17), and so they leave the frozen landscape. We are shown Jacques Cartier, wandering, the one who the speaker says "couldn't find a cartload of good earth" (IV.34). In a later stanza, we see "murders thieves merchants missionaries soldiers./ Craftsmen. Convicts./ Women of heroic and of easy virtue. Saints." and even Jesuits, "[t]rad[ing] furs for souls" (IV.64-71). But even as we see the settler struggle – man vs foreign landscape – the reader is unable to escape a ringing interjection, one from the perspective of the native inhabitants of the land. The entire canto is littered with one interjection, the powerful "*Cassee kouee!*" which means, the reader is informed in the glossary, "'Go home!' (Iroquois), in the sense in which one sends an unwanted intruder packing" (p. 63). Even as we experience the struggles of the French and Englishmen who attempt to create a place in a new world, we are encouraged not to empathize with them too completely; rather, the brilliance of Beissel's poem is his ability to use each of the disparate experiences on the land to undercut each other, to speak to the multiplicity of narratives that exist

under the simplistic and often reductive perception of one unified national history.

It is easy to see at this point in the progression of the poem that we are never located in one perspective; the "I" of the speaker is constantly shifting, refusing to identify with one person or even one perspective, and so as soon as we think we have been settled in the settler narrative, we are introduced to something else entirely. The shift begins in the fifth canto, "How to Build an Igloo/ Into History," where the reader is given an intimate view of the Inuit way of life in the high Arctic. This traditional lifestyle is not merely described, but celebrated; the speaker compares the achievements of the Inuit to some of the greatest creative achievements in all of Western cultural history. Even "before Homer could drink to the sea with his eyes full of the dark/ wine of his song the same sun was singing here/ up north in the pinched eyes of men against the cold" (V.3-5), and while "Europe's academies debated/ truth, the Innuit curved his space from slabs of windbaked snowblown/ marble so elementary it preserved the body's heat" (V. 22-24). These comparisons serve as an antidote to common rhetoric – in literature and in life – that has portrayed indigenous cultures as uncivilized or uneducated; the speaker demonstrates the ingenuity of the Inuit, whose creations might not be literary but are nonetheless great in design and greater in value. In kayak and in numiak they "braved and battled seas and whales/ more furious than a nightmare, challenged icebergs with a paddle/ when far away Ulysses set mighty sail for a more equal foe" (V.65-67). The speaker's characterization of the Inuit as champions of the land is both a testament to their strength and once more a celebration of the power of the landscape itself. They are "[e]pic/ beyond any Homer" (V.74-5), but only because the harshness of the land gives them opportunity for such triumph. What one sees in these portraits of the people is the challenging symbiosis of life in Canada: one is fully forged by the land, thrown not into fire, but ice, and forced to survive.

The speaker delivers a similar glimpse into the lives of other Indigenous people making their home in the vast landscape; canto eight, "Sun Dance/ Out of History" describes the First Nations as they experience the trials of the landscape, both natural and man-made.

The overwhelming power of nature is compared several times to winter, each whose "paths glitter with the icy designs/ of conquest" (XIII.62-3). However, there is the suggestion of a symbiotic relationship between the Indigenous peoples and the land: despite the challenges of nature, they grow "heroically against all the odds/ of history and winter" (VIII.10-11). Keeping with a pattern established in earlier sections, canto eight has a kind of refrain: after each stanza, the speaker consciously reinforces the impermanence of humans as compared to the endurance of nature. "Oh sun, you remain forever and we must die" (VIII.13), says the speaker, and this sentiment is repeated in reference to the moon, stars, earth, and other natural components. There is the sense throughout this canto that even the most seemingly intimate relations between man and nature are still not quite close enough; that at any point, the balance may shift, and nature reveal the upper-hand of which it's been in possession all along.

As the poem progresses, the speaker continually reminds us that all people in and of this nation – Indigenous, settler, or otherwise – are subordinate to the magnificence and power of the land, and it is in this shared subordination that all the people of this nation find common ground. The speaker shows the reader that, though Indigenous peoples have a special relationship with the land – having lived on it for many thousands of years – they too are in a sense immigrants, having been delivered by history in migrations "so ancient not even archaeologists can read them" (III.77). Here, "all beginning is arrival," even for the "hawk-nosed hunters who never knew they'd come/ to haunt a continent a thousand generations/ before a dream of pioneers became a nightmare" (III.60-62). The land is solitary, impenetrable; even those who seem native to it are themselves occasionally rendered senseless by its variety and its vastness. The land will not yield to anything, not to "imperial command or to the march/ of boots" (VI.42-3), or even always to the skilled hand of the native; rather, it bestows "its fortunes and misfortunes with no reference/ to merit, measuring out the seasons equally/ to all who make their home and stead in it" (VI.58-60). In this way, the North is not object, but subject: it "discovered us/ fell upon our vanity/ with tomahawks of ice" (III.64-66). As the speaker continually reminds us, this land

is "large enough to crucify us all" (IV.69); even when you have begun to feel at home, you are constantly made aware of your dislocation, forever reminded that there is a wilderness and power to the land that cannot ever be fully tamed.

While *Cantos North* is, at its heart, about the Northern landscape, its power ultimately comes in the recognition that the North is more than just landscape, insofar as it is anything at all. In the twelfth and final canto, titled "Singing the North Into Love," the speaker comes to recognize that though "[l]atitudes and longitudes run circles round the north," they can never truly "take the measure of this land" (XII.6-9). The speaker, at this late point, reveals that he is the true voice of the North, but we see that in him are embodied several distinct and differentiated voices. He is at once the voice of "Edward the prince whose tongue/ was a cat o' nine tails" flogging his men until they mutineed" (XII.68-70), but also the voice of "Tatanga Mani/ [who] speak[s] for all/ the tribes whose treaties you have broken" (XII.107-108), and that of Uvavuk, whose "tongue can pierce/ the ice circle that holds [his] people" (XII.129-30). He even speaks for the landscape itself: he is "[s]ong of river. Song of bird./ Song of silence/ never heard in the steel and stone/ woods of our cities" (XII.88-91). This North is plural, polyphonic, resistant to reduction.

What the speaker presents at the end of the poem is a kind of unity of life and landscape: unlike much of the previous literature, there is a sense in this poem that the North speaks for itself, not in one unified voice but in many. Perhaps it is for this reason that Sherrill Grace – after taking stock of what seems to be the entire Canadian literary canon – celebrates *Cantos North* as the only Canadian "great epic poem," though she also insists that it is, at its heart, a love poem (267). The speaker – or, rather, the speakers – are at once the heroic navigators of the epic and the sweet-tongued lyric lover. I would argue that this odd pairing is what makes the poem so characteristically and unfailingly Canadian. There is, as Atwood articulated, the sense of struggle, of survival; still, the speaker knows to "praise the north/ where all life converges/ to open out again/ into another mystery" (XII.143-46). One cannot ever be off-guard: a reverence to the landscape must be paid, and even then, there are no guarantees. However, this necessary reverence is also a kind of adoration. In the final stanza, the speaker refers to "my love and my north" (XII.159), a love that is more rewarding for its being borne out of struggle.

Beissel recognizes that the North – our North – is inherently polyphonic, not just in the number of voices that ring out from its heights, but also in the timbre and texture of their utterances. In the final lines, we are hit thrice with the word "between," the speaker's unsubtle attempt to make us see, finally, what he has been showing us all along. The speaker closes the poem with the assertion that he sings "winter/ for forever into spring" (XII.160-1). To be a Canadian, he suggests, is fundamentally about polarities, the greatest of which is that between struggle of metaphorical winter – barrenness, desolation, and threat – and spring – unrelenting, beautiful, and full of potential. You exist in the reality of one, knowing that the other is forever overhead. To live in this country is to always be pulled between two things; the sublimity of the landscape has us stuck in some great and terrible rapture, somewhere between fear and love, struggle and survival.

Works Cited

Atwood, Margaret. *Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature*. Toronto: Anansi, 1972. Print.

Beissel, Henry. *Cantos North*. Moonbeam: Penumbra Press, 1982. Print.

Grace, Sherrill. *Canada and the Idea of North*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002. Print.

"Mother I am": Patriarchal Resistance in "Parturition"

By Lauren Wildgoose

In "Moths and Mothers," Tara Prescott describes the "profound shift" in consciousness that the speaker in "Parturition" achieves through childbirth (Prescott 208). I argue that the "profound shift" the speaker experiences is not merely an enhanced self-awareness, but also an entrance into a state of being that transcends utilitarian functionality to reach a meaningful connection to the universe. Through this transcendence, the speaker actively resists patriarchal definitions of women's potential. Loy includes both the voice of society, with its masculine-oriented thinking, and the female speaker to suggest the possibility of transcendence through childbirth. Her integration of the former perspective represents patriarchal imposition of a definition of womanhood: that of a nature grounded in the realm of the practical and bound to functional, other-oriented aspects of motherhood and femininity. Loy constructs this voice through the use of language associated with the "masculine" fields of math and science, allusions to the divine, and movement depicted through sensory language. Loy's female speaker, on the other hand, describes the process of childbirth as a means of resisting this very definition of feminine potential and thereby achieving transcendent, empowered being, using anaphora and language evoking the cosmic to do so. Thus, through Loy's juxtaposition of the distinct perspectives of women and the patriarchy on childbirth and the nature of femininity, she presents the experience of childbirth as a medium to resist patriarchal society's definition of women's role as utilitarian by enabling them to fulfill their potential as cosmically significant.

Loy's view of childbirth, and its potential for women to achieve a connection to the cosmic order and a transcendent existence, is in part communicated through lineation and language evocative of universal themes. One instance of this strategy appears in the twelfth section. The lines "Mother I am / Identical / With infinite Maternity" offer a double reading, suggesting that the speaker is simultaneously

announcing her new role as a mother (if read as the separate phrase "Mother I am") and addressing her own mother in declaring that she is "Identical / With infinite Maternity" (if read with a break after mother rather than after "I am") (Loy 96-98). These layered meanings suggest a sense of continuation across universal time facilitated by the experience of childbirth and motherhood. The speaker is able to assert herself in her new role as a mother, to reach across generations and connect with her own mother because of her new ascension to the universal order that motherhood has offered her, and to seamlessly fit into the timeless cosmic significance of "infinite Maternity." This message of empowerment through childbirth and motherhood is continued in the following lines, where Loy's characteristically unconventional typography adds significance to the line breaks and to abstract, language contained therein. The words

"Indivisible / Acutely / I am absorbed / Into" (Loy 99-102)

each occupy their own indented line, creating a sense of continuation and ascent that complements the words' connotations of universality and grand scale. This accumulation of ideas ends with "Into," which emphasizes the speaker's entrance to the cosmic order described by the following line: "The was–is–ever–shall–be / Of cosmic reproductivity" (Loy 103-104). This sequence further emphasizes the universal scale of the female potential the speaker achieves by assigning it a sense of persistence through time. Finally, at the end of the section, the phrase "cosmic reproductivity" lends gravity and magnitude to the speaker's new role as child bearer and mother. The term "reproductivity" also connotes a process of universal continuity, of which the speaker is becoming a part, rather than the small-scale, concrete conception of reproduction and motherhood seen from a masculine perspective. Loy's depiction of the speaker's ascension to universal magnitude and connection to forces beyond herself contrasts sharply with the definition of motherhood imagined and enforced by patriarchal society. This tension presents the experience of childbirth as well-situated as a means of resistance to this patriarchal constraint, emphasizing its empowering capacity.

The idea of fulfilling cosmic potential through childbirth and motherhood is further reinforced in the following sections through

anaphora. Both the thirteenth and fourteenth sections begin with the line "Rises from the subconscious" (Loy 105, 111), though the final word is hyphenated ("sub-conscious") in the fourteenth, and the second lines of both sections begin with "Impression of..." (Loy). This repetition emphasizes the idea of the cycle of life the content of the sections evoke. As Prescott points out, the speaker is attempting to "find a possible metaphor for her situation" in the natural world (Prescott 206). In a series of semi-solidified images "ris[ing] from the subconscious," the speaker imagines herself first as a mother cat with her kittens, and then a "small animal carcass" (Loy 112) covered in flies. Her sequential and equal consideration of each image, the first embodying new life, the second stagnant death, is underscored by the repetition of the first line of the section, indicating her acceptance of the full cycle of life. By engaging with the cycle of life and death through this acceptance and through imagining herself as part of that cycle, the speaker inserts herself into the order of the universe. This achievement exemplifies Loy's imagined transcendence of male limitations on femininity to fulfill a cosmically significant potential for being through childbirth.

Loy juxtaposes these descriptions of existential empowerment with the masculine perspective on female potential, thus revealing the oppressive forces women must resist. Her employment of scientific language to discuss the experience of childbirth in "Parturition" represents patriarchal society's attempts to suppress women's connection to forces beyond themselves and thereby to reduce their potential role to concrete, utilitarian functionality. In "Moths and Mothers," Prescott claims that Loy's use of "language of the sciences... and terms from 'masculine' fields of study" empowers by foregrounding female experience in childbirth and by presenting childbirth as an "important phenomenon worthy of serious observation" (Prescott 199). However, I argue that the use of scientific language in a discussion of an experience unique to women in fact imposes a masculine worldview on the female experience and controls women's possibilities for being. Loy's decision to integrate this type of language into her expression of the uniquely female experience of childbirth can be interpreted as a representation of the imposed patriarchal definition of women's role

as strictly utilitarian and without true agency rather than as capable of accessing cosmic significance or the realm of the abstract.

One instance of Loy's use of scientific language occurs in the sixth section: "Pain is no stronger than the resisting force / Pain calls up in me / The struggle is equal" (Loy 23-26). In this sequence, Loy characterizes the speaker's power to combat the overwhelming pain of childbirth as "resisting force," which, as Prescott notes, evokes processes studied in math and science (Loy 23, Prescott 199). This scientific description of the female speaker's experience is combined with a line break that separates this "force" from the speaker, and its sentence construction – "Pain calls up in me" – places the speaker in a passive position instead of giving her agency in summoning that force. Thus, Loy presents the female experience of childbirth, via the language of "masculine" sciences, from a masculine perspective that emphasizes women's passivity and physicality rather than their power to exert "force" or to participate actively in the abstract. Scientific language appears again in the tenth section: "And the ego succeeds in unifying the positive and negative / poles of sensation / Uniting the opposing and resisting forces" (Loy 61-3). This objective description of the speaker's pain at the height of her contractions obscures her inner experience as well as her agency by transposing the sensation into impersonal scientific terms that privilege a traditionally masculine understanding. It also demonstrates the limitation of feminine potential to concrete modes of experience by placing her experience in abstract terms that suggest her exclusion from them. Thus, scientific language serves not as an empowering appropriation of masculine terminology, but also as a way of imitating the attempts at possession and control of women's potential.

Loy's invocation of religious language in the final section similarly suppresses women's connection to and agency in forces greater than themselves to limit their roles to quotidian functionality. With the lines "–Man and woman God made them– / Thank God," Loy places women in the context of divine will and hints at a connection to a greater force (Loy 132-3). However, by expressing this connection in terms of women's practical use to humanity, Loy conveys the notion of women's potential that patriarchal society would have imposed

and perpetuated. The speaker mentions that the words were "heard in a church" (Loy 131), suggesting that they represent institutional, and presumably societal values. After announcing this societal voice, Loy foregrounds women's reproductive usefulness by positioning "woman" as a counterpart to man, depicting women's nature as part of a pairing capable of producing a child. It is this female identity for which the speaker ironically thanks God from a societal perspective in the last line, rather than for women's nature as entities in themselves or as entities capable of transcending utilitarian roles to become part of the cosmic order.

Furthermore, Loy's suggestion of movement through sensory language in the penultimate section further illustrates the patriarchal definition of feminine nature as grounded in the practical and mundane. Prescott interprets the "wom[e]n-of-the-people" to represent the speaker's servants, possibly imagined as nuns, who surround the speaker following her return home after giving birth (Loy 127). She likens their movement to that of religious figures, and suggests that Loy is "emphasizing the difference between the very human servants, and the speaker" (Prescott 207). However, these women could also exemplify a conception of all women from the perspective of patriarchal society that counters the empowered consciousness the speaker describes up until that point in the poem. By depicting women through this lens, Loy demonstrates patriarchal society's suppression of their connection to a heightened existence and their restriction to the realm of the domestic. First of all, their epithet, "woman-of-the-people," conveys a practical nature oriented toward quotidian duties to others rather than one capable of the type of self-discovery the speaker describes achieving through childbirth. Loy's language to depict these figures uses a variety of sensory cues to suggest constrained movement that mirrors the restrictions patriarchal society places on women's possibilities for being. The description of the women "[t]ip-toeing the red pile of the carpet" evokes a visual image of a figure in painstaking motion, an aural impression of silent footsteps, and a tactile impression of feet pressing delicately into the "red pile" (Loy 125). The combination of these sensory images expresses a sense of physical constraint that not only echoes the restricted state of having

a definition of womanhood imposed on them, but also echoes the particular conditions of that definition: being grounded in concrete facts of daily life and domestic duties rather than the empowering aspects of motherhood and femininity. The following line reinforces this impression. The "hushed service" evokes a similar muted aural image to the previous line, which combines with the idea of an other-oriented role to further illustrate the patriarchal limitations on women's nature (Loy 126).

The constrained sensory language in this section contrasts sharply with the language that pervades the rest of the poem and its description of the transformative experience of childbirth. Loy uses verbs like "rises," "races," "exceeding," and "climbing" to create a sense of free, active motion rather than the physical and existential constraint suggested in the second-to-last section. Loy's use of cosmic language, such as "infinitely" and "contents of the universe," also contrasts with the concrete, everyday images used in the second-to-last section like the image of walking across a household floor. This contrast distinguishes the masculine definition of women's role in society from the feminine understanding of women's potential for self-discovery. The servile, timid "woman-of-the-people" who function primarily in the practical world of household duties embody Loy's depiction of the role society imposes on women, which she contrasts to the powerful woman who achieves self-discovery and connection to the universal order.

Loy's attitude in "Parturition" ultimately imagines childbirth and motherhood as an experience that enables women to fulfill their full potential in the universal order. She presents the particular forces that women must transcend to achieve this state of being as the patriarchal imposition of a strictly utilitarian, passive definition of their nature. Her juxtaposition of this definition, communicated through scientific and religious language and sensory depictions of movement, with the feminine definition of their possibilities for being and their fulfillment of them through childbirth, expressed with cosmic language and anaphora, illustrates the nature of the resistance women must undertake by presenting the conditions that necessitate it. This allows the reader to understand why childbirth in particular effectively enables women to engage successfully in this resistance to achieve their maximum potential. In this way, childbirth is depicted as a way of reaching a more meaningful state of being, both in an absolute sense and relative to the limitations society imposes on feminine possibility.

Works Cited

Loy, Mina. "Parturition." *The Lost Lunar Baedeker: Poems of Mina Loy*. Ed. Roger Conover. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997. 4-8. Print.

Prescott, Tara. "Moths and Mothers: Mina Loy's 'Parturition.'" Women's Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 39.3 (2010): 194-214. Print.

"We All Will Be Received": Exploring the Use of Cultural Polyphony in *Graceland*

By Ford Donovan

Paul Simon's 1986 album *Graceland* is an eclectic blend of diverse, seemingly disparate, musical genres and styles. As Simon's music began to slip out of pop culture notoriety in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Simon immersed himself in the musical traditions of South Africa — namely mbube and isicathamiya — to reinvigorate his musical creativity and revive his artistic career. Initially a critical triumph, *Graceland* is Simon's most successful studio album to date, winning the 1987 Grammy Award for 'Album of the Year.' Simon began the project by spending two weeks in Johannesburg recording with local South African musicians, most notably, Ladysmith Black Mambazo. Although the recordings were ultimately finished and mastered in New York City and in London, much of the album's sonic and lyrical content remains firmly rooted in South Africa; indeed, the emergence of the worldbeat genre evinces Graceland's significant influence on popular music. The record is also frequently heralded by critics for the introduction of new styles and approaches to American music (Tangari). Curiously, Simon himself describes his motivations towards recording the record as purely "apolitical" (Vevo). Simon makes explicit that he did not travel to South Africa to "describe the plight and burden" of black South Africans, but rather, to "[make] a really great record with really great musicians." Despite Simon's intentions, the prospect of recording an apolitical album in South Africa during Apartheid was highly improbable.

Though Simon's motives for writing and recording *Graceland* are contradictory — he wanted to make an apolitical record while simultaneously expressing "the indignation [regarding] the sin of apartheid" (Vevo) — he nevertheless produced a popular record that "provided an accessible look into black South African culture" (Greer 52).The ambiguous place that *Graceland* holds in popular

music history asks listeners to question whether a particular piece of art that borrows from other cultures is inherently exploitative. In other words, is cultural appropriation, in this context, a synonym for cultural exploitation? Trinh T. Minh-Ha's essay "Not You/Like You" theoretically supports this essay's primary claim: that art promoting or celebrating cultural difference does not inherently denote cultural exploitation. Ngugi's approach to the 'problem' of language in African literature will be applied to two songs from the record, "Homeless" and the title track "Graceland" to demonstrate how Paul Simon's *Graceland* represents cultural polyphony: the ability of a piece of art to present many different voices equally and simultaneously (Norment).

Paul Simon attempted to posit *Graceland* as proof that cultures separated by geographical space and political boundaries could still commune with one another through artistic expression. Despite the fact that South Africa was stratified into "eleven countries; the white Republic of South Africa and ten black tribal states," the supposed 'world community' did very little to intervene (Hamm 219). During the 1980s, Britain and the United States not only opposed sanctions with imperturbable consistency but went so far as to "relax the [political] pressures which it had previously applied" (Hamm 220), focusing mainly on smaller trade and financial sanctions that earlier administrations had established. Simon arguably tasked himself to make a statement against South African oppression through his art, despite the UN cultural boycott that "prohibited international recording artists from performing in South Africa" (Greer 5). Consequently, *Graceland* received significant cultural and political backlash upon its release. In "Graceland Revisited," Charles Hamm argues that Simon "immersed himself in [South African] culture only to emerge with typically insular Paul Simon lyrics" and that "the exploration of culture and talents of the African musicians... for Simon's own aims" was indeed a signal of cultural exploitation (55). For many, *Graceland* was not a symbol of artistic communion but, rather, a reaffirmation of the Black vs. White binary in South Africa. The Apartheid regime actually used Simon's record as evidence of black "tribal" (Hamm 54) music being distinctly separate from that of white South Africans.

Although many critics have condemned *Graceland* for exploiting South African culture for personal artistic and financial gain, Simon's engagement with cultural 'difference' on the record can be construed as a celebratory act. As Trinh T. Minh-Ha explains, "difference...does not necessarily give rise to separatism" that is, the "apartheid type of difference" (156). Speaking in more general terms, Minh-Ha suggests that we can only evaluate whether or not difference is used as an oppressive measure based on the "context in which an act is carried out" (156). By this reasoning, Simon is not inherently guilty of exploiting South Africa simply by travelling to Johannesburg or by engaging with African musical tradition. Indeed, *Graceland* should be viewed as a re-appropriation of the term 'difference.' More specifically, the album can be heard as a celebration, and reconfiguration, of cultural stereotypes typically used as vehicles of oppression. For example, Minh-Ha writes how "for centuries and centuries, we have been told that primitive mentality belongs to the order of the emotional and the affective" (156); in essence, emotion and affect are traditionally appropriated to identify a passive, primordial, more easily subjugated 'other.' Affect, in other words, has associations with weakness and inferiority. It is notable, then, that several reviews of the album praise the "emotional response" (Denselow n.p.) the songs evoke from the listener. Simon's record, in fact, dismantles the present connection between affect and oppression by celebrating the heterogeneous affective experience of listening to a piece of music, thereby enabling multiple voices to be heard simultaneously. The experience of listening to the album is arguably affective and, as such, it provokes communion between artists and audience. Simon evidently attempts to summon a sense of common, human "feel[ing] and partic-ipati[ion]" (Minh-Ha 157), to present cultural difference as something worth celebrating.

Though the record works on an affective level to acknowledge these cultural differences at once, Simon's 'speaker' on the album assumes a rather contradictory persona. To accommodate both American and South African musical traditions, Simon must assume a hybrid identity as both an American and African performer. In a sense, Simon wishes to place himself as "not quite an insider and not

quite an outsider" (Minh-Ha 157) to juggle two musical traditions simultaneously. Though Simon puts himself at risk of inadvertently speaking on behalf of another culture, he mitigates this risk by recognizing his own subjectivity at work in the album. Simon draws attention to his own observations of the world through personal anecdotes. *Graceland*, then, is Simon's impression of two musical traditions co-existing polyphonically — an artistic recognition that cultural differences cannot be reduced to distinguishing between "outsider and insider" (Minh-Ha 157); rather, they are fluid and a product of an individual artist's subjectivity. Simon's awareness of his role in the "production of meaning" (Minh-Ha 158) on the record — that is, his seeming awareness of the self-reflexivity of representation is evidenced through the album's intimate and personal focus on songs such as "Graceland." Simon does not attempt to reduce an entire culture to a romanticized and simplificatory postcard snapshot — he instead presents his subjective impressions of South Africa as explicitly personal stories. Furthermore, Simon constructs *Graceland* as a case study of the communion that can exist between two distinct artistic cultures. This idea of communion, of cultural polyphony, can be best observed on the tracks "Homeless" and "Graceland."

"Homeless," the seventh song on *Graceland*, is an entirely a cappella recording that uses the South African musical styles of mbube and isicathamiya as primary influences; the song is evidence that musical melody can serve as a culturally polyphonic force by addressing multiple, disparate cultural traditions simultaneously. "Homeless" is primarily sung in Zulu — in fact, Simon's only lyrical contribution is the refrain "we are homeless, homeless/moonlight sleeping on a midnight lake." The rest of the song was written and composed by Ladysmith Black Mambazo band leader Joseph Shabalala, who drew inspiration from the South African choral style of isicathamiya. The style embraces the rhythmic and melodic texture that, according to Greer, can be traced to the "American minstrel show, the Methodist hymn and doo-wop" (84). Indeed, the vocal melodies used on "Homeless" suggest a "sign of a long and irrevocable entanglement of local performance practice and the modern world" (Greer 84). This interpretation of Simon's song suggests that South African and American musical traditions are inherently intertwined. Further solidifying this idea is the use of the mbube choral style on the track, which is "characterized by choral singing in complex, overlapping responsorial patterns" (Greer 106). The style draws from "both South African and foreign influences, combining ideas of European church singing with traditional African choirs" (Greer 15). Emerging out of traditional African vocal patterns of "call and response," "Homeless" establishes a dialectic between African and American musical traditions (Greer 15). Not only a recognition of shared experience, the song is an aural representation of two cultures existing in figurative and literal harmony. "Homeless" refutes critical notions that Simon's engagement with South African musical tradition is culturally voyeuristic or artificial. Sonically, the track works to exemplify the kind of cultural communion and syncretism that Paul Simon sought to achieve with *Graceland* more generally.

"Homeless" is also an example of Simon self-reflexively addressing the problems inherent in linguistic communication when attempting to address multiple cultures at once. Indeed, by featuring Zulu lyrics and South African modalities on the track, "Homeless" epitomizes *Graceland*'s resistance to the reductive presentation of South African culture as merely an "extension of the west" (Ngugi 89). In *The Language of African Literature*, Ngugi states "the choice of language and the use to which language is put is central to a people's definition of themselves in relation to their natural and social environment, indeed in relation to the entire universe" (4). Though English is the dominant language used on the album, the emphasis on Zulu seeks to negate the "destruction or the deliberate undervaluing of... culture" that naturally occurs when one imposes a foreign language on, or establishes a language hierarchy in, a particular culture (Ngugi 16). Thus, Simon and Shabalala's creative choice to emphasize Zulu over English is a move to present South African music authentically. Since language is an inherent "carrier of culture," performing cultural traditions in a language that is closely tied to those traditions allows for the South African musician to speak in his or her own voice (Ngugi 13). Though Simon and Ladysmith Black Mambazo are speaking two distinct languages on "Homeless," their linguistic differences in fact

enable a stronger kind of cultural communion — each culture is allowed to speak for itself, on its own terms.

The title track, "Graceland," exemplifies the album's polyphonic representation of culture from a more lyrical perspective than "Homeless." In a discussion of popular music as poetry, William R. Kenan suggests that "poetry is singing which makes its own music out of the sounds and rhythms of common speech...song lyrics may be poems, too, but they must leave their vocalization and instrumentation at the door when they audition." Indeed, when we close-read "Graceland" as we would a traditional poem, it becomes clear that Simon places emphasis on his own experiences as an author. The line, "I am following the highway through the cradle of the civil war," suggests that Simon is embarking on a personal journey to explore his own country's history of race-based oppression. Instead of speaking in universalities, however, Simon draws attention to his personal experiences and anecdotes; the "[loss of] love" that Simon has experienced in his own life addresses cross-cultural themes such as alienation and exile through his own personal lens.

The lyrical content of "Graceland" articulates a cultural communion and self-reflexivity that calls upon musical memory. In "Graceland," both the lyrical and sonic textures interact to bridge South African and American histories, while establishing an immutable connection and a sense of shared affect. Simon explains that South African-born guitarist Ray Phiri's lead melody on "Graceland" is the product of "his impression of country music from what he remembers from childhood" (Vevo). Indeed, Phiri's memory of country music "contributes to a musical texture common to both American and South African music" (Greer 34), further suggesting a cross-cultural dialectic between musical influences. Thus, the recording process of "Graceland" was one of mutual interpretation of sonic memory on the part of the musicians; the final result is an album that represents two cultural experiences simultaneously.

Although some music critics viewed Paul Simon's *Graceland* as an exploitation of South African music and culture, the arguments presented in this essay have demonstrated that recognizing difference is not necessarily inherently an act of exploitation. In the context of

Simon's record, cultural difference is celebrated — it exists to unite seemingly disparate cultures and histories on the basis of artistic communion. Paul Simon and his South African collaborators Joseph Shabalala and Ray Phiri created a record that is culturally polyphonic: a vivid depiction of two distinct cultures in a call-and-response form of conversation. In creating a work of art that embraces cultural difference for a newly expressive and popular genre of "worldbeat" music, Paul Simon established a channel through which scores of subsequent musicians and artists would work to express and embrace cultural harmony.

Works Cited

Denselow, Robin. "Paul Simon's Graceland: The Acclaim and The Outrage." Review. *Guardian* 19 Apr. 2012: n. pag. 19 Apr. 2012. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.

Greer, Jonathan. *Paul Simon's Graceland and Its Social and Political Statements.* Diss. Baylor U, 2006. N.p.: Baylor UP, 2006. Print.

Hamm, Charles. "Graceland Revisited". *Popular Music* 8.3 (1989): 299–304. Print.

Kenan, William R. "Paul Simon's Graceland: A Close Reading." Richard Ellmann Lecture Series. Emory University, Atlanta. 11 Oct. 2012. Lecture.

Minh-Ha, Trinh T. "Not You/Like You: Post-Colonial Women and the Interlocking Questions of Identity and Difference." (1997): 415-19. Rpt. in *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation and Postcolonial Perspectives.* N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.

Norment, C. "Sound Pools: Cultural Polyphony in Sound and Music." *Journal of Visual Culture* 10.2 (2011): 189-97. Web.

Simon, Paul. *Graceland.* Rec. Aug. 1985. Paul Simon, Roy Halee, 1986. Vinyl recording.

Simon, Paul. "Paul Simon's Graceland." Interview. *Paul Simon Vevo.* N.p., 6 Sept. 2012. Web. 30 Nov. 2015.

Tangari, Joe. "Graceland: 25th Anniversary Edition." *Pitchfork.* Pitchfork, 1 Aug. 2012. Web. 2015. <http://pitchfork.com/reviews/albums/16843-graceland-25th-anniversary-edition/>.

Thiong'o, Ngũgĩ Wa. *Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature.* London: J. Currey, 1986. Print.

Cultural Performance, Magical Bodies, and Encounters with the Other: Analyzing Race in *The Book of John Mandeville* and *The King of Tars*

By David Helps

The concept of race in medieval studies has a complex history in which scholarly arguments have often been bound to their sensitive historical situations. The histories of academic racism have made scholars averse to applying the idea of race to the medieval period. To suggest race was present where it had been assumed absent was tantamount to legitimizing race as a mode of classification. The consequence of this, for medieval studies, has been a rejection of race in research on literature of the period in question. The traditionally dominant school of thought argues race is a purely modern concept, a product of nineteenth- and twentieth-century science and politics.[1] Arguing against this are scholars for whom primordial concepts of race predate modernity.[2]

I argue that to view medieval texts through the lens of race is not anachronistic, at least in the case of England. Two fourteenth--century English texts, *The Book of John Mandeville* and *The King of Tars*, provide a worldview comparable to what we now call race. Each of these texts features encounters with the Other which include examples of difference being both *performed* through cultural rituals, and externally coded in bodily markers of Otherness. The texts' respective narrators racialize characters through placement within theological hierarchies, comparisons to beasts, proto-scientific theories of difference, and observations of magical phenomena surrounding the body.

1 See Ivan Hannaford, *Race: The History of an Idea in the West* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996).

2 For the most contemporary summary of this debate, see Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, "Race," in *A Handbook of Middle English Studies*, ed. Marion Turner. (Malden, MA: WileyBlackwell, 2013), 109-22.

Let us first address the issue of anachronism. As Jeffrey Jerome Cohen points out, the most obvious difficulty in historicizing race is semantic: "Although race is etymologically related to Latin and romance terms denoting descent, the word has no exact medieval equivalent."[3] For this reason, many scholars resist using the term.[4] Consistently, "[r]acist ideologies are associated with the pseudo-scientific theories and taxonomies that arose in the late seventeenth century."[5] Ivan Hannaford agrees: "theories of race...are inventions of modern times and stem from the combined contributions of physical anthropology, the biological and chemical sciences, and various subbranches of history."[6] But to posit 'race' as a product of a certain development in science is to assume that medieval people did not perceive and give meaning to differences between bodies. As an analog, consider other instances of pseudoscientific theory predating actual scientific knowledge. The narrator in *Mandeville* needs no 20th century understanding of geography in order to imagine the shape of the world. Similarly, his use of astrology is long outmoded but does not mean he was not still imagining the universe around him. The people of medieval England lacked the tools of genetic theory, Social Darwinism and eugenics but they hypothesized about the sources and implications of difference nonetheless.

Discussions of race as a modern concept springing from modern intellectual thought are inadequate for my purposes. For Hannaford, Enlightenment-era notions of race are distinguishable from previous concepts of Otherness because "the works of English and German romantics [were] broadly linked to the idea that character, and the psychic and physical expression of it, could be distinguished in the structures and features of the face and expression,"[7] but the texts in question give us reason to revisit such a strict periodization. More in line with these texts' evidence, John Block Friedman argues that in medieval Europe, "color polarities were easily interchanged with moral polarities, and the blackness of immorality contrasted with the whiteness of salvation."[8] Identity has been shaped and manipulated over time, with clear historical breaks difficult to impose without obscuring the identity formation process.

In *The King of Tars*, a sense of race develops out of the text's world of binaries: light and dark, black and white, Christian and Saracen. These distinctions have a utility to them: European-Christian identity is constructed in opposition to what it is not—Saracen. Otherness is by definition and design, a relationship to a normative group.[9] In this Othering arrangement, the 'normal' or 'typical' condition is normal because it is not Other. To a lesser extent, encounters with the Other in *The Book of John Mandeville* are also opportunities for the narrator to situate himself in a strange and at times unsettling universe of diverse peoples and practices.

The King of Tars establishes its bipolar universe from its first lines. The text begins with a war between a "trewe Cristen king" and an "hethen heye lording."[10] Phenotypic otherness buttresses this moral-religious polarity. The king's family's whiteness is emphasized throughout: his wife is "white as fether of swan" and "non feirer woman might ben" found.[11] The king's enemy is a war-mongering "Sarazin"[12] sultan from "Dames."[13] In the Middle Ages, the category of Saracen was not straightforwardly defined, but rather formed at the intersection of culture, religion, geography and bodily difference. The category was composed of several "tangled relationships between 'theological' and 'biological' notions of race in both the premodern and modern eras."[14] Non-Muslims were included as Saracens, suggesting that these constitutive criteria were conflated, or perhaps taken as mutually dependent.[15] That physical and cultural difference was so difficult to separate suggests a category closer to what is contemporarily understood as race.

3 Cohen, "Race," 117.
4 Lampert-Weissig, *Medieval Literature*, 68.
5 Lampert-Weissig, *Medieval Literature*, 68.
6 Hannaford, *Race*, 8.
7 Hannaford, *Race*, 232-3.
8 Friedman, *Monstrous Races*, 64-5.
9 Jesus Montaño, "Sir Gowther: Imagining Race in Late Medieval England," in *Meeting the Foreign in the Middle Ages*, ed. Albrecht Classen. (New York: Routledge, 2002), 118-32.
10 "The King of Tars," *Auchinleck MS (19.2.1)*. National Library of Scotland Digital Collection, Edinburgh, 112.
11 "The King of Tars," 712.
12 "The King of Tars," 43.
13 "The King of Tars," 6.
14 Lampert-Weissig, *Medieval Literature*, 689.
15 Cohen, "Race," 118.

The King of Tars is more obviously a story about moral poles, about righteous Christians and inferior infidels, but only because it involves just two peoples. In *Mandeville*, the fact that the story is told in the first-person, through the perspective of the Mandeville-figure[16] necessitates that every character who enters the story can only exist opposite him, a European Christian. The first references to the Other form an undifferentiated list of lands and peoples, each equally unfamiliar and therefore each equally Other.[17] From Mandeville's perspective, the non-Christian fringes (real and imaginary) are a single curiosity. Specific discussions can be found in the text, but glimpses of the Other are always fleeting, as the traveler-narrator passes through the text's constructed world. By virtue of the text's genre, Otherness becomes homogenized. On the surface, difference seems less polar, but Otherness is essentially a bipolar relationship, and *Mandeville* is no exception.

One thing uniting encounters with the Other in Mandeville is perceived cultural strangeness. The narrator's appraisal of entire peoples often takes the form of situating groups within a theological hierarchy along lines of familiarity to England. He marvels at the peculiar habits of other Christians, but never through a scriptural defence so much as an inability to understand others' culture's. Greeks make their sacramental bread out of sour loaf rather than wheat[18] and their marital rituals are also unusual.[19] The narrator points out that during Lent they hold mass on Saturday instead of Sunday,[20] and have different eating habits which he considers inferior.[21] Mandeville asserts that they are still Christians[22]—what is Other about them then is that their cultural norms do not conform to his. Mandeville continues to draw this conclusion from diverse peoples he encounters and even ones he only hears about, from "Great Chone" to the Amazon.[23]

That Otherness is a cultural observation does not mean it is not racial. Bodies, as mediators of culture, act as sites for the performance of Otherness. Andrew Tyrrell argues the body "is intimate to every aspect of human lives—nothing that humans do can be removed from the intervention of the body."[24] Bodies are both "physical" and "imaginary."[25] That *Mandeville* is a travel narrative also reasserts the body's primacy. As Geraldine Heng observes, "Audiences of travelogues are conditioned...to expect the exotic/erotic," particularly exotic bodies representing the exoticness of the unfamiliar world.[26] The *Mandeville* narrator provides examples of what John Block Friedman elsewhere refers to as "legendary races," made from "fictions and distortions of actual customs."[27] As these scholars argue, Otherness is cultural, but when mediated through perceptions of bodies it takes on connotations of race.

It is worth considering the religious binary in *The King of Tars* in this light, as religion was the central cultural expression of medieval life. The *Tars* binary evolves nearer to one of race, or more accurately, religion *as* race. The king's daughter has a beautiful, pale complexion known throughout the world.[28] Yet the sultan who hopes to marry the princess is repeatedly described in terms of darkcoloured, ugly animals: alternately a "hethen hounde"[29] or "wilde bore."[30] His beastlike appearance is continually associated with his violent and irrational behaviour and religion. Each time he is rebuked by the princess, he lashes out, including ripping out his own hair and beard[31] and

16 Scholars have used different terms and phrases to negotiate the difficult authorial situation of the text. To acknowledge that the text is written as a memoir, and for convenience, I refer to the narrator as John Mandeville. However, the narrator should be treated as a character or at least authorfigure more than the voice of a known, existing author.
17 *The Book of John Mandeville*, TEAMS Middle English Texts, Robbins Library, University of Rochester, 62-6.
18 Mandeville, 249.
19 Mandeville, 254-7.
20 Mandeville, 260-2.
21 Mandeville, 268-71.
22 Mandeville, 234-5.
23 Mandeville, 1476-92; 2792-7.
24 Andrew Tyrrell, "Corpus Saxonum: Early Medieval Bodies and Corporeal Identity," in *Social Identity in Early Medieval Britain*, ed. William O. Frazer and Andrew Tyrrell, (London: Leicester University Press, 2000), 137.
25 Tyrrell, "Corpus Saxonum," 137.
26 Geraldine Heng, "Eye on the World: Mandeville's Pleasure Zones; or, Cartography, Anthropology, and Medieval Travel Romance," in *Empire of Magic: Medieval Romance and the Politics of Cultural Fantasy*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 243.
27 John Block Friedman, *The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 197.
28 "The King of Tars," 19-24.
29 "The King of Tars," 93.
30 "The King of Tars," 97.
31 "The King of Tars," 99-101.

murdering his "serjaunt, squire, clerk, knight, erl and baroun."[32] The narrator also juxtaposes his prayers to the Prophet Mohammed and pagan gods with -his madness.[33] Religion, cultural background and physique coalesce in the characterization of the sultan in a manner not dissimilar from modern racist iconography.

The text suggests, however, that the sultan is not a repulsive exception, but representative of the homogenous Saracen group. The sultan's army of sixty thousand "Sarazzins" is presented as a teeming, barbaric and undifferentiated mass next to the king's army of "mani an hardi knight."[34] These "wilde," sanguinary "houndes" attack "Cristen men" mercilessly.[35] On the eve of her wedding night, the princess dreams of a horde of "an hundred houndes blake" who torment her with barking and try to bite and rape her.[36] Yet her Christian reason prevails: "On Jhesu Crist was alle hir thought;/ Therfore the fendes derd hir nought"[37] and a vision of a white Christ appears and protects her.[38] Jesus Christ's whiteness reoccurs later: his gift is said to be "Hevene liht" and the ability to see his "swete face."[39] Given the earlier characterization of Saracens, the violent dogs of the princess' dream represent the sultan and his men. In fact, dogs often represented heretics in Christian Europe,[40] and in *Sir Gowther*, the titular Saracen is forced to convert to Christianity by eating dogs, causing his armour to change colours from black to white.[41] Even in *Mandeville* savagery and dogs are linked when the narrator comes across people with "houndes hedes" dressed as savages.[42] The thread of dog imagery in *The King of Tars* draws heavily upon a set of symbols for what would contemporarily be called race.

Opposite the Saracens, the princess' whiteness and Christianity are her sources of moral purity and reason. She marries the sultan and convinces him she has converted to Islam to end his war of vengeance against Christendom.[43] Her piety is twofold: she remains covertly faithful to God and also does so to "save Cristen kinde."[44] She makes this decision while "clad all in palle,"[45] and later her white body is given as a sign of her piety.[46] Taken together, the princess suggests whiteness and Christian moral goodness are synonymous. The sultan's hairy, animalistic blackness is the physical, moral and religious inverse. Here again, culture is embodied and prefigures the tropes of modern ideologies of race. *The King of Tars* is thus indicative of a larger process of racializing in the context in which it was written.

The conflation of physical characteristics, moral character, and the ability for reason can be seen in *The Book of John Mandeville* as well. The innumerous descriptions of sensational peoples in the text include people without eyes[47] and tiny men who live off the smell of wild apples.[48] These strange sightings are not distinguished from what must have been equally strange morphological phenomena like the "right black" people of "Ethiope."[49] These peoples, and the places they inhabit, are each fascinating to the narrator. But the text does more than observe an intersection between territorial zone and somatic difference. The Mandeville narrator theorizes about the link between location, morphology and moral character in "Ynde." The men there, he believes, "dwelleth under...Saturne" and "therfore men that dwelleth under hym and that climate haveth no good wyll to mech styryng aboute."[50] The narrator's astrological-climatological understanding of culture is a corollary to later race science. Explicit are all the qualities of concepts of race familiar to a modern reader: the assumption of group homogeneity,[51] a physical distinction between this group and

32 "The King of Tars," 106-8.
33 "The King of Tars," 102, 197-8, 793-8.
34 "The King of Tars," 105-6.
35 "The King of Tars," 169-74.
36 "The King of Tars," 418-23.
37 "The King of Tars," 434-5.
38 "The King of Tars," 446-53.
39 "The King of Tars," 1241.
40 Friedman, *Monstrous Races*, 61.
41 Montaño, "Imagining Race," 126-7.
42 Mandeville, 1854-68.
43 "The King of Tars," 229-31, 243-52.
44 "The King of Tars," 243-52.
45 "The King of Tars," 220-5.
46 "The King of Tars," 457-9.
47 Mandeville, 1890-1.
48 Mandeville, 2639-40.
49 Mandeville, 1496-7.
50 Mandeville, 1546-50.
51 The homogeneity assumption is further evidence by the shifting location of "Ynde": it is associated at various times with northern, eastern and western Asia, and even east Africa. What matters here, as elsewhere in the contradictory depictions of geography, is space rather than place: the world outside the narrator's comfort is all Other. The various places are

one's own group, and the belief that this distinction is based on nature.

In *The King of Tars*, baptism and conversion reinforce the racial polarities established from the poem's beginning. The fact that the princess does not renounce Christianity in her heart has important consequences for the construction of race in *The King of Tars*. The "conversion" is anticlimactic, involving no spiritual or physical change.[52] Not long after her wedding to the Saracen sultan, another major event occurs—the birth of their child:

And when the child was ybore,
Wel sori wimen were therfore,
For lim no hadde it non,
Bot as a rond of flesche yschore
In chaumber it lay hem bifore
Withouten blod and bon.[53]

The child is even stranger than the most extraordinary peoples in *Mandeville*. It is inhuman, lacking all corporeal form which necessary to make it a person. Like the irrational people of "Ynde" in *Mandeville*, the infant lacks basic human qualities: it has neither eyes nor a nose and "lay ded as the stone."[54] Lampert-Weissig connects this scene to a body of various texts which "recount stories of such a union resulting in an offspring somehow monstrous, either as lump-like, freakishly hairy, piebald, or half-animal, a motif with roots in folklore."[55] Remembering that the princess did not convert 'in her heart,' the marriage is one of two opposing faiths and of two people with opposite physical signifiers in the text.

The sultan is not ignorant to such stories, and he immediately attributes the child's lifelessness to his wife's "fals believe."[56] The Sultan places the lump-child on the altar, prays to his gods to "help now in this perile" of immoral cross-cultural reproduction.[57] It does him

collapsed into spatial poles with physical and cultural evidence.
52 "The King of Tars," 478-89.
53 "The King of Tars," 574-80.
54 "The King of Tars," 582-3.
55 Lampert-Weissig, Medieval Literature, 77.
56 "The King of Tars," 591-2.
57 "The King of Tars," 622-33.

no good: "Yete lay the flesche stille so ston."[58] The sultan's religious impotence brings him to the worst of all his violent outbursts.[59] Placed next to the image of day and night which follows,[60] the black-white polarity again becomes associated with moral badness and religious inferiority.

The princess then takes the child to baptize it, "And when that it cristned was/ It hadde liif and lim and fas."[61] The child gains flesh and limbs, and is said to be the fairest in the world[62]—recalling the descriptions of the princess and her mother. Against this, the sultan's religion is said to be not worth the bristle on a pig's back—another comparison to a black animal.[63] The princess follows with a genealogical argument in which religion and culture are inherited, but changeable: the child will not be his until he himself is baptized.[64] The sultan, convinced by this embodied miracle, agrees and rises "when it was light of day" with new white skin, purged of Saracen qualities.[65] "His hide that blac and lothely was/ Al white bicom thurth Godes gras/ And clere withouten blame."[66] "That on Mahoun leved he nought/ For changed was his hewe."[67] Morphological change brings a reversal in behaviour. He becomes pious and saintly in appearance, and uses violence only agaisnt those who refuse to be baptized.[68]

It has been shown that by the fifteenth century, people wondered whether conversion could change the fundamental differences between people.[69] *The King of Tars* is explicitly an example of such wondering. Yet we should not read the text as offering a means of overcoming racial distinctions. Rather, the sultan's racial mobility

58 "The King of Tars," 659-60.
59 "The King of Tars," 637-57.
60 "The King of Tars," 618.
61 "The King of Tars," 769-70.
62 "The King of Tars," 771-7.
63 "The King of Tars," 793-8.
64 "The King of Tars," 808-10.
65 "The King of Tars," 907-9.
66 "The King of Tars," 921-4.
67 "The King of Tars," 937-9.
68 "The King of Tars," 1000-2.
69 David Nirenberg, "Race and the Middle Ages: The Case of Spain and Its Jews," in *Rereading the Black Legend: The Discourses of Religious and Racial Difference in the Renaissance Empires*, ed. Margaret Rich Greer, Walter Mignolo, Maureen Quilligan, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 80.

supports the polarity. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen suggests the lesson is that "polarized worlds may be traversed, but in sudden movements that engender complete metamorphosis rather than difficult hybridities."[70] The text's universe is navigated but never remade.

The fascination which the *Mandeville* narrator has with strange Others is matched in different ways by the narrator and characters of *The King of Tars*. Both texts develop racial systems of classification based on physical, cultural, religious and geographic differences, often conflating one or more of these sources of Otherness. The Other is often alleged to be primitive, compared to animals, said to be without reason, or otherwise devoid of humanity. Yet the elasticity of racial or proto-racial distinctions shows that where these hierarchies and polarities existed, they remained contestable and in a sense, experimental. Thus, at least in these texts, race is made up of "invented signifiers" which are malleable, fluid.[71]

What might be the implications of these characterizations of people and peoples? Geraldine Heng, analyzing *Mandeville* and other medieval travel romances, suggests these stories are always a means of making sense of the world (248). It would follow that, by extension, such texts' Othering conventions contribute to this overall purpose. That is to say, the way exotic peoples are represented is often deliberate, allowing the heterogeneity of the world to be categorized, appraised, and accounted for. In the texts treated here, racialization takes place on the bodies of individuals and on populations' bodies as well. Imagined markers—the colour of one's skin, the clothes one wears, and the God one prays to—do not need to be understood so much as *placed* in a ready-to-use typology of familiar and Other. Both *The King of Tars* and *The Book of John Mandeville* show the ways in which texts are attempts by their authors at 'world-making': formalizing an imagined world out of a real one which is not so easily understood in polarities.

70 Cohen, "Race," 119.
71 Montaño, "Imagining Race," 119.

Works Cited

Cohen, Jeffrey Jerome. "Race." *A Handbook of Middle English Studies.* Ed. Marion Turner. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. 109-22. *Wiley Online Library.* Web.

Friedman, John Block. *The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981. Print.

Hannaford, Ivan. *Race: The History of an Idea in the West.* Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996. Print.

Heng, Geraldine. "Eye on the World: Mandeville's Pleasure Zones; or, Cartography, Anthropology, and Medieval Travel Romance." *Empire of Magic: Medieval Romance and the Politics of Cultural Fantasy.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. 239-306. ProQuest. Web.

Lampert-Weissig, Lisa. *Medieval Literature and Postcolonial Studies.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010. *ProQuest.* Web.

Montaño, Jesus. "Sir Gowther: Imagining Race in Late Medieval England." *Meeting the Foreign in the Middle Ages.* Ed. Albrecht Classen. New York: Routledge, 2002. 118-32. Print.

Nirenberg, David. "Race and the Middle Ages: The Case of Spain and Its Jews." *Rereading the Black Legend: The Discourses of Religious and Racial Difference in the Renaissance Empires.* Ed. Margaret Rich Greer, Walter Mignolo, Maureen Quilligan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 71-87. ProQuest. Web.

"The King of Tars," *Auchinleck MS (19.2.1).* National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh. Web. *The Book of John Mandeville,* TEAMS Middle English Texts, Robbins Library, University of Rochester. Web.

Tyrrell, Andrew. "*Corpus Saxonum*: Early Medieval Bodies and Corporeal Identity." *Social Identity in Early Medieval Britain.* Ed. William O. Frazer and Andrew Tyrrell. London: Leicester University Press, 2000. 137-156. Print.

The More Fool We: Touchstone's Curative Counter-Foolery in Arden and *As You Like It*

By Zain Mian

'How shall we find the concord of this discord?'
-Theseus (*MND*, V.i.60)

For nearly half a millennium, from 1598 to 2015, Shakespeare's Forest of Arden has deceived the critics of his work. By camouflaging itself as an Edenic paradise, Arden fools critics with its faux celebration of "the superiority of life in the country to life in the city and court" (Daley 300). Writing in 1968, Harold Jenkins notes that Arden is a place where 'convenient caves stand ready to receive outlaws, [where] alfresco meals are abundantly provided, with concerts of birds and running brooks' (Jenkins qtd. in Daley 300). As recently as 2004, critics like C.L. Barber have still found in Arden "the traditional contrast of court and country" while others like Ruth Nevo brand it a "locus amoenus"–a space of regeneration and transformation (Barber 6, Nevo 24). Though Arden's reality has since been complicated by critics such as Stuart Daley and Paul Alpers, much pertinent criticism still promotes this convenient understanding of Arden in *As You Like It*. And it is precisely this malaise of misperception that we must remedy.

As with any other ailment, we must first recognise the cause of the affliction. I argue that Arden persists as this positive, "festive place" because of the linguistic tendency of *As You Like It* and its cast (Barber 6). When characters such as Charles, Celia, and Duke Senior speak, their words project a "golden world" image of Arden that contradicts its material reality (I.i.93-97). These characters fail to recognise Arden's inhospitable climate because they are fooled by the forest's superficial similarity to paradise. This verisimilitude to the Edenic ideal arises from Arden's particular spatiotemporal con-

struction. Through its apparent timelessness, spatial uniformity and geographical abstraction, Arden exemplifies Mikhail Bakhtin's idyllic chronotope.[1] This idyllic space-time imbibes the "mere folly" of Orlando and Rosalind's love, and as such Arden affects a sense of the pastoral. Arden exemplifies the pastoral not because it brims with shepherds and lovesick suitors, but rather because it inherits a specific form of the idyllic chronotope, the love-idyll, *which is itself the pastoral.* The intersection of space-time and sentimentality makes Arden feel like Eden, though it is by no means Paradise. This intersection veils the forest's many deficiencies such that characters come to insist upon the goodness of Arden, to focus on the miniscule "jewel" it may contain, whilst ignoring the venomous toad it really is (II.i.13). As these characters consequently then declaim for all the many virtues of Arden, the viewers and critics begin to believe them.

In contrast to this feigning forest and its gullible denizens, however, Touchstone acts as our comic physician for he reveals the fictitiousness of Arden's supposed Edenic qualities. Touchstone's role in *As You Like It* is subtle but pervasive: he deconstructs the pastoral in Arden by introducing time into its timeless chronotope and by drawing attention to the uniformity of its space through his wandering. Touchstone subverts the love-idyll through his insistence on the carnal needs that underscore affectations such as love. In his consistent articulations of fatigue, lust, and hunger, Touchstone reveals Arden's inability to fulfil basic human needs. He compares court and country, and his largely reliable logic serves as an antidote to the folly of love and to Arden's otherwise unabashed pastoralism. By focusing on Touchstone, then, we begin to understand Arden as it really is and not as critics have historically understood it to be.

Most criticism of *As You Like It* recognises the play's overtly linguistic quality. Alpers notes that *As You Like It* is "unmarked by the shapings and energies of plot" (Alpers 121). Alpers's critique finds agreement with Cynthia Marshall, who reads *As You Like It* as "not a heavily plotted" but rather an "extremely conversational" play (Marshall 2). Leo Salingar too finds "there is much reporting of meetings and conversations" and that this reporting and talking intensifies as

1 Bakhtin defines the chronotope as the "intrinsic connectedness between temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature" (Bakhtin 84).

we enter the forest of Arden (293). Here, amidst trees and brooks, characters such as Touchstone and Corin recall pastoral eclogues in their one-on-one discourses. Their discussions are highlighted by the play's own peculiar sparseness of plot, particularly within forest scenes, and as such *As You Like It* foregrounds language in its structure. Like Hamlet of the first few acts, the play focuses on "words, words, words" rather than deeds (*Ham.*II.ii.210).

Shakespeare uses *As You Like It*'s linguistic stress to construct the identity of Arden. This particular identity emerges in the first two acts, when most characters are either still at court or remain otherwise deceived by the superficial appearance of Arden. Indeed, Arden is a locus amoenus, an ideal place, only because of the linguistic construction of its space. When Charles the wrestler introduces us to the forest, he refers to it as the "golden world" (I.i.93-97). This "golden world" conception of Arden recalls from classical mythology a certain space-time characterised by "uncomplicated harmony and happiness" ("Golden World"). Charles's idea of a blithe Arden flourishes in the simple joyousness of the "merry men" to whom he refers (I.i.94). As they supposedly "flock" to the Duke to "fleet the time carelessly," these men embody an innocence and idleness associated with the pastoral landscape (I.i.93-97). The idyllic image of these men, of their cavorting and careless fleeting of time, emerges forcefully from Charles's speech.

Through its use of pastoral imagery, Charles's speech constructs Arden as an ideal and uncomplicated space. But this construction is not rooted in fact. As far as we know, Charles the wrestler has never been to the forest of Arden. In communicating the condition of Arden to Duke Frederick, Charles relies upon the words of others. He does not tell us what he knows to be true from experience but only what "they say" (I.i.93-95). It is crucial that Charles is an outsider, just like us, with no first-hand experience of what Arden really is. Though his speech successfully constructs Arden's utopic identity, it nonetheless communicates only an idea of the forest and not its material reality. This idea emerges from Charles's own assumptions and from what other courtiers have told him, none of whom have likely been to the forest either.

In this regard, Charles's estimation of Arden much resembles Celia's when she calls for a march to "liberty and not to banishment" (I.iii.130). Just as Charles does not know what Arden's landscape holds, Celia too projects an image of Arden without any first-hand knowledge of it. The falsity of Celia's impression emerges when she, Rosalind, and Touchstone enter the forest in Act 2 Scene 4. As Touchstone laments the weariness of his legs and Rosalind wishes to "cry like a woman," Celia's admission that "she cannot go no further" makes the disjunction between the material Arden and its linguistic construction exceedingly clear (II.iv.2-7).

A parallel to this disjunction emerges in Duke Senior's speech at the start of Act 2. Despite being afflicted by the "icy fang/ And churlish chiding of the winter's wind," Duke Senior and his Lords nonetheless find "sermons in stones, and good in everything" (II.i.7-17). Though the afflictions these men suffer are very real and become underscored by the alliterative "churlish chiding" and "winter's wind," they refuse to acknowledge their penurious conditions. Instead, they focus on the little "jewel" in the toad that is both Arden and their fortune (II.i.13-14). The men's words belie a tension between what is felt and what is projected. While the Duke's speech tacitly acknowledges the incredible difficulty that defines his stay in Arden, it nonetheless insists on a redeeming quality that never emerges except in language (which is unreliable, as Celia's example shows) and in the ludicrous conversions of Duke Frederick and Oliver (which beg to be questioned).

The cause of this tension between what the characters feel and what they purport to feel results from the chronotope that characterises the forest of Arden. Bakhtin defines the chronotope as the "intrinsic connectedness between temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature" (Bakhtin 84). This category is essential to understanding why the forest of Arden comes across as an ideal space to both critics and characters despite the abundance of contrary evidence. In my understanding, the forest of Arden exemplifies the "idyllic chronotope" in general and the "love-idyll" in its specific form (Bakhtin 226). In such a formation, time undergoes an "organic fastening-down" to space and cycles of birth and death are erased

as the unity of place "fuses the cradle and grave" (Bakhtin 225). The idyllic chronotope thus stresses an organic timelessness and unity of space, which in the case of Arden is deepened by its geographical abstraction. In essence, because Arden is not a real place but rather an imagined landscape, it becomes easier for the audience to accept it as a largely undifferentiated, and timeless, space. One does not question why this tree is there or that cave here: it is convenient for us to accept that Arden is simply a collection of trees, hedges, and caves that do not need to correspond to any real, physical place.

Arden clearly articulates the spatiotemporal configuration of the idyllic chronotope. Its forest space proves timeless, particularly when compared to that of Frederick's court. The start of *As You Like It* roots the court within standard structures of time: a clear distinction of age permeates the relationship of young Orlando and the older Oliver. This distinction is exacerbated by the courtly primogeniture that creates socio-economic difference between individuals based on the relationship between their births in time. Moreover, Adam's age renders him mostly without a function in the court. He is "an old dog" and for this reason is pushed to the edge of society, near to death (I.i.65). The relative abundance of action in the court reinforces these standard notions of time. Characters such as Rosalind, Oliver and Orlando do not merely talk but actually *do* things in the court such as fight, flee, and plot. Being more than just words, and connected by an innate causal relationship, these structured events that characterise the court invoke a sense of progressive time: Oliver, for example, conspires to have Charles wrestle Orlando. When Orlando defeats Charles, Oliver contrives to kill Orlando. When Orlando discovers this from Adam, he elects to leave for Arden. As cause thus continuously gives way to effect throughout the courtly plot, it informs us of not just the passage but also the *forward movement* of time.

Such forward movement of time is noticeably absent from Arden, however. Jenkins notes that *As You Like It* presents a "dearth not only of big theatrical scenes but of events linked together by the logical intricacies of cause and effect" (Jenkins 41). I argue that this dearth of causal logic erupts only in Arden, where exceptionally evil men such as Oliver and Frederick become wholly good at a moment's

notice, where roaring lions jump out and attack protagonists without any evident cause. In Arden, there is little (if any) logical progression of action. As characters such as Touchstone and Corin and Jaques and Duke Senior emerge to discourse "two at a time" or to sing songs, the space of Arden articulates a particular timelessness (Jenkins 50). Indeed, as Orlando notes, "there is no clock in the forest" (III.ii.267). The action in Arden is thus primarily linguistic and its constitutive events are not connected to one another by any causal logic.

This timelessness of Arden complements the forest's spatial uniformity and geographical abstraction. While Shakespeare clearly delineates courtly space and makes distinctions between its various sub-spaces such as "Oliver's house," the "the Orchard of Oliver de Bois" and more generally "the court of the usurping Frederick," he forsakes the same for Arden. Unlike the court, whose scenes play out amidst varied settings, Arden is rather uniform. Not only does Shakespeare always refer to Arden only as "the forest of Arden," but more often than not he leaves out stage directions altogether. This implies a continuity and uniformity of space that unites and generalises the space of Arden. This uniformity of space, too, is amplified by the abstraction of Arden as a fictional landscape. Though Arden emerges from several real-world sources, it does not exist for us the same way Venice does in *Merchant*, or as Denmark does in *Hamlet*. Because Arden's topography is imaginary and abstract, and because it does not denote any real place where time moves at a predictable pace, the forest readily assimilates uniformity and timelessness into its landscape. As such, Arden's existence as fictional space allows it to better exemplify the characteristics of the idyllic chronotope.

Arden's general characterisation as an idyllic chronotope partly veils the forest's material reality from the play's cast. Surrounded by brooks, trees, and a uniform landscape that consistently evades questions of death, characters like Duke Senior and Amiens struggle to realise they are not in Paradise. They find "good in everything" because everything seems good, at least superficially (II.i.7-17). The uniformity of space and absence of plot recalls the shepherd's life, which is characterised as free and in harmony with nature. Though the forest still hosts evils such as lions and the "icy fang" of winter wind, these evils

fade into the background as Arden continually reasserts its timelessness by erasing any trace of aging and worldly time. Adam's case proves crucial in this regard. Adam's distinctive feature in *As You Like It* is his age: he is alternatingly "an old dog" or a "good old man," but always old, and at "fourscore" Adam only wants to "die well" (II. iii.56-76). Adam is not only old and thus a signifier of worldly temporality but, because he is always near to death, he is also a *memento mori*–a reminder of death. For this reason, Adam appears in only two scenes after entering the forest of Arden, and never returns to the play thereafter. The forest of Arden forces Adam, like all its problems, into the background. There is the sense that Adam has died somewhere along the course of the play, and this interpretation of Adam's absence makes the forest's ignorance of worldly truths much more powerful and perhaps even harrowing.

While Arden's characterisation as idyllic chronotope partly explains its tendency to fool characters into ignoring their immediate grievances, its specific characterisation as a love-idyll exacerbates this condition. In *As You Like It* and other Shakespearean plays, love is "mere folly" (II.vii.181). It is a subversive tool, perhaps even a disease, that distorts the sufferer's perception of not just their beloved but of the entire world around them. In the love-idyll, or pastoral space-time, "life is abstracted into a love that is completely sublimated" (Bakhtin 226). Life in Arden thus assimilates the folly of Shakespearean love into its landscape, affecting characters such as Rosalind, Orlando, Silvius and Phoebe in the process.

Rosalind aptly articulates the condition of love as a form of "madness" (III.ii.346). This madness of love is not simple insanity but rather a form of unreason, the deprivation of logic and of unimpeded perception. Sentimental love pervades the forest of Arden through pairs of country lovers, their interactions, and the resultant discourses on love. Love distorts reality and, by making reality appear as that which it is not, it temporarily uplifts the condition of Arden. The distortive powers of love prove exceedingly clear when Silvius becomes enchanted with Phoebe and Phoebe with Ganymede.[2] From his very introduction of her character, Shakespeare asserts Phoebe's

2 Rosalind dons boy's clothes in the forest of Arden and takes on this name.

plainness. She is "ill-favoured" and "not for all markets" (III.v.60), yet Silvius finds her endearing and sighs "O Phoebe, Phoebe, Phoebe!" with love (II.iv.37). Similarly, even as Ganymede remains standoffish and consistently rebukes her, once Phoebe falls in love she finds Ganymede's every action endearing. Though Ganymede emphatically rejects all her advances, Phoebe still wishes they "chide a year together" (III.v.64). "Sweet youth," she says, "I had rather hear you chide than this man woo" (III.v.65). That Phoebe would rather hear Ganymede's rebuffing than Silvius's wooing implies that she finds even this rebuffing pleasant. Phoebe's love is thus not only blind, but blinding: it prevents her from acknowledging Rosalind's dismissal by making it seem sweeter than it really is. This disingenuousness allows Phoebe to remain unreasonable, sightless and in love, the same way it allows Duke Senior and his men to find the forest life "more sweet/ than that of painted pomp" (II.i.3). Shakespeare himself encourages this connection between amorous and general folly. Indeed, Phoebe insists on Rosalind's continual chiding the same way Duke Senior insists that "sweet are the uses of adversity" (II.i.12), and Rosalind herself resembles Arden for her chiding of Phoebe recalls the "churlish chiding" of the wind from earlier in the play (II.i.12).

By thematically centralising love within his supposedly idyllic Arden, Shakespeare also centralises folly and misperception. The Ardenic mood, characterised by these youngsters in love, fosters ignorance of Arden's tribulations. This focus on Rosalind and Orlando, Silvius and Phoebe thus dilutes our appreciation of the difficulties inherent to Arden's topography. When Orlando is hurt, for example, we ignore how "the lioness had torn some flesh away/ Which all this while had bled" (V.i.144-145). Despite the brutality of this image, we neither focus on nor question the lion in the forest, its immediate dangers, but we lament the fact that Orlando, the lover, has been impeded in his quest of love, that he "cried in fainting upon Rosalind" (V.i.147).

This question of love, particularly when entwined with that of marriage, conceals some of Arden's most bitter truths. The four marriages that conclude *As You Like It* are far from perfect. The play does not "end in true delights" but rather represses misery behind the prominent Rosalind-Orlando relationship (V.iv.184). The marriage between Silvius and Phoebe, for example, is certainly not happy. Throughout *As You Like It*, Phoebe incessantly chastises Silvius for attempting to court her: "Come not thou near me," she says at one point (III.v.33). Phoebe ardently hates Silvius and no word in the play argues the contrary. She only marries him because of what is at best a contrived plot-device: the promise she makes to Rosalind that she "to his love must accord" (V.iv.119). This promise brings Silvius and Phoebe together at the end of *As You Like It*; it does not alter the fact that their relationship is not a happy marriage but one of enforced bondage. Similarly, Celia's relationship with Oliver begs questioning. The pair comes together exceedingly quickly and Shakespeare neglects to explain how this comes to be. We witness only a brief exchange between Celia and Oliver in Act 4 Scene 3, before Oliver announces their engagement a short moment later in Act 5, Scene 2. Before we are even aware of this marriage, Shakespeare asks us to question it when Orlando asks, "Is 't possible that on so little acquaintance you should like her? That, but seeing, you should love her? And loving, woo? And wooing, she should grant? And will you persevere to enjoy her?" (V.ii.1-3).

In this opening speech to Oliver, Orlando articulates our most pressing concerns. He questions not only the immediacy of Oliver and Celia's love but also its legitimacy. The questions Orlando poses are not only pertinent but logical, and it is telling that Oliver's only reply is the plea that Orlando not question him but rather agree to his and Celia's love, so that they both "may enjoy each other" (V.ii.7). As in much of the play, love is an excuse to evade truth and reason. In its fundamental unreason, love skirts explanation because it is the one answer that needs no justification. As such, Oliver's defense of his engagement to Celia through love is apt, because it avoids more profound scrutiny of their decision. This is crucial because much in the play suggests that there is more to Celia and Oliver's relationship than this artifice of love. Indeed, Celia's position becomes increasingly tenuous as the play progresses. Not only does she desert her father to be exiled in the forest with Rosalind, but as the latter becomes increasingly involved with Orlando, Celia becomes estranged from the person that is both her best friend and tacit love interest, as many

critics note. When Celia leaves for the forest of Arden, she wishes to be named "something that hath reference to [her] state" and thus she is "[n]o longer Celia, but Aliena" (I.iii.120). Celia's alienation escalates from this point forward, particularly as she witnesses Rosalind blithely woo Orlando in several scenes hereafter. Celia watches Rosalind misuse their sex in her "love-prate" and is clearly unnerved by her friend's mock-marriage to Orlando (IV.i.167). That Celia "cannot say the words" to validate Rosalind and Orlando's marriage, even in jest, reflects her inability to conceive of a world where Rosalind is not hers alone (IV.i.106). At this point, Celia feels uprooted and unmoored because where she and Rosalind once went "coupled and inseparable" she must now trek alone (I.iii.68). It is telling, then, that Celia clings to the next man she meets, which happens to be Oliver. For Celia, marriage to Oliver not only substitutes for the support and companionship she once received from Rosalind, but the marriage contract guarantees this support. Her marriage is not conditioned by arational love, as Oliver suggests, but it is rather a calculated decision with complex sexual and emotional roots. In suppressing Celia and Phoebe's discontent at the play's end, particularly as Rosalind and Orlando's love is foregrounded, the play creates a false sense of happiness through its projection of love as an inherently inexplicable and all-conquering entity. This function exemplifies the way love works in the love-idyll and the idyllic chronotope: it conceals the blemishes of Arden and the life incumbent there. Love retouches reality to make it more palatable, but in so doing it also renders appearances false. We can no longer trust what characters say or what is ostensibly presented to us, because Arden's spatiotemporal configuration combines with this "quotidian of love" to make these appearances unreliable and markedly more positive than the reality they supposedly represent (III.ii.319-320).

Given this elusiveness of truth, the duplicity of appearance, and the disingenuousness of an entire cast, we wonder whether any character in *As You Like It* proves worthy of trust. In *The Comic Characters of Shakespeare*, John Palmer states, "in most of Shakespeare's comedies there is a character who stands, as it were, at the centre. To get a clear view of the composition of the whole, we must take our position as near and possible beside him." In the case of *As You Like It*, he says, Shakespeare "has named his own Touchstone" (Palmer 35).

Touchstone's role within *As You Like It* is perhaps the play's most perplexing. Critics have long debated whether Touchstone exemplifies a material or natural fool.[3] While there is certainly enough evidence to argue either proposition, the case for Touchstone's material nature proves more valid. Touchstone is not "comically disabled" but cut from a much finer cloth than most Shakespearean fools–particularly naturals such as Launce, from *Two Gentlemen of Verona*, and Lavache, from *All's Well That Ends Well* (Barber 10). What primarily sets Touchstone apart from these fools is his evident self-awareness and the dexterity he demonstrates with language. Indeed, Touchstone is no bumbling Dogberry, the fool in *Much Ado About Nothing* who barely recognises his own speech. Touchstone possesses immense linguistic acumen and uses subtle nuances in meaning to achieve whatever purpose pleases his fancy. Where other fools blunder, Touchstone "discourses" (Bell 22), and this emerges not only in his dissertations on the virtue of "If" but shines particularly in his tête-à-tête with William.

When Touchstone attacks William, he draws a clear distinction between himself and the "clown" in front of him (V.i.9). In calling William a "clown" Touchstone is not being ironic; rather, he recalls the subtle difference between such clowns and courtly fools (or jesters) like himself. As Bell points out, while "the clown is an ignorant rustic" the jester is "a sophisticated courtly performer" (Bell 12). As the two then meet, Touchstone proclaims: "We that have good wits have much to answer for. We shall be flouting. We cannot hold" (V.i.10). This proves true, for the ensuing conversation demonstrates Touchstone's wit and intelligence. What proves most useful for our understanding of him as a material fool emerges in the manner of his discourse with William. As Touchstone dispatches with William, he insults the clown twice over:

3 The distinction between material (or: artificial) and natural fools is drawn largely on the basis of mental faculty. While natural fools are persons suffering from either physical or intellectual disability, material fools only play the role of jesters and are in no such way challenged. Consequently, material fools tend to be depicted as more adept with language and frequently make wise remarks. Natural fools, in comparison, are often depicted as more crass individuals.

> Therefore, you clown, abandon—which is in the vulgar 'leave'—the society—which in the boorish is 'company'—of this female—which in the common is 'woman'; which together is, abandon the society of this female, or, clown, thou perishest; or, to thy better understanding, diest; or, to wit, I kill thee. (V.i.42-47)

In the speech above, Touchstone not only directs William to "tremble and depart" but does so in a manner that consistently underlines William's comparative inferiority (V.i.51). As Touchstone directs William to leave, he translates high-flown words such as "abandon," "society" and "female" into more common ones like 'leave,' 'company' and 'woman.' That Touchstone is able to do this implies that he recognises the nuance between these words. Even though words like "abandon" and 'leave' share a common denotation, Touchstone recognises that each word's connotation reflects the intellect of both speaker and listener, and it is this connotative difference with which he undermines William. That Touchstone is able to do this at all reveals his command over both language and logic–something he also proves in his balanced comparison of courtly and country life in Act 5 Scene 2.

Touchstone is a material fool not only because of his control over language and logic but also because of his self-awareness. As Nevo points out, Touchstone is no "bumbling village constable" but a man that is certain of himself and of his capabilities (Nevo 36). In Act 2 Scene 4, when Touchstone says that "all nature in love [is] mortal in folly," Rosalind tells him that he speaks wiser than he is aware (II. iv.49). To this, Touchstone replies in blithe dismissal: "Nay, I shall ne'er be ware of mine own wit till I break my shins against it" (II. iv.50). Touchstone's remark here is assuredly ironic. He is clearly aware of his wit and holds no qualms about flouting it, as he does with William in Act 5 Scene 1. Not only is Touchstone aware that he is not "Nature's natural" as Celia and Rosalind believe him to be, but he also knows how to play the part of one (I.ii.41). As Bell notes, Touchstone "is able to enter and appreciate the viewpoint he mocks" (Bell 23). This is precisely what he does here, for he pretends to be the standard natural fool, a person that understands only those things that are tangible and immediate, and these too only when they present themselves very obviously. By pretending to be a natural fool, Touchstone proves that he is certainly not one.

Touchstone is also material insofar as his was the first part written specifically for the new actor at the Lord Chamberlain's Men: Robert Armin. This new actor, Armin, was markedly different from his predecessor Will Kemp. Whereas Kemp was a "roustabout" that mostly played "jigger or slapstick" clowns, Armin was a literary critic and, as Bell notes, his fools "display[ed] richer interiority and figure[d] more substantially than Kemp's" did (Bell 21). Indeed, because Armin's style suited the "intellectual type of fool," his fools have proven to be much more "cerebral" than their predecessors (Marshall 5, Bell 21). Touchstone exemplifies such a cerebral fool. If his status seems liminal at all, this may be because he appears at an important moment in Shakespearean history, when the guard of fools is shifting towards the cerebral. Nonetheless, with the arrival of Touchstone and Armin, "foolery moves from the margins to the center" and thus begins to address the necessary questions of Shakespeare's plays (Bell 21).

As a wise fool then, Touchstone is our "guide, counsellor and friend" through *As You Like It* (Palmer 52). He feels and ruminates more than he lets on but nevertheless works in subtle ways to counteract the folly of his fellow characters. That Touchstone does this is evident in the way he attempts to deliver us from the artifice of Arden. Barber notes that Touchstone mediates between the audience and the play. Because Touchstone is "put outside by his special status as a fool" and is a wise fool at that (Barber 10), he is not affected by the superficial appearance of Arden but sees its underlying (and unpleasant) reality. While Barber argues that Touchstone is placed outside the play because he is "comically disabled" and unable to "do anything right" (Barber 10), I argue that Touchstone stands outside the play for the exact opposite reason. Touchstone is no illiterate klutz but a jester *par excellence*. He sees things for what they are, and this insight is why he is able to remain "resistant to Arden and critical of life in it" (Alpers 125). Notably, As You Like It's source text, *Rosalynde* by Thomas Lodge, contains no character like Touchstone. Shakespeare adds him to the play and it behoves us to question why this may be

the case. As Barber notes, *Rosalynde* is a typically pastoral text in which Lodge "treats the idyllic material at face value. He never makes fun of its assumptions but stays safely within the convention" (Barber 10). Touchstone, as I have suggested throughout this essay, questions these pastoral conventions. He deconstructs Arden's artifice and the underlying idyllic chronotope. In so doing Touchstone critiques the pastoral as a form, because it is after the image of this pastoral that Arden casts itself.

Touchstone reworks the idyllic chronotope of Arden primarily by introducing time into this timeless space. In Act 2, Scene 7, Jaques relates his encounter with Touchstone. He quotes the fool saying thus:

> "'Tis but an hour ago since it was nine,
> And after one hour more 'twill be eleven.
> And so from hour to hour we ripe and ripe,
> And then from hour to hour we rot and rot,
> And thereby hangs a tale." (II.vii.24-8)

As Jaques hears Touchstone's "moral on the time," he initially finds the fool to be one of "Nature's naturals" as Celia and Rosalind do (II. vii.29). Jaques finds no solemnity in Touchstone's statement and, afflicted by Arden's own blithe timelessness, laughs at the mock seriousness of the fool's speech. However, as Jaques's lungs begin to "crow like chanticleer," he "laughs sans intermission/ an hour by his dial" (II.vii.32-33). In so doing, Jaques experiences firsthand what Touchstone has seen all along. Jaques realises that though Arden's Edenic form veils this fact, he and the other characters are still rotting, and nothing has really changed. Even as they believe themselves to be in the green world, time has not stopped, it cannot stop, and it will always pull them relentlessly towards oblivion. This fact is precisely why Arden's artifice is so dangerous: it fools characters into believing that nothing is imperative because they have limitless time and they need not do anything of consequence because such things can always be done later. This is precisely why As You Like It becomes, in Arden, plotless: the play's characters have little incentive to do anything aside from converse, sing and play games of love. As Celia says of her new house in Arden, "I like this place/ And willingly could waste my time in it" (II.iv.86-87).

Touchstone, however, realises that time is consistently running out. Any time spent in Arden effectively squanders the life one is given. For this reason, our courtly fool attempts to counteract Arden's faux timelessness wherever he comes across it. Another instance of such blithe ignorance of time comes in Act 5 Scene 3, as Audrey and Touchstone come across several singing pages. These pages sing a typically pastoral tune about "a lover and his lass" (V.iii.14-31). This song is so long and redundant that the *Norton Critical Edition* of *As You Like It* reduces the last three lines of each stanza to an "etc." The pages' song repeats these same three lines in each stanza; and because these stanzas are sestets, at least half the song is redundant–a waste of time. As Touchstone points out, "there was no great matter in the ditty" (V.iii.32-33). The pages' song is also mostly meaningless. It uses both meaningless words and entirely meaningless lines to maintain the rhythm such as "with a hey and ho and hey nonny-no" and "hey ding-a, ding, ding" (V.iii.15-18). Despite having the longest song in the play, the pages say very little. In its form, the pages' song typifies the insouciance of Arden, the way it causes its denizens to "ripe and ripe" and "rot and rot" without being aware of such processes of self-decay (II.vii.26-27). Touchstone, however, does not fall for Arden's tricks but rather sees them for what they are. "I count it but time lost to hear such a foolish song," he says and then proceeds with Audrey to leave (V.iii.35-36). In chastising the song thus, and then leaving its singers, Touchstone emphatically proclaims that he will not take part in such self-foolery. He calls attention to the song's pretensions and makes us aware of its semantic emptiness. In this way, Touchstone alerts us to the meaninglessness of life in Arden and the way it disguises this lack of meaning through its projection of timelessness.

Touchstone ferments the recognition of Arden's artificial temporality. His conversation with Jaques, for example, shows that he provides the impetus for the play's central rumination on time and death: Jaques's "All the world's a stage" speech (II.vii.139-166). In this speech, Jaques spreads Touchstone's message of "how the world wags" to a wider audience (II.vii.23). That this speech occurs in the same scene in which Jaques recounts his experience with Touchstone demonstrates Jaques's indebtedness to Touchstone. By exhorting that

the last scene of "this strange eventful history/ Is second childishness and mere oblivion," Jaques acts as a *memento mori*. Jaques urges Orlando, Duke Senior, and the various other courtiers to make use of their time so that they do not just "ripe and ripe" and "rot and rot" (II.vii.26-27). He and Touchstone thus act together to bring about change in *As You Like It*. The characters' recognition of time means that characters can no longer "fleet the time carelessly, as they did in the golden world" (I.i.96). Rather they begin to feel that they "lose and neglect the creeping hours of time" (II.vii.112). Characters such as Orlando and Duke Senior recognise the falsity of life in Arden as its timeless structure comes undone. This is precisely why, after nearly an entire act of courting Ganymede, the fake Rosalind, Orlando "can no longer live by thinking" (V.ii.42). His urgency to have the real Rosalind marks his recognition of the fleeting nature of time. This recognition becomes partly responsible for the rush of marriages at the end of the play, as characters become eager to finish their business so they may leave Arden for the court.

Much as Touchstone prompts realisation by reworking the temporal configuration of Arden's idyllic chronotope, he undermines its more specific characterisation as a love-idyll. As demonstrated earlier, the atmosphere of love that pervades Arden also promotes folly within it. As a form of "madness," love clouds the individual's perception of their world (III.ii.346). It distorts the external environment and infuses it with a positivity that is unwarranted at best and false at worst. Touchstone counteracts the love-idyll at its very foundation. He finds love not an affection but rather an affectation, one that dresses up the most base and carnal needs of either sex. Through his words and deeds in Arden, Touchstone stresses the rampant carnality that underscores the affectation of love. In so doing, he deconstructs the love-idyll of Arden.

Touchstone's insistence upon lust and not love is most obvious in his relationship with Audrey. In his courting of and even marriage to Audrey, Touchstone does not once claim to be a victim of "the quotidian of love" as nearly all other lovers in the play do (III.ii.319-320). Instead, he and Audrey contrast with the other couples in the play. Indeed, Touchstone makes no illusions as to the reasons behind

his marriage, nor does he nurse any misapprehensions of Audrey's beauty. Introducing Audrey to Duke Senior, Touchstone mentions that she is "an ill-favored thing, sir, but mine own" and that in taking her to be his wife he "take[s] that that no man else will" (V.iv.54-55). Touchstone's ability to perceive Audrey as just another person despite pledging marriage to her puts him in stark contrast against other lovers in the play. While Rosalind, Orlando, Silvius, Phoebe and even Oliver suffer from the "wounds invisible/ love's keen arrows make," Touchstone blocks these arrows with his reason (III.v.30-31). As a material fool, he remains "dryly objective" and attempts to instill this same objectivity into the other characters of *As You Like It* (Barber 10).

Touchstone's feelings for Audrey are "reduced to the lowest common denominator" and remain devoid of sentiment (Barber 13). Still, when Jaques asks him if he will marry, Touchstone responds in the affirmative: "As the ox hath his bow, sir, the horse his curb, and the falcon her bells, so man hath his desires; and as pigeons bill, so wedlock would be nibbling" (III.iii.79). In his reply to Jaques, Touchstone explains that he marries purely because of sexual (and perhaps even animal) desire. For Touchstone, marriage is not the apotheosis of true love but only sanctioned sexual consummation. Indeed, Touchstone does not marry so that he can spend his life with Audrey but only so that they may have intercourse without having to "live in bawdry" (III.iii.76). Few could argue that Touchstone means for this relationship to be permanent. He is himself not eager to be "well married" because if the arrangement is weak he will have "good excuse" to leave Audrey after he becomes tired of her (III.iii.71). In his relationship with Audrey, Touchstone strives to prove that he is not in love. In being truthful to both himself and Audrey, Touchstone taps into the carnal truths that underlie both love and marriage as concepts. His relationship contrasts against those of lovers that "swear in poetry" (III.iii.16). Unlike them, he does not feign, but in his truthfulness he reveals their feigning.

In Act 3, Scene 3 Touchstone proclaims that "the truest poetry is most feigning, and lovers are given to poetry" (III.iii.15-16). In saying this, Touchstone connects both love and loving to feigning and

falsehood. Touchstone seeks to counter the feigning poems and songs of lovers with verse of his own. Not only does Touchstone chastise and repudiate the pages' songs, as noted before, but as he meets Rosalind and Orlando's verse, the interaction becomes much more complex. Orlando's poetry to Rosalind in this regard proves extremely conventional. He plays the part of a typical Petrarchan lover insofar as he cannot help but heap praise onto Rosalind. Orlando mars trees by writing couplets such as "All the pictures fairest lined/ Are but black to Rosalind" and "Let no face be kept in mind/ But the fair Rosalind" (III.ii.83-84, 85-6). When Touchstone hears this folly, just as with William, he "cannot hold" (V.i.10). He says,

> If a hart do lack a hind,
> Let him seek out Rosalind.
> If the cat will after kind,
> So be sure will Rosalind.
> Wintered garments must be lined;
> So must slender Rosalind. (III.ii.89-94)

Touchstone deprives Orlando's verse of sentiment by writing poetry of his own. The complexity of Touchstone's language emerges in the puns he crafts. In his mock poetry, Touchstone once again stresses the sexual and not the amorous. His wordplay with "hart" and "hind" features the fool at his best. By comparing Orlando to a male deer that simply lacks a "hind," Touchstone reduces the supposedly romantic relationship of Orlando and Rosalind to its most base sexual roots. As the heart has historically been a symbol of romantic love, through his aural pun on "heart" and "hart" Touchstone notes how this purely sexual relationship camouflages itself as something more spiritual and deep, such as love itself. Touchstone takes Orlando's comment on the "pictures fairest lined" and consciously perverts it such that it is not the photographs but Rosalind herself that "must be lined" (III. ii.93). At this point Touchstone becomes exceedingly lewd, perhaps unpalatable. He references not only Rosalind's genitalia but also the act of insemination and, in the ensuing shock of his auditors, delivers irrevocably his message of lust and not love as the defining force in Arden.

Touchstone's upending of Orlando's poetry thus demonstrates

a critique of the pastoral genre. Throughout *As You Like It*, songs take on important meaning, particularly because they often reinforce Arden's Edenic identity. Both the pages' song and Orlando's poetry are characteristic elements of the Ardenic space. In the former's disavowal of time through both form and content and the latter's use of conventional love tropes, both songs contribute to the characterisation of Arden as an idyllic chronotope and, more specifically, as a love-idyll. As Touchstone debases love through his deconstruction and eroticisation of pastoral songs and poetry, he also distorts the conventions to which these songs adhere. Through his "sublimely fantastic and ridiculously material" actions, Touchstone deconstructs the Edenic Arden as he moves "from matrimonial vows to bodily imperatives" (Bell 25). Touchstone's consistent references to the phallus (as with "love's prick" [III.ii.100]) reinforce the notion of love as not affection but basic sexual instinct. In the wholeness of his actions, Touchstone undermines the atmosphere of love prevalent in Arden. In so doing, he allows us to recognise the forest's immediate realities more clearly because he makes us critical of the love that both veils reality and acts as an excuse to avoid penetrating the superficial veneer before us.

By deconstructing the artifice that has in the past prevented scholars from critically engaging with Arden in an intelligent manner, Touchstone suffuses reason into As You Like It. Touchstone's reason, briefly understood, manifests in his ability to assess his surroundings logically and with unimpeded mental faculties. It sets him apart from other characters in the play, all of whom suffer from one or more forms of unreason. Touchstone remains "dryly objective" towards Arden and its contents (Barber 10). His reason emerges most obviously in his conversation with Corin in Act 3, Scene 2. In his discussion with Corin the shepherd, Touchstone compares courtly and country life. He declares:

> Truly, shepherd, in respect of itself, it is a good life, but in respect that it is a shepherd's life, it is naught. [...] Now, in respect it is in the fields, it pleaseth me well; but in respect it is not in the court, it is tedious. As is it a spare life, look you, it fits my humour well; but as there is no more plenty in it, it goes much against my stomach. (III.ii.13-21)

Barber notes that here under the "apparent nonsense of self-contradictions, Touchstone mocks the contradictory nature of desires ideally resolved by pastoral life" (Barber 10). While Barber is certainly right in his interpretation of Touchstone's appraisal of Arden, I argue that Touchstone is not being self-contradictory at all; rather, he is exceedingly reasonable. In his speech to Corin, Touchstone denies Arden the exalted image most other characters are fain to give it. But Touchstone's dismissal of Arden as an Edenic space is not abrupt, nor does it erupt from utter whimsy as one might suppose when considering fools. His appraisal involves self-debate and a balancing of thought. Touchstone's mind is not one-sided as those of Rosalind, Celia, and Silvius often prove to be. As a wise fool, Touchstone recognises the forest of Arden for what it is: it has its positives and negatives and these may stem from the same basic facts of its space. Take his comment on the spareness of life in Arden, for instance. In saying that he likes the spareness of life here, Touchstone notes that life in Arden is not as overtly material as that in the court. He sees this as an advantage because this spareness brings man closer to himself and to external nature. However, this same spareness of life, as Touchstone notes, also has "no more plenty in it" than the court does. While it is good for man's soul, it "goes much against [his] stomach." Touchstone's reference to hunger and the stomach recognises that while Ardenic life may bring the characters of *As You Like It* close to nature, it remains unable to fulfil their most basic human needs.

This recognition of hunger is not an anomaly on Touchstone's part but rather feeds off information already present in the play. Arden's inability to fulfil basic human needs is articulated by several characters on several different occasions throughout the play. In Act 2 Scene 6, for instance, Adam says he "can go no further" because he "die[s] for food" and Orlando reiterates the same in Act 2 Scene 7 when he "almost die[s] for food" himself (II.vi.1). Similarly, at another point, Celia too faints "almost to death" for want of food (II.iv.57). Indeed, these statements linking the absence of food in Arden to death suggest the unviability of life in the forest. While they remain somewhat unacknowledged because of their dispersal throughout the text, Touchstone concentrates their implications within his speech. He thus

speaks for other characters in the play, saying directly what they only acknowledge in passing.

In this final appraisal of Arden then, Touchstone reasons better than most characters in *As You Like It*. He weighs Arden's flaws and strengths, and he rejects the notion that Arden is a faultless idyllic space. Touchstone's reasoning about Arden's flaws follows from his deconstruction of the forest's specific space-time. While Arden fools other characters through its use of the idyllic chronotope generally and the love-idyll specifically, Touchstone undermines both of these forms through his words and deeds. As a wise, linguistically-oriented fool, Touchstone counters the forest's assertions of timelessness through his consistent reminders of time and death. He erodes the forest's pretensions concerning love by emphasising the underlying sexual desire through his puns and wordplay. For Touchstone, all assertions of true love in Arden are feigning. While his success in making others realise this may be questionable given the play's euphoric end, there remains no doubt that he at least sees things for what they are. Touchstone is a remover of artifice and a revealer of truth. Whether others acknowledge this truth or not remains up to them. He, at least, like Phidippides, calls us into a circle from afar.[4] As we approach from a distance the words from his lips ring clear: *Ducdame, Ducdame, Ducdame*, he says.

4 Phidippides is the central figure in the story that has inspired the modern-day marathon. He is rumoured to have run from Marathon to Athens to deliver news of the Greek victory against the Persians in the Battle of Marathon.

Works Cited

"Golden World." *The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms*. 3rd ed. 2008. Print.

Alpers, Paul. "What is Pastoral? Mode, Genre and Convention." *Bloom's Modern Critical Interpretations: As You Like It*. Ed. Harold Bloom. New York: Bloom's Literary Criticism, 2004. 121-142. Print.

Bakhtin, M. M. "Forms of Time and of Chronotope in the Novel." *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*. Ed. Michael Holquist. Austin: U of Texas, 1981. 84-258. Print.

Barber, C.L. "The Alliance of Seriousness and Levity in As You Like It." *Bloom's Modern Critical Interpretations: As You Like It*. Ed. Harold Bloom. New York: Bloom's Literary Criticism, 2004. 5-20. Print.

Bell, Robert H. *Shakespeare's Great Stage of Fools*. Chippenham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Print.

Daley, A. Stuart. "The Dispraise of the Country in As You Like It." *Shakespeare Quarterly* 36.3 (1985): 300-14. Print.

Jenkins, Harold. "As You Like It". *Shakespeare Survey*. Volume 8 (1955): 40-51. Print.

Marshall, Cynthia. *As You like It*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2004. Print.

Nevo, Ruth. "Existence in Arden." *Bloom's Modern Critical Interpretations: As You Like It*. Ed. Harold Bloom. New York: Bloom's Literary Criticism, 2004. 21-38. Print.

Palmer, John. *Comic Characters of Shakespeare*. London: Macmillan, 1946. Print.

Salingar, Leo. *Shakespeare and the Traditions of Comedy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974. Print.

Shakespeare, William. *As You Like It: Authoritative Text, Sources and Contexts, Criticism*. Ed. Leah S. Marcus. New York: W.W. Norton, 2012. Print.

Shakespeare, William. *Hamlet*. Ed. Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor. London: Arden Shakespeare, 2006. Print.

The Channel is a McGill University academic journal with literary submissions by the undergraduate students of its Department of English.

Printed and bound in Canada by Rubiks Printing.

The Channel is generously supported by the Arts Undergraduate Society, the Dean of Arts Development Fund, the Department of English Students' Association, the Department of English, and the Students' Society of McGill University.