

This paper explores Clare's problem of unsettledness and displacement through an analysis of how his reiterative, attentive contact with nature works as an entryway to an intersubjective relationship with nature. Living in and writing about both the margins of society and the minutiae of nature, Clare explores the possibility that through detailed knowledge of local nature, processed through poetry – a format that emphasizes rhythm, movement, and vocality – an uncertain and skirting relationship with nature can transform into, or function with, one of belonging. John Barrell, a major Clare critic who helped reinvigorate studies on John Clare with his 1972 book *The Idea of Landscape and the Sense of Place*, became a key component to the development of my argument in his discussions on Clare's sense of place, and I am grateful for having been able to read Clare's poetry over his shoulder. I aim to use past critics' works on Clare in a way that, incidentally, echoes the system of communication within the pre-enclosed community that Clare witnessed disappear. This system exemplifies the circumambulatory nature of communication so that, as I make my way down my own critical pathway, points of interest are signposted, flagging alternate routes, forming an image of criticism not unlike Clare's poetical journey as one that is both sociable and solitary. This paper will begin with a general introduction to Clare's particular attention and how it differs from his predecessors, situating him within a larger poetic and historical context. It will then turn to an analysis of how we can read Clare's poetry as educational and what it means for poetry to be a form of knowledge, looking at language and sound, then rhythm and vocality, and finally, at the relationship of our bodies to nature. This examination uses Clare's nest poems as a basis of analysis. The thesis then shifts to a discussion of community and belonging and how Clare's poems – guiding, attentive, exemplary – can figure for us an open communication and appeal to a common tenderness.

II. Context and Attention

Clare's love for nature local to his village developed from the time and attention he devoted to it, his practice of a conscious, everyday looking. Molly Mahood uses Clare's phrase "a pure unselfish love" from his poem "Childe Harold" to describe his relationship to nature. Clare's "pure unselfish love" partly stems from intimate knowledge of the subject — perhaps because to know so much about the other can be an unselfish act; indeed, that the poet takes time out of his day to crouch and look, whiling away hours and waiting for a bird to appear speaks volumes about his love and dedication. Clare's observations in "Summer Images" (Robinson *MP* III, 153) are a striking example:

I love at early morn from new mown swath
To see the startled frog his rout pursue
& mark while leaping oer the dripping path
His bright sides scatter dew (lines 99-102)

A detailed observation like this would be impossible from a passing glance. That the dew sprinkles off not just the frog's general "body," but his "bright sides," specifically, is more likely an observation that came from a moment of sustained attention and repeated looking. Clare's love is continuous, not an established, finite action, but something that happens in the present moment and will happen again; thus, it reflects the ways of nature around him, the way the frog will jump across the road again because the swath will be mown again and disturb the wildlife. Clare notices the effects of these frequent and continuous motions not just because of his regular exposure to this environment, but because he chooses to look and listen in places others might not. Margaret Grainger fittingly uses a quotation for Clare that originally referenced Edward Thomas: "[his] knowledge of natural history diffused itself through his mind, ... it never hampered the artist in him ... or obscured the poet's vision ... he wrote, not of the rare experience or the unique occasion, but of the everyday happening and of the common life of the open air" (xlvi). Clare's sensitivity to "the common life" transfers the everyday from ignored to elevated.

Clare's attentiveness, which introduces deep and sensitive ways of knowing, originates in his habitual nature — walking the same paths, performing the same tasks — but it could also work vice versa. Does he repeat the action because he loves, or does he love because he repeats the action? On Heraclitus' aphorism "Nature loves to hide," Pierre Hadot in *The Veil of Isis* discusses the use of the Greek word *philei* for love, or the Latin *diligendo*. *Philei*, as used in Heraclitus, denotes love as a habitual kind of love, or "a process that occurs necessarily or frequently." Thus, the wind loves (is accustomed) to blow (7). In this light, perhaps we can understand Clare's acts of attention and motion not just as the root of his love, but as acts of love in themselves. As with many poets of his age, Clare was a prolific walker. "Solitude" (Robinson *EP* II, 339) is full of ways of walking that encourage a Clare-like attention in the reader: "Wether sauntering we proceed," "Wether curious waste an hour, / Pausing oer each tasty flower," "Or as lingering by the streams" (7-15). And with a watchful and practiced eye in "Recollections After an Evening Walk" (327), Clare catalogues all the littlest creatures: the bee, the beetle, the moth, the snail, frog, glowworm, bat, cricket, and mouse. We also hear about the "down headed grass" (line 28) and the "guggles & groans" over the "pebbles & stones" (43-45). Things that usually live in the hedges and rivers, cracks and rafters emerge, unoppressed, coaxed out by the curious and wandering eye and ear of the poet. He does not abstractly love the object of his attentions; he loves to see, notice, to mark, and to know. He loves the process, the action, just as much as the object.

To look, for a moment, at Clare in contrast to his predecessors — poets he sometimes emulated and at other times critiqued — might show where his poetry, and more specifically, the practice of observation in relation to his poetry, departs from those who came before. Viewing Clare against the background of landscape poets sharpens our understanding of what informs his attention to the everyday, namely that his knowledge about nature is the firsthand knowledge of a working-class person rather than the distantly gleaned knowledge of a landowner. Broadly, on the tradition of prospect

poetry as whole, John Barrell writes “the descriptive procedures that [James] Thomson developed ... demanded that the particular objects in the landscape be subdued to our impression of its total design; and this had the effect of making the language of the landscape-description a very general one” (136). While Clare valued and admired the previous tradition of nature – landscape – poetry, he struggled to write comprehensive prospect poetry, as in the vein of his predecessor Thomson, because “he [kept] trying to bring the most distant objects into the sharpest possible focus” (Barrell 140). When writing in a tradition that scans horizons, Clare could not separate his knowledge about nature from his verse, making it hard to paint in broad, prospective strokes and participate in a knowledge of expansive landscapes in which he did not live. To do so, he would need to stand at a remote point, abstracting himself from the landscape – the kind of abstraction enacted by the urban tourist, whose class position preemptively removes them from the land.

To compare, here are several examples of Thomson’s technique that indicate what kind of landscape the tradition was interested in describing and what objects within that landscape were prioritized:

From these the prospect varies. Plains immense
 Lie stretched below, interminable meads
 And vast savannas, where the wandering eye,
 Unfixt, is in a verdant ocean lost... (qtd. in Barrell 30)

And see where surly Winter passes off
 Far to the north, and calls his ruffian blasts:
 His blasts obey, and quit the howling hill,
 The shattered forest, and the ravaged vale;
 While softer gales succeed, at whose kind touch,
 Dissolving snows in livid torrents lost,
 The mountains lift their green heads to the sky... (qtd. in Barrell 33)

We see a pronounced sense of the eye’s tendency to organize the landscape according to the tradition of landscape artists and writers, such as Claude Lorrain and William Gilpin, who pioneered a way of looking at the landscape in which the eye enacts the framing. In Thomson, the eye sweeps the landscape; it is “unfixt,” “wandering,” finding purchase for mere moments before passing onto the next prospect, constructing a vast winding land that is great, intangible, and potentially mutable. Clare’s sonnet “A Scene” is an

example of what Barrell calls one of Clare's "hardest tries" (136) at prospect poetry. He begins:

The landskip's stretching view, that opens wide,
With dribbling brooks, and river's wider floods,
And hills, and vales, and darksome lowering woods,
With grains of varied hues and grasses pied; (qtd. in Barrell 136-137)

Attempting to align himself with the tradition, Clare echoes the language — a “stretching view” that “opens wide” — and tries to enumerate landscape types, picking elements to add up to a whole: “hills, and vales, and darksome lowering woods,” like Thomson's “howling hill, / The shattered forest, and the ravaged vale.” He attempts to use the sweeping gaze of the eye to simultaneously compartmentalize and conflate objects in its view, but for him this view simply cannot stay too distant, and later within the same poem, objects in the landscape, both “far off and near / Approach my sight,” “maidens stript, haymaking too, appear; / And Hodge a-whistling at his fallow plough; / And herdsman hallooing to intruding cow.” Now the landscape is noisy, bustling, and Clare's knowledge and experience of the village community shuffle in, inseparable from his poetry. He skips over the landscape for something more familiar, creating a poem with action and movement where even the brooks and rivers try to spill out of their determined courses. As Clare comes into his own poetic practice, his view draws much closer to the land, giving the impression of an individual walking, moving, pausing within not just a landscape at large, but right in the thick of it. He highlights the by-ways and the hedges, he enters the “darksome lowering woods,” and stops there, listening and looking, not just to the workings of his own mind, but to his immediate surroundings. Clare's knowledge of his habitat and his language for it is naturally more intimate because he does not gaze at Helpston from a prospect. Aware of his proximity to nature, and by walking within the landscape, not above it, listening to the people's hallooing and bawling, he more fully embraces the scope of what his senses can inform him.

Clare accounts for his attention to detail in his awareness of landmarks

and language as something he had since childhood, but the enclosure that Helpston underwent in the 1810s challenges the familiarity he had honed. His insistence on staying local,¹ or perhaps his inability to be anything other than local, puts further pressure on this familiarity. Enclosure was not an efficient, surreptitious process, but instead unfolded over a lengthy period of time; the nineteenth century simply saw the last bout of enclosure laws. For Helpston, The Act of Parliament for the Enclosure of Helpston was passed in 1809 and the work was largely completed by 1816 (Barrell 106). J. M. Neeson neatly summarizes:

Most commoning economies were extinguished by enclosure at some point between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries. The pace of change was uneven. Much of England was still open in 1700; but most of it was enclosed by 1840. Commoners did not always object to enclosure, but often they did. Of the smaller commoners many lost land as well as grazing. They lost a way of life too. In Helpston, wheat and beans still grew after enclosure but they did not grow in open fields. They were fenced in with rails and quickthorn. Enclosure — rightly named — meant the closing of the countryside. (5)

Enclosure shut down a certain way of life, specific community-driven agricultural practices. It was a closing achieved by implementing barriers within a landscape. Barrell details the process of enclosure specifically in Helpston, noting how the “openness and the old uniformity of the fields disappeared together, to be replaced by a very different uniformity; and by its new straight highway to Peterborough, and its new system of land-drainage, Helpston was made a part of the large, flat, fenny area.” Enclosure, then, while separating fields and discontinuing footpaths across those fields, also, contrary to its name, opened the area and exposed the people and land to a larger world. It developed a countryside that could better blend into the surroundings with one cohesive sweep of the eye, a view of land to which Clare’s nature was opposed.

A few years after the end of Helpston’s enclosure, around 1821, Clare became almost solely preoccupied with writing about his village, compelled to write on its particularities that he already knew and loved. At this point,

1. He wrote to his publisher: “I wish I livd nearer you at least I wish London would creep within 20 miles of Helpstone I don’t wish Helpstone to shift its station” (Clare 19).

however, faced with the effects of enclosure, “which sought to de-localise, to take away the individuality of a place” (Barrell 120), he was now hyper-aware of the impermanence of the system he was used to and the fragility of nature at the hands of men. In “Helpstone” (Robinson EP I, 156), published in 1820, he condemns destructive land practices: “Now all laid waste by desolations hand / Whose cursed weapons levels half the land ... Accursed wealth o’er bounding human laws / Of every evil thou remainst the cause ... Thou art the cause that levels every tree / & woods bow down to clear a way for thee” (123-34).

Clare was acutely self-aware, however, and recognized the singularity of his attention to sense of place, right in those key years of his drawing towards Helpston as a source of writing, calling himself out on it: “‘A second thought tells me I am a fool,’ he wrote to John Taylor in 1821, ‘was People all to feel & think as I do the world could not be carried on — a green woud not be Since the threat of loss gives rise to an urgency to preserve specificities of ploughed a tree or bush woud not be cut for firing or furniture & every thing natural and local history, Clare’s compulsion to write about Helpston is partly they found when boys would remain in that state till they dyd’” (qtd. in Adam what establishes his role as a guide, as one who details the nature around him Phillips 210). He understands that for life to go on as usual, indeed, for the so carefully that it becomes educational. It is important to note that as soon as “world” to “be carried on,” destructions must happen — trees need to be cut, we figure Clare’s writing as educational, the question of audience emerges fields need to be ploughed — yet as time wore on the devastating effects of enclosure became more apparent in their erasure of a past way of life, he explored the topic more passionately and explicitly, as he does in “The Mores” (Robinson *MP* II, 347): “Inclosure came and trampled on the grave / Of labours rights & left the poor a slave” (lines 19-20). While the threat of loss did not incite his attention, it did make it keener, into something only the more ripe for poetry, which became a place for him to explore those feelings of loss.

III. Education

and it becomes necessary to distinguish between types of audiences that Clare may or may not have been writing for. When reading his detail-driven poems as educational, it is typically assumed that the audience is an urban one, unfamiliar with Helpston and with the countryside in general.

The language that Clare engages with in his poetry, both dialect words and sound-words, encapsulates one of his key ways of knowing and acts as an access point for readers to be observers in the same way he was, as he forms their perceptions. The nests and flowers and birds that Clare knew and wrote about were specific to his home in Helpston, and thus have to be described in ways that are precise and recognizable, especially to speakers of that community:

as long as he was in Helpston, the knowledge he had was valid, was knowledge: the east was east and the west was west as long as he could recognise them by the landmarks in the parish, and by the simple habit of knowing; the names he knew for the flowers were the right names as long as the flowers were in Helpston. (Barrell 121-122)

Indeed, when not conceding to his editor's changes, Clare defended himself in response to criticism of his lexicon. He wrote to his publisher's partner, James Hessey, "I think vulgar names to the flowers best ..., as I know no others" (qtd. in Barrell 126). His resistance to learning the standardized names of flora and fauna reads like a love-letter to locality; it implies that learning different words for them would change his relationship to the natural world. When he leaves his language unedited, he brings us much closer to the reality, the sights and sounds of his day-to-day life. To help us understand the connection between language and consciousness, Robert Macfarlane's book *Landmarks* (2015) proves helpful. Macfarlane writes about current language losses that impoverish people's understanding and view of the natural world, connecting the loss of specificity in language with a slipping attention to surroundings. In his project, he brings together glossaries of nature-specific vocabulary from across the British Isles that have either gone out of use or are threatening to do so. One of his sources is a Hebridean "Peat Glossary," in which the words differentiate themselves with demanding accuracy:

lèig-chruthaich is ‘quivering bog with water trapped beneath it, and an intact surface,’ whereas *breunloch* is ‘dangerous sinking bog that may be bright green and grassy,’ and *botann* is ‘a hole in the moor, often wet, where an animal might get stuck.’ Other terms are distinctive for their poetry. *Rionnach maoim*, for instance, means ‘the shadows cast on the moorland by clouds moving across the sky on a bright and windy day,’ *Èit* refers to ‘the practice of placing quartz stones in moorland streams so that they would sparkle in the moonlight and thereby attract salmon to them in the late summer and autumn.’ (18)

Macfarlane writes that such linguistic flexibility and precision “is a testimony to the long relationship of labour between the Hebrideans and their land,” and the fact that it makes room for poetic language is significant: “For this is also a language of looking, touching and appreciation – and its development is partly a function of the need to love that which is being done, and done to.” In that sense, the language is both educational and brilliant; it simultaneously instructs and shines on its own, in its sounds. Clare’s language, local and scattered with dialect words, establishes an immediacy to wherever he is in the present moment, whether describing a sound, an action, or the appearance of something. Macfarlane recognizes that the language of a community such as Clare’s develops from attentiveness to the natural world because of their daily proximity to it and their use-based relationship with it. Macfarlane remarks that “once [natural phenomena] go unnamed they go to some degree unseen. Language deficit leads to attention deficit” (24). In knowing the right words to use, or describing things by impression or natural-transcription (“& chirping plaudits fill the chilling shades ... / And twitwit their visions as they rise” (“Helpstone” 36-38), Clare’s attention to the natural landscape is sustained and strung all the way from his experience into the lines of poetry.

Clare’s particular language in describing his surroundings works to both recognize the natural phenomena in Helpston in the way its inhabitants understand it and usher the reader into an intimate space of nature and learning. “The Woodman” (Robinson *EP* II, 287) shows us this:

The squirking² rabbit scarcely leaves her hole
 But rolls in torpid slumbers all the day
 ...
 The hare so frisking timid once and gay
 Hind the dead thistle hurkles³ from the view
 Nor scarecely scard tho in the travellers way
 Tho wafflings⁴ curs and shepherd dogs pursue (46-53)

The poem sounds out the environment it replicates, the unfamiliar words jumping out at us from the page, adding new edges to movements and sounds that sharpen our conception of what the wintery wood is like. Evidently, a waffling dog is not the same as a barking dog. Mahood writes that Clare's love for nature was best expressed through poetry because poetry is a place for "the kind of pleasure that most naturally expresses itself in heightened, connotative, metaphorical language" (135). While this is true of some of Clare's more musing, philosophical poetry, it also seems that when working in his own particular mode, he likes to recreate the presence or sound of something in the most accurate way possible, rather than suggest it through comparison, thus keeping the reader strictly within the bounds of Helpston. In preserving these words, Clare works to resist the universalizing effects of enclosure that sought to "de-localise, to take away the individuality of a place" (Barrell 120) and, because of its specificity, allows us to read his poetry as an educative project.

As seen in the previous paragraph, Clare's poetry does not only incorporate local language, but is also attuned to nature's own language. It is musical, imitative, bordering on onomatopoeic – reminiscent of how some birds are named after their calls (chickadee, cuckoo). "Summer Evening" (Robinson *EPI*, 5), for example, is filled to the brim with twilit motions:

Cooing sits the lonely dove
 Calling home her absent love
 Kirchip Kirchip mong the wheat
 Partridge distant partridge greet
 ...
 Round the pond the martins flirt
 Their snowy breasts bedawbed in dirt. (7-16)

2. Squeaking
 3. Crouches
 4. Barking

We are familiar with the word “cooing” since it is still commonly used, for birds and babies alike, but we less often use “kirchip” in our everyday. Not only is Clare writing in birdsong, but he repeats it and weaves it into the rhythm of the poem, allowing the sounds around him to shape the poem. The first two lines are shaped by: “Cooing,” “lonly,” “dove,” “Calling,” “home,” “love” – round, soft words, with ‘l’s and ‘o’s, drawing out the gentler side of the country’s evensong. The next two lines have “kirchip,” “wheat,” “partridge,” “distant,” “greet,” with sharper ‘i,’ ‘s,’ and ‘t’ sounds, gesturing to a more alert movement of nature, mirroring the haste and alertness that twilight birds sometimes sing with, as if aware of the time-constraint of evening (also perhaps echoing the sharp jitteriness of a partridge call). His language also sometimes denotes motion itself, like “bedawbed,” in which we can almost see the bird on the ground, moving in a quick dipping and rising motion to the rhythm of the word, speckled with dirt like dew. The alternate spellings he uses, like “daubs” (20), instead of, say, “dawb,” are also key because in our reading of variable words, we shape our mouths in ways that align more accurately with the sound or motion of the moment, which adds a somatic layer of immediacy and further strengthens the poem’s sense of place.

By examining his technique of establishing immediacy to place through audio-perception, we can further understand how for Clare, poetry is a way of knowing, moving into a discussion beyond aural awareness and into visual and physical perception. For Clare, writing poetry stemmed from and was, in itself, a physical experience, as we will see through a breakdown of some of his nest poems. Hugh Haughton and Adam Phillips helpfully write that “For Clare, poetry was a form of knowledge – a place where his absolutely particular, but also historically and socially representative, knowledge of place might finally be acknowledged” (16). Perhaps through publication, his knowledge was acknowledged in a larger social context, but I want to look for a moment at why it is important that poetry was the medium for that knowledge to be transferred and why it is so conducive as an outlet

for his noticings. In reference to the larger context of the literary world, Haughton and Phillips write that the issue with Clare in the scene of Romantic poetry is that he was not always taken seriously as a thinker. They write that it seemed as if he was “working at a lesser degree of intellectual intensity and in relative obliviousness of the quasi-philosophical questioning associated with the now-dominant Romantic tradition” (15). This aligns with Keats’ critique of Clare that “the Description too much prevailed over the Sentiment” (qtd. in Barrell 129) – that because he writes so completely about nature, there is no room for further philosophical meditations.

Yet is it exactly because poetry has limited space that makes it so powerful not only for what Clare wants to convey, but how he conveys it. When a reader begins a poem, there is a tacit agreement between the poet and reader that they will immerse themselves in the music of it, the line breaks, the

vocabulary. Poetry differs from prose in that while poetry is intentional in its boundaries, prose has no such measurement; the beginning and end of a line letters and plant species he exchanged with his friends Edmund Tyrell Artis and Joseph Henderson, employees of Clare’s patron, Lord Fitzwilliam, at Milton Hall. In a letter to Clare, Henderson attempts to identify a bird for the precious space of a line. Clare allows the music of the particular play for him, successfully identifies a caterpillar, congratulates Clare on his drawing of itself, unlike his predecessors and contemporaries who did not, despite being figures “who were also interested in natural history”:

His own writings ... set him apart from such poets as Thomson, Goldsmith, Cowper, Crabbe, and Bloomfield, whose incidental study of natural history displayed far less acuteness, range, and curiosity. In this context it is worth noticing that, unlike Cowper whose subtle nose distinguished a peculiar scent in the soil, ‘exactly the scent of amber when it has been rubbed hard, only more potent’, but whose sense of literary propriety prevented him from mentioning this in *The Task*, Clare makes no distinction between what is a fit subject for poetry and what is not. (Grainger xlviii)

it, and also thanks him for the “plants of Elder,” reminding him, “Do not forget to collect some specimens of plants & send me” (xxxix). However, despite these lively discussions and Clare’s extensive botanical reading, a genre that he supported the publication of for a wider, working-class audience (Grainger xlii), he was not comfortable with the rigorous standardization of the system. Perhaps as a result of his troubled relationship with botany and prose, he includes his learned natural knowledge into his poems in ways that other poets may have found awkward.

Poetry allows for the variability of nature to be expansively, delightfully explained in a melding of connotative and denotative qualities. Mahood astutely describes Clare’s revisions as displaying a “botanical exactitude”:

his perceptions sharpened by all the natural-history activity of the interim, he saw that the hawthorn ‘unseals’ rather than ‘uncurls’ its shoots; that the pussy-palm willow is studded, not with ‘golden down’ as he first wrote, but with a ‘golden dust’ of pollen that transforms the appearance of the downy white catkins; that the elm flowers are more accurately described as ‘hop-like pale’ than ‘hop-like green.’ (133)

Clare’s effectiveness, Mahood writes, comes from a mingling of “the exact and the evocative” (133) — noting how the above-quoted poem, “Spring,” with its microscopic technicalities, ends with a recollection of the spring buttercup’s involvement in a children’s fortune-telling game. Yet it does not seem that it is entirely horticultural accuracy that is at stake here. Rather than improving upon description always for more accuracy, Clare sometimes seems to experiment with the endlessly revisable quality of poetry in a way that reflects the minute variability seen in nature, in the changing seasons, in the behavior of animals. The poems show that he strived for precision, but edits like these also indicate an unending search, both for the right words and for the leaves, flowers, or birds themselves — giving him the chance to keep looking again and again. Thus, while the connotative and metaphorical

5. Hills *Herbal* gave me a taste for wild flowers which I lov'd to hunt after ... & on happening to meet with Lees *Botany* secondhand I fell for collecting them into familys but it was a dark system & I abandoned it with a dissatisfaction” (Grainger xliii).

6. This tactic reflects his habitual relationship with nature as one that needs continual revisiting, to hear and see again and again, since there is no way to do justice to an experience (or a poem) except by continual rereading.

freedoms of poetry are highly conducive to writing that constantly seeks to work with the variability of nature, it is also important to remember the helpfulness of the denotative accuracy of his local descriptors, the squirking of rabbits and the waffling of dogs. Because of poetry's particular quality that allows for recording ways of speaking and being in the world specific to certain locales, Clare's poems become educationally generative in their inherent vocality. He minimizes the space between poet and the willing listener, whether local or not, and fills the shoes of the guide, and by contracting that distance, creates a space where readers can experience nature more wholly with their bodies in ways that he experienced, experimenting with a kind of embodied knowledge.

"The Nightingale's Nest" (Robinson *MP* III, 456) is a talkative poem that not only exemplifies how poetry can be a form of knowledge, but also demonstrates the role of the body in that knowledge. As such, it is a prime example of how Clare is able to orchestrate an experience for his readers. An ~~The ability to choose what to say and how to say it is a key skill for the speaker and the reader as~~ ~~five lines into the poem, Clare the poet is speaking to the reader, who is~~ ~~on to look for its nest. The poem has a conversational quality to it, engaging~~ ~~in a back and forth which the rhythm of verse effectively captures for~~ ~~translating the sway of conversation, particularly one held while walking. The~~ ~~poem begins with an invitation to walk, locating the reader and speaker,~~ ~~together: "Up this green wood land ride lets softly rove" (1), then as the two~~ ~~figures move, the poet begins to expound upon his past experience hunting~~ ~~for the bird:~~

There have I hunted like a very boy
 Creeping on hands & knees through matted thorns
 To find her nest & see her feed her young
 & vainly did I many hours employ
 All seemed as hidden as a thought unborn
 & where these crimping fern leaves ramp among
 The hazels under boughs—Ive nestled down
 & watched her while she sung (lines 12-19)

and chatter. The enjambment between “matted thorns” and “To find her nest” makes us work to continue onwards, and the physical distance between the lines gives breathing space for the speaker, finding his words to finish his sentence. The decision to write “crimping fern leaves ramp among / The hazels under boughs” instead of “crimping fern leaves ramp / Among the hazels under boughs,” despite the latter making more syntactical sense, working with the rhythm of the line, adds to the walking rhythmic quality. This structuring allows the specific pairs of words to bounce off the page, like “rove along,” “run among” (which also arises from the quick succession of similar vowels and consonants in the chosen words). The speaker then goes on to marvel in the bird itself until saying,

While nightingales to summers life belongs
& naked trees & winters nipping wrongs
Are strangers to her music and her rest
Her joys are ever green her world is wide
—Hark there she is as usual lets be hush (38-42)

At the end of a line, in the middle of a thought, the bird is spotted and the voice hushed. These kinds of interruptions abound in the poem, making “The Nightingale’s Nest” intensely instructional. After his invitation, he guides the reader, revealing that he has been here before, “this very spot, / Just where that old mans beard all wildly trails / Rude arbours oer the rode & stops the way / & where that child its blue bell flowers hath got” (7-10). Here are our identifiers: old man’s beard and the places that children frequent for bluebells, a neat juxtaposition of old and young, a span of age, yet a continual relatedness to nature — a subtle invocation to community and the passing of knowledge. An incredible narration follows, as if he is guiding us through the motions as we explore, trample, and listen:

— Hark there she is as usual lets be hush
For in this black thorn clump if rightly guest
Her curious house is hidden—part aside
These hazel branches in a gentle way
& stoop right cautious neath the rustling boughs
For we will have another search to day

& hunt this fern strown⁷ thorn clump round & round
 & where this seeded woodgrass idly bows,
 We'll wade right through it is a likely nook
 In such like spots & often on the ground
 Theyll build where rude boys never think to look
 Aye as I live her secret nest is here
 Upon this white thorn stulp⁸ – Ive searched about
 For hours in vain – there put that bramble bye
 Nay trample on its branches and get near. (42-56)

Clare gives us various commands, “Part aside / These hazel branches,” “There put that bramble by,” cautions us to do it “in a gentle way” and even corrects our actions while motivating us: “Nay trample on its branches and get near.” It is clear that we are not the experts in this field; we are the ones who are given directions, being cautioned and assessed. This is indeed the most physically involved of the nest poems, doling out both encouragement and censure, while identifying landmarks that we could use in the future if we ever find ourselves without our knowledgeable host.

There is an evident heightened energy about the poem, a hushed but barely contained excitement, given away by the written vocalizations, like “Hush,” “Hark,” “Aye,” and “There,” blurted out, as if he cannot help himself. Therein is both the immediacy of the joy of observation and the happiness in sharing it, in exclaiming it, and writing it down. Theresa Kelley also identifies this, writing: “Vocality shapes the singularity of this poetic address: its orality, repetition, dialect words and syntax, and punctuation impede or hasten the speaking voice” (127). Thus, both through the words themselves and their delivery, Clare includes the readers in the process of discovery, and this inclusion is successful because of the emphasis on the poem’s conversational elasticity; he maximizes the quality of verse to serve an educative purpose. Clare’s distribution of the metrical beats once again allows those beats to echo the sounds of the environment and speeds up the reading, adding a level of urgency, fitting for a hunting call. In the line “& stoop right cautious neath the rustling boughs,” the beats land on “stoop,” the first half of “cautious,” “neath,” and the first syllable of “rustling,” emphasizing the sharp “st” sounds

and even leaning into the “sh” sound in “cautious,” making us quite the rustling readers and walkers, spurring on the need for gentleness. The repetition and emphases in “& hunt this fern strown thorn clump round & round” also serve the same purpose, although perhaps this time the words stand for a hushing, a whispering, since the metrical beats land on “hunt,” “fern,” thorn,” and “round,” touching on soft “h,” “th,” and “r” sounds. This rhythm, in combination with his vocalizations and instruction is mimetic and has a transportive quality in imitating not just the sounds of the forest, but the sounds of the humans – their breath, their trampling, their hurrying and tripping.

To add to this nervous energy, the search for the bird is a long one, and for a large portion of the poem it is unclear whether or not we have found the nest, either. At the “Hark,” our attention is brought from our guide’s musings on the nightingale’s joys down to the ground, continuing our search, but then the poet-guide throws uncertainty into the mix with his “if rightly guest.” This leads us to understand that while our guide has a fair knowledge of the area and habitat of the nightingale, where he has “heard her many a merry year,” nature still retains its variabilities and we must use our attentive faculties and guess work – extending the mind to other potentialities and conclusive thinking – to find our quarry. Once Clare revives or extends our attention, renews our focus from search for the bird to the nest, he says “For we will have another search to day,” and continues in the same earlier vein of half guess-work: “We’ll wade right through it is a likely nook: / In such like spots & often on the ground, / Theyll build.” In these lines, Clare orchestrates a simultaneous use of former knowledge based on habit, experience, and careful attention as well as a fraction, or perhaps more, of guess work. This inherent variability in nature further excites the seekers and the poet – it brings the energy to a constant state of visual expectation (although only partially satisfied). Throughout the reading process, we feel our eyes searching the poem as if searching the ground, attempting to distinguish between the foliage, battling through the thorny “fern strewn thorn clump,” over which our mouths or feet might stumble.

We know that the seekers find the nest after all this searching because the poet writes that the nervous nightingale stops singing due to their proximity to the nest: “& now near / Her nest she sudden stops—as choaking fear / That might betray her home.” As a result, the poet comforts the bird and assures her that we will not disturb it: “so even now / We’ll leave it as we found it—safetys guard / Of pathless solitudes shall keep it still” (59-63). Yet even then, after the poet’s verbal assurances to the bird (which mean nothing to it), Clare detains our attention for a moment longer, for one last lesson in identification, and details the outfitting of the nest — “dead oaken leaves / Are placed without & velvet moss within / & little scraps of grass — & scant & spare / Of what scarce seem materials down & hair” (78-81) — so despite not reaching the nest and poking around in it, Clare still provides sufficient identificatory information. He does this however, not out of any overt penchant for expositing didactic content through verse, but rather because: “How curious is the nest” (76). Mahood refers to “a hairspring balance between delight and apprehension” (141), which we can see here. He just cannot help but stay a while longer to admire and adjust his perception of the nightingale’s little home, despite knowing that our presence not only disturbs the nightingale, but may put it in danger by drawing attention to it.

Clare retains a balance between a kind of pedantry in these poems in his directions to the reader and a simultaneous innocence in his impulsive exploration and description, adding to the poem, lengthening it, instead of sharpening his descriptions through shortening. With the same eager energy which our eyes search for the bird and the nest as we read the poem, the poet corrects himself about the eggs: “of deadened green or rather olive brown” (90). This in-the-moment qualification shows that his tendency for exactness (or his search for it) is so strong that he corrects himself within the poem, not as a post-walk or writing edit, as if there is no time to edit and revise. More than that, however, since he includes the self-editing process in the poem, it seems that the importance of it is not that you, the observer, walker, writer, etc., find the objectively correct way to identify an egg or a bird (such that a

book of botany might provide), but that the excitement in partaking in these moments of identification leads the participant to self-correct, to constantly seek the better, more accurate word – a process that will keep him close to his surrounding nature and paying attention.

This entire sequence and transfer of knowledge, however, comes off as rather precarious – precarious because we do not, ourselves, see the bird; we are not given a description of her in real time, but only one from his past visits. To add to that, the bird is restless and scared, and when we do hear about the nest in detail, it is only after we have agreed to leave. The poem is exciting and simultaneously indicative of the difficulties of having a clumsy human body in nature – yet that does not prevent Clare’s intense curiosity, perhaps because our tricky physicality comes hand-in-hand with the joys of a sensory experience in nature. Either way, while it is a precarious transmission of learned technique and identifiers, it is one that is spurred by love and curiosity, by embodied, sensory contact. The variability of nature and its temperamentality is not shunned, but given to be understood and worked with.

In “The Nightingale’s Nest” Clare uses elements of vocality – address, rhythm, sound – to mimetically orchestrate a physically involved experience in nature. The educational quality of Clare’s poems, however, is not only vocally instructive and physically involved, but it also teaches us to use nature to measure and to think of our bodies in relation to the natural world around us, sometimes using them as instruments of learning in their own right. This teaching approach calls for a greater awareness of our surroundings and hopes to make the process of developing that awareness easier by using our bodies – something we always have access to – as a point of reference. In the poems on the pettichap and yellowhammer’s nests, he goes a few steps beyond identifying a location or a nest for us, like he did with the nightingale, but once we are situated in the now-familiar Clare crouch, he encourages us to think of ourselves as part of the very nature we observe. This shift in some of his poetry is significant in his educational effort because it allows the

reader an additional liberty in which our bodies become key players in the experience — in other words, we are allowed to touch (or perhaps imagine touching) and are encouraged to imagine ourselves part of the natural community we observe.

In “The Pettichaps Nest” (Robinson *MP* III, 517), although the nest is spotted by accident, Clare reminds us of our physical presence and, establishing a relationship between ourselves and the nest, gives us an accessible way to identify and aggregate information about the natural world: through our very fingers. Clare writes that the pettichap’s nest is “Hard to discover — that snug entrance wins / Scarcely admitting e’en two fingers in” (20-21). With this description, he prompts us to think of our own two fingers, the size of them, drawing us into the moment with him. Anyone reading the poem can look down at their own hand and immediately understand the scale of the object. Clare helps us understand the scale of it even further by observing the contents: “& full of eggs scarce bigger e’en then peas / Heres one most delicate with spots as small as dust — & of a faint and pinky red” (24-26). Once we have entered this natural realm, so different from ours, and understood the size of it, we can imaginatively inhabit the physical space. Clare situates us very closely to the nest. He says it is “Built like an oven” (19), with only a hole, yet he describes the interior intimately enough, and we can imagine him on his knees, peeking right inside: “& lined with feathers warm as silken stole / & soft as seats of down for painless ease” (22-23). When Clare invites us to leave the peaceful scene and wish the inhabitants well, he does not miss a chance to remind us of the risks that the eggs face: “they are left to many dangers ways / When green grass hoppers jump might break the shells” (29-30). Since Clare has situated us so closely to the tiny home and delicate softness of it, line 30 now accomplishes two things: the grasshopper’s jumps become an immense and terrible force, and we are led to feel that perhaps we are the intruding, offending insect. The following line — “While lowing oxen pass them morn & night” — does not help our case, since only earlier in the poem, we trampled our own way past the nest, like oxen, “& you & I / Had

surely passed it in our walk today” (9-10), scaring the bird and making it flit up. In the poem, after Clare describes the nest, we seem to stand on our feet again, looking at the hedgerow and the bird there, but for a moment, our involvement with the nest went beyond mere observation.

We see this technique again in “The Yellowhammer’s Nest” (Robinson *MP* III, 515) which physically transforms us and appeals to our sympathies. He writes, “Let us stoop / And seek its nest — the brook we need not dread / tis scarcely deep enough a bee to drown” (3-5). We stoop down once again, and, amusingly, are assured that we are not in any danger from the babbling brook. “Dread” is a strong response to a brook, but perhaps not so if we were about the size of a bee; in Clare’s assurance of safety, however, our bee-form is more fully inhabited. Once we are on the ground, our eyes levelled with the flowers and the reeds, the delicacy of the eggs and the dangers of the brook become pressing concerns. While lying low, Clare then invites us to imagine how our newly embodied grasshopper weight could crush these eggs and by imagining so, more generously realise how precious they are. By understanding their fragility, we too could come to know a “pure unselfish love” (“Childe Harold,” 43) that attempts to understand the stakes that birds (and bees) live with day-to-day.

Clare also noticeably uses points of reference that are instantly relatable to almost anyone, but perhaps particularly a person who has grown up in a natural environment, simultaneously appealing to both his own community and the one outside of Helpston. Generally, his units of measurement are simple and universal because they tend to be either his own body or objects that surround him: peas, a bee, an apron.⁹ Perhaps he is more comfortable with these references because unlike poet and naturalist J.F.M. Dovaston (1782-1854), “with his nesting boxes and ornithotrophe, Clare devised no special equipment and conducted few experiments. He did not possess a microscope or field-glasses; there is no evidence of his use of a simple magnifying glass” (Grainger xliii). Whatever Clare’s reasons for abstaining from such scientific implements, despite them being used and praised by his

9. “They make a nest so large in woods remote / Would fill a womans apron with the sprotes” (“The Puddock’s Nest,” Robinson *MP* V, 367).

contemporaries, his approach to the world remains accessible to those who have no access to such instruments.

The teaching in his poetry moves beyond both prosaic didacticism and fanciful poetics, leaping into and striving towards an almost literal incorporation of oneself into the natural world, a forming of the body so that it may better understand the implications of being part of a system that is interdependent and full of risks as well as beauty. Raymond Williams writes that the guiding principle in Clare's poetry is "of wonder at the life which pulses through each entity, an awareness of the dangers it faces, and an intense desire to write about it before it is lost" (215). I believe that this wonder at pulsing life extends beyond the objects we observe in non-human nature, but to ourselves, as well, and Clare's ability to talk about nature as related to our bodies and lives pulls forward that wonder. Importantly, however, that wonder is also a double-edged sword when paired with his ecological knowledge because he cannot allow himself to get lost in the wonder, but must remain, as quoted earlier, in "a hairspring balance between delight and apprehension" (141), particularly of the dangers to which living beings are subject. Thus, Clare's moments of "We'll leave it as we found it" ("The Nightingale's Nest")¹⁰ always pull us back to the stark differences between ourselves and the subject, whether that is the bird, the nest, the tree — in short, the entity at risk of disappearing. Our presence poses a risk to it if we stay too long, either by bringing too much attention to it so that it is endangered or by damaging it ourselves. Throughout these physically-involved poems there is an underlying thread of tension, as if we are on a timer. Thus, while we become so engaged in the world at our feet that we are almost part of the nature we observe, as if attempting the ultimate communing with nature, we are always reminded of the line between the human community and the natural community in that while we enjoy observing their ways of being, we are also aware of and respect their vulnerabilities. Harm to their environment can, in turn, affect our human vulnerabilities and harm our environments.

10. Also see: "We'll let them be and safety guard them well" ("The Pettichap's Nest").

however, faced with the effects of enclosure, “which sought to de-localise, to take away the individuality of a place” (Barrell 120), he was now hyper-aware of the impermanence of the system he was used to and the fragility of nature at the hands of men. In “Helpstone” (Robinson EP I, 156), published in 1820, he condemns destructive land practices: “Now all laid waste by desolations hand / Whose cursed weapons levels half the land ... Accursed wealth o’er bounding human laws / Of every evil thou remainst the cause ... Thou art the cause that levels every tree / & woods bow down to clear a way for thee” (123-34).

Clare was acutely self-aware, however, and recognized the singularity of his attention to sense of place, right in those key years of his drawing towards Helpston as a source of writing, calling himself out on it: “‘A second thought tells me I am a fool,’ he wrote to John Taylor in 1821, ‘was People all to feel & think as I do the world could not be carried on — a green woud not be ploughed a tree or bush woud not be cut for firing or furniture & every thing nature itself since the closer he gets to nature, the more he understands the they found when boys would remain in that state till they dyd’” (qtd. in Adam Phillips 210). He understands that for life to go on as usual, indeed, for the them be, oscillating between the two worlds he inhabits. On the other hand, “world” to “be carried on,” destructions must happen — trees need to be cut, it is possible that to totally belong in a community is exactly that distancing, fields need to be ploughed — yet as time wore on the devastating effects of enclosure became more apparent in their erasure of a past way of life, he explored the topic more passionately and explicitly, as he does in “The Mores” (Robinson *MP* II, 347): “Inclosure came and trampled on the grave / Of labours rights & left the poor a slave” (lines 19-20). While the threat of loss did not incite his attention, it did make it keener, into something only the more ripe for poetry, which became a place for him to explore those feelings of loss.

IV. Community and Belonging

or rather, knowing when he needs to distance himself (knowing, for example, that the nightingale ceasing its song is a symptom of its alarm). To be constantly stopping and starting, checking, redirecting oneself, is something that can transform into a type of belonging because to coexist with other living beings is to be aware of their vulnerabilities, requiring a level of caution that he exemplifies. This behaviour is the mark of one who has lived a long time amongst these other creatures.

If we understand his oscillating as belonging, this figures Clare's watchful response to nature as a positive thing, but I also want to explore for a moment how this can appear as a problem in his social life. Within the larger human community, this oscillation can be presented as an unsettledness, shading the otherwise positive experience of being intimately connected with nature. In Clare's "intense desire to write about [nature] before it is lost" (Williams), paired with his instinctive, impulsive observation, the observer becomes the observed. Anne-Lise François instructively pointed out to me that "As the so-called last of the 'peasant poets,' Clare has been the object of a certain kind of ethnographic attention. He is consumed — especially in his 1820 volume — as a kind of curiosity or exceptional phenomenon by middle class urban readers whose gaze risks objectifying him as some kind of trapped animal." This is what is so significant about reading his poetry as an educative project, because once he establishes himself within his poems as the learned one who guides the reader — the reader who, at least within the poems with a second figure, we assume is not from Helpston — then he becomes the ethnographer himself, teaching the city-dweller not only to identify, but also how to approach nature carefully, how to gently and minimally handle it. To take on this role, however, exposes both Clare and the nature he wants to preserve to the public eye. To make something public adds an element of danger, as that object is then subject to appropriation and exploitation. Perhaps Clare tries to minimize this by being discreet in his exposing of nature by only occasionally inviting just one guest at a time in his poems, as if saying "I will show you, but not everyone," but of course, despite this, his poems are available to the general reading public. Adam Phillips

touches on Clare's exposure, noting that: "Publishing poems is an invitation to strangers; and especially if by doing so one enters a literature culture from a largely oral culture. For Clare, wider circulation meant less room for himself" (208). Apparently, when faced with the realities of being a public figure, he could feel stifled, as when an admirer from London visited and he found he had "little or nothing to say for I always had a natural depression of spirits in the presence of strangers that took from me all power of freedom or familiarity & made me dull & silent" (qtd. in Phillips 208). How then, can we compromise his instinctive noticing, loving, and writing that results in educational published poetry which brings the world to him — either to observe him as some sort of anomaly or to try to relate to nature as he did — with his discomfort in exposure? Vinciane Despret, in *Living as a Bird* (trans. Helen Morrison), can perhaps aid us in answering this problem by looking to nature itself:

Birds have the advantage of a much greater mobility and are capable of flying over their territory rapidly from one point to another, which is not the case for mammals, particularly since the latter seek to remain hidden. The problem of movement in space — the ability, or inability, to be everywhere at once — and that of needing to be seen or to remain hidden have been resolved in each case through a different relationship between presence and time. Birds, with their songs and displays, are in a regime of physical presence, whereas mammals, with their marking activities, have adopted a regime of historical presence. The tracks left behind by a mammal continue to be effective over a relatively long period of time (in relation to the actual presence at the site), with the animal seemingly present everywhere at the same time even though in fact any actual presence occurred some while previously." (24-25)

The bird sings wanting to declare itself, to be heard but not exposed or endangered, in the same way that Clare wants to show but not expose — a careful showing that hopes to preserve and allow for a reshowing, since it is that repeated, habitual viewing that instills love. Clare, a mammal without the ability to fly away from hostile presences, in an effort to alleviate himself from the heavy historical presence of a mammal's tracks, sings and circulates in

11. Anne-Lise Francois translates "the problem of movement" as "the problem of circulation" in an unofficial translation, which calls to mind the repetitive flight of the sand martin discussed in the following pages.

space, poetry generating the possibility for him “to be or not be everywhere,” to create a mixture of actual and historical presence. To be simultaneously in one place, seemingly settled and connected, yet also everywhere, consumed by a reading public, brings us back once more to an oscillation, a stopping and starting – a constantly alert attention that both does and does not seem to find a place to rest – and Phillip’s words perhaps ring true in a new way, that for Clare, “wider circulation meant less room for himself” (208).

I want to look for a moment at what exactly this marginal existence means, however, and how Clare looks to nature for belonging, introducing the possibility of a natural community replacing a human one. To talk about nature as community means that his identity, as formed by community, is tied to his intense knowledge about it. In a cyclical way, then, by identifying other living beings around him, he identifies himself, and that is what is at stake in his accuracy. As if in a final way of knowing, Clare seems to yearn for a reciprocal knowing and recognition of identity. Keegan aids us in this analysis by identifying the span of the power of his phrase “I love” with which he so often starts poems. She writes that by doing this, his poetry “substitutes an intersubjective relation of love for the objectifying relationship of the gaze” and “disrupts the conventional hierarchy of active human seer and passive natural seen” (160). Keegan claims that by writing his love so explicitly into his poetry, stating it overtly at the beginning of most of his poems, it does not fall to the wayside but is put front and center, and in this way, Clare turns the object of his attention into an active, loving subject. The connection between his “pure unselfish love” and his deep knowing becomes relevant here again – the relation between the two being that it is an act of love to invest time and energy to intimately know the other.

We can see this relationship in action in his personal prose writing. In his *Autobiography*, Clare writes that when he wandered into neighboring fields he “imagind that the world’s end was at the orizon” (qtd. in Williams 90). With this image in mind, he sets off: “So I eagerly wandered on & rambled along the furze the whole day till I got out of my knowledge when

the very wild flowers seemd to forget me.” Barrell writes that the wildflowers forgetting Clare indicates that he was not only separated from “the place he was familiar with,” but “out of everything [he] knew” (121), including the flora. In other words, he experiences a total alienation from subjects that he could recognize and talk about, and thus, feels forgotten and unknown himself. Clare’s insistence that the flowers themselves could not remember him implies a reciprocal relationship in the love and knowledge that he projects. He engages in a relationship more profound than the one-sided knowledge of a placid observer, one that extends beyond the ability to correctly identify plants and move on, because for him, an inherent aspect of identification is to recognize the identity, the character of the flower.

The poem “The Fate of Genius” tells us of a boy who sounds awfully like Clare, who, as he “rambl’d in each peaceful round / Hed fancy friends in every thing he found / Muttering to cattle – aye & even flowers” (Robinson *EP* II, 668). When Keegan uses the word “intersubjective” to describe the loving relationship, she seems to mean that there are two conscious minds at work. Clare, when “got out” of his knowledge, is only able to talk about the unrecognizable wildflowers in a vague way as “wild flowers,” without any specificities. Mahood points to a valuable moment in Clare’s poem “The daisy wan the primrose pale” that illuminates the communicative, identity-forming relationship between Clare and his flowers. Describing how Clare’s colour-based identifications for flowers “record the poet-botanist’s act of recognition: ‘ah, there you are,’” she writes that “this is only half the story. There is a response, ‘here I am’, that arises from Clare’s associative form of perception. Flowers ‘sing and talk of their delights’, telling the poet ‘of what they felt and I did feel / In springs that never will return’” (135). This call and response could suggest that without the attention of the poet, it would be as if the flowers did not exist, but also that when noticed and correctly identified, the flowers are able to “sing and talk” to Clare more than they could otherwise, if at all. They are realised, as they metamorphose from just a living being into a living, talking being (and happily for Clare, a singing one, too). The syntax of

the line also supports the idea of the intersubjectivity of the two, as the rhythm requires a repetition of the verb. If Clare had written “of what they and I felt,” there would have been no ambiguity as to whether they felt the same thing. “Of what they felt and I did feel” may mean they experienced different emotions, and further, it happened at the same time, in an interchange. Through this relationship of ongoing reciprocal recognition created by accurate poetic description and repeated looking, Clare generates the flowers into existence and a communicable life. Now we can conceive what was so singular about the flowers in the foreign field not knowing Clare, because through his lack of knowledge about them, his disconcertedness about being in a new place, he is unable to talk to the flowers and they, in turn, do not know him. This relationship, then, is more than that of poet to flower or botanist to plant, but more akin to a relationship with a community as seen in the intersubjective knowledge that strengthens the perception of one’s identity.¹²

His attention that constantly seeks to know and love often looks to objects in the margins; this, along with Clare’s own unsettled circulation leads us to his troubled relationship with community and centeredness, things that help establish identity and sense of place. In “Sand Martin” (Robinson MP IV, 309) Clare looks to the circling bird and feels some kind of happiness or encouragement from its circling, as if seeing this reiterative behaviour in nature is validating:

Ive seen thee far away from all thy tribe
 Flirting about the unfrequented sky
 And felt a feeling that I cant describe
 Of lone seclusion and a hermit joy
 To see thee circle round nor go beyond
 That lone heath and its melancholly pond (9-14)

12. Mahood expands upon Clare’s relationship to plants as people, saying:

Given this kind of feeling for the essential character of the flower, something as instantly recognizable as a friend’s laugh or turn of the head, Clare would have little use for procedures that would consign it to order Gyandria: class Monandria: genus Orchis: species macula. For him it was not a dried specimen but a living neighbor. Hence his greatest need was for a name to greet it by. ‘When we notice flowers’, he once wrote to an unidentified botanist – and to ‘notice’ was for him to realise intensely – ‘we feel a desire to know their names as of so many friends and acquaintance.’ (121)

It is important that the bird is away from its “tribe,” that the sky is “unfrequented” because it means the bird has a flock but is currently separated from it. He takes joy in the bird’s staying within his view, but the bird’s circling in place has a wider significance than appreciation. He sees in the bird’s habits a reflection of his own circling, his own dislike for leaving the nest that is Helpston. Barrell also argues that Clare identifies with the sand martin, saying that “the bird cannot, perhaps, but certainly does not go beyond the circle of the heath and pond, and yet this limitation is accepted by Clare as a perverse source of joy” (123-4). There is, indeed, a kind of perverseness to his reaction, since why does the “lone seclusion,” the “lone heath,” and the “melancholly pond” give him joy? Perhaps because despite all these gloomy factors, bird and man are two subjects present together in one space, and by noticing and identifying the sand martin, he can explore the “lone seclusion” that he feels as a published poet and an attentive lover of nature in a community that, despite living in close proximity to nature, may not have the time or energy to appreciate it to the extent that Clare does. This marginal “flirting” is also key, this constant inconstancy, circling without settling, yet always returning to the same place, as it mirrors the repetitive quality of Clare’s observational practices. For Kelley, Clare’s vision was specific, a “seeing from among, a seeing in which the seer was equally unusual and particular” (129), as if he understood exactly what it was for the sand martin to be circling in this way. Thus, whatever his discomfort may be in his isolation in Helpston, he takes comfort in his solitude and tendencies through the habits of other animals. In the poems in which he is evidently the solitary human figure, as in the “Sand Martin,” perhaps nature can play a role that allows Clare to feel part of a community even when alone, and when not instructing others, he can find instruction and identification in nature for himself.

An analysis of “Sand Martin” also leads to a discussion of a community at large and allows us to understand how this unsettledness in the margins works for both the circulation within the larger poetic world and for Clare’s

work as an educative project. At first glance, the sand martin, the main subject of the poem, distinctly away from its tribe, is visualized as the center of the scene and Clare, as an observer, is somewhere on the edge of the scene. As the poem continues, however, and Clare mentions his feelings “that [he] cant describe,” he begins to shape into the central figure. To bolster this feeling, in the next few lines, not only is the bird flying an “unfrequented” sky, but it is distinctly circling the same area repeatedly, as if gradually shifting into the margins of the scene, circling the edge of the poem as it becomes the symbol for Clare’s isolation. Yet Clare does not or cannot lose sight of the bird. After all, the poem is titled after the bird, not, say, “Reflections on seeing a sand martin circling.” Interestingly, the sand martin’s circling, the tracing and retracing of its limits, is a little like the tradition of “beating the bounds,” in which a village’s inhabitants walk along the bounds of their parish, beating certain landmarks with sticks in order to not forget the village limits. Repeating this action retains the permeable boundaries in a common geographical memory, and without this continuous, reiterative contact, those boundaries would no longer exist in the shared mental map of the inhabitants and would instead be imposed by the encloser’s lines in hedges and fences – generally fixed, once drawn. The identity of community as related to place is strengthened through this repetitive drawing and redrawing of boundaries. Clare, in watching the sand martin circle the sky, may be reminded of this tradition and, seeing this practice visualized before him, may come to understand that to be at the edges of a community, but constantly moving, is an identity-validating practice. In the same way that Clare finds comfort in the solitary but beautiful sounding nightingale, with its scantily foraged home, the sand martin figures for him the circling, secluded man, who “haunts” “far away from all [his] tribe.” Further, while the sand martin flirts on heaths and glen that are desolate and lonely, they are, importantly, “common wild” – untamed but accessible. The sand martin has a tribe but makes solitary circles; he inhabits a lonely place, but one that is still commonly used ground with community attached to it. Thus, even in the

visions of isolation, somewhere in the margins of the poem, there is a suggestion of home, of belonging and community in the in-between spaces. This existence in the margins would also not be a foreign idea to Clare, since, as François writes, “commoning was in multiple senses an affair of the margins.” Communities center and identify people, and the habits of the community that Clare lived with and experienced himself were habits that made use of and reinterpreted the definition of margins:

if by most accounts, commoners were afforded only a margin of subsistence, it was by virtue of subsisting in the margins between the temporarily abandoned or regularly unclaimed and the actively redirected; hovering between the passive opportunism of making secondary uses of things already fallen, left behind, or momentarily fallow and more active forms of shaping the course of things, commonable practices required continual interpretation of the edges of spaces as well as of laws (see Neeson; Kelley). (247)

Clare’s attention and looking, then, is useful not only for seeing what he loves in nature, but as a social survival tool, because to subsist like this, one needs to be in a state of constant awareness, seizing the slightest opportunity and making the best use of resources. Alternatively, perhaps his attention towards the minute in nature is used as a distraction from the risks and vulnerabilities of this kind of living. Kelley supports this idea, as she writes that his seeing was a “relentless and obsessive looking, as if to ward off a sense that he is at the very fragile edge of the human community that lives on, off, or near the land” (129). While all this situates him in the margins of a community that already inhabits the edges of a growing capitalist society, based on the objects he is drawn to obsessively look at in nature – the small, the fallow, the hidden and the circling – it would seem that even through his particular looking he is unable to entirely ward off that creeping sense of fragility. Indeed, the fragility of edge-land and edge-living is encapsulated in the very things Clare looks to.

Clare’s everyday life was surrounded by evidence of a marginal living and, particularly in the pre-enclosed landscape, an open communication within the community he lived in. Encompassed by the structure of this life, his poetry also takes on an open kind of communication that aids him in his

educative project. John Middleton Murray's critique that Clare's "faculty of sheer vision" demands "so complete an engagement and submission of the whole man that it leaves no margin for other faculties" (qtd. in Barrell), when read alongside François' description of commoning, introduces two ways of looking at margins. We have on the one hand, an existence that uses nothing but margins, reinterpreting the uses of land, and on the other hand a poetry that is apparently devoid of margins, nothing but content. Clare, in that case, used to interpreting and making good use of things, reinterprets the margins of poetry so that the poetry bursts at the seams. He runs the bounds of his own natural territory as he talks about it with such ardor and energy that he cannot help but write and rewrite and add.

Thus, the poetry becomes densely populated and talkative, mirroring a kind of pre-enclosure form of communication. Neeson writes that "The description of common fields as open fields is entirely appropriate. Distances are shorter when fields are in strips. You can call from one to the next. You can plough them and talk across the backs of the horses at the same time" (2), gesturing not only to a kind of ease of communication, but the frequency and accessibility of it. Describing Laxton, Nottinghamshire in the eighteenth century, Neeson writes:

you could tell the time of day by the regular comings and goings of the common flocks and herds among the village roads, ... Fieldsmen, pinders, and haywards were often about. Twice a year they made field orders to manage the fields and pastures, and a jury sat to ratify them and hear their complaints. Jurors and fieldsmen met at an inn, in public, with an audience of commoners. (2)

Orders were shouted out so all could hear, and the entire collective of a village gathered once a year for the beating of the bounds, as mentioned. This quality of openness and accessibility in communication of agricultural community systems provides a blueprint for Clare's educative poetry. Clare's poems talk to each other; they repeat passages, images, like the frequent occurrences of "I love," forming a community between the huge body of work he produced, populated with living creatures that fill the poems with sounds

that are entirely their own, transcribed sound for sound, and with names given to them by their own surrounding community.

In attempting to educate and guide, Clare refers to the community he was familiar with and uses elements of it and, whether speaking to the city-reader or country-dweller, he appeals to a common tenderness that reaches into images and remembrances of youth, key for both education and a return to nature that is not dependent on wage-work. The image of the typical solitary nature poet does not seem to fit in with our picture of Clare, when taken together with his community-based interconnectedness, and it seems as if through his poetic actions, Clare redefines the solitary nature poet and shows a relationship with nature that is a communicative act. Sometimes, even if there is not another explicit audience or companion within the poem, when the solitary “I” is the only human body mentioned, the nature of his poems as explanatory and knowledge-driven brings his reader into his locality. In “Summer Images” (Robinson *MP* III, 153), for example, his trademark phrase “I love” is left at the beginning of the poem, repeated only once more at the beginnings of the fifth stanza, but between and after those “I loves,” the rest of the phrases — “To see,” “To hail” — hang alone. This is fine enough, and echoes of the “I love” are still heard through these, but then he begins stanzas with simply “And note on hedgerow,” “And mark the evening curdle dank and grey,” with the penultimate stanza beginning “And catch the melody of distant bells” (132). Of course, it is he who loves to catch, to mark, to hear, but in the absence of the mention of his own love, those phrases sound more akin to encouraging commands directed to his readers. Now, his singularly specific love that stems from his individual ability to notice and know extends to our own imaginations and calls on our abilities. Part of the effectiveness of this is that Clare’s instinctive attachment to nature appeals to a communal memory. Mahood writes: “Clare’s own sensibility is here sunk in a common tenderness: any, or all, of the weeders might remember a child’s pleasure in discovering that the leaves of the thistle-like knapweed are soft to the touch, or share the old woman’s recollection of the

eye-to-eye encounter in childhood with a wild flower” (118). In appealing to a common tenderness and audience, as seen in the community found in his childhood, and in his botanist friends Artis and Henderson, there is a hope that this appeal stretches to both audiences.

This brings up a slight difficulty, however, in terms of audience. This common tenderness does seem to apply only to those who have had ample access to these natural spaces as children, so if Clare’s educative move hopes to bring urbanites closer to an understanding of nature like his, so that they can identify and love like him, how can this appeal to childhood sensation and pleasure apply universally? Does he seek to address the city-dweller intentionally or out of necessity, because there is no one else? He writes about his cohabitants:

I live here among the ignorant like a lost man in fact like one whom the rest seems careless of having anything to do with. They hardly dare talk in my company for fear I should mention them in my writings and I find more pleasure in wandering the field than in mixing among my silent neighbors who are insensible to everything but toiling and talking of it and that to no purpose. (Clare 19)

I do not believe he finds agricultural labor to be opposed to nature, but more that his qualm is in their being “insensible” to certain pleasures and that their form of vocality is *only* of the day’s work. Clare writes in his autobiography about the period in his life when he was discovering his poetic tendencies and the isolation that came with:

When I happened with [my companions] in my Sunday walks, I often try’d their taste by pointing out some striking beauty in a wild flower, or object in the surrounding scenery, to which they could seldom make an answer; and if they did, ‘twas such as ‘they could see nothing worth looking at,’ turning careless to resume their old discourse, and laughing at my ‘droll fancies’ as they would call them. (Clare 67)

He is solitary in his keen observations and feels isolated from a larger poetically-sensitive community, even as at the same time, his specific locality is highly important to him. Those most capable of learning the aspects — vulnerabilities, habits, names — of objects in nature that Clare wants to impart may not have the time or opportunity to enjoy such instruction. It is

also possible that they were dispossessed of their time even before enclosure, but enclosure only further increased the amount of wage-work and left less chance for non-waged activities. Even gleaning, for example, the practice of picking up from the field what was left after the harvest, came to be seen as a lazy technique, when in fact it is helpful for both the gleaners and the earth. While Clare does not always explicitly write about farm labor, his land is still peopled with “shepherds, schoolboys, a village ‘doctress’ who specializes in curative plants,” and in this way, “Clare replays and refigures the sociable, inhabited landscape of his youth.” Kelley writes that “this inclination goes deep: sociability provides a needed and expansive ground for his identity as a poet who writes about commonable land and plants” (131). The sociability of childhood comes up often, both in his reminiscent nostalgic poetry and when writing about children in his own community.¹³ The appeal to a common memory in childhood, then, can perhaps apply to any given community, a space where one can escape this waged disciplining for a time.

V. Conclusion

Clare writes poetry that is firmly rooted in Helpston, from the sounds of the birds to the place names, simultaneously exemplifying a way of looking and loving as well as a way of belonging in his development of a sense of place. When we read Clare’s poetry as inherently educational, he becomes a central figure, more than a quaint “peasant poet.” This research has inevitably led to a discussion of in-betweenness, an eddying between communities, between places, languages, and the touch-and-go relationship that we read in Clare’s gentle approach to nature. Ideally, his poetry exemplifies a way of living that generates a meaningful relationship with nature and with oneself because it strives to be as accurate as possible in its description, and in doing that, not only trains the readers’ eye to see the minute in nature, but also allows for the practice of an attention that can then be turned towards oneself.

12. “They scarce one effort make to hitch them up / But down they sluther soon as ere they try / So long hath been their dwelling there – old men / When passing bye will laugh and tell the ways / They had when boys to climb that very tree” (“The Raven’s Nest” [Robinson *MP* III, 55g]).

Alternatively, since Clare writes poetry in which “the Description too much prevailed over the Sentiment,” a question may arise as to whether he encourages his readers to step out and experience nature physically, grubbily, with aching knees and ankles or whether his poetry provides the substitute for those experiences. Yet even if his poetry can figure as a substitute for natural experiences, the hope is that it brings people to understand that to write like this is not just to preserve nature – the fear being that one day we will no longer recognize the plants, animals, and habits he describes because they have changed or disappeared – but to train people’s perceptions and attentions to a state in which they themselves will practice a careful attentiveness. The medium Clare uses also plays to this hope; a reader of poetry must commit to the poem and feel the rhythm of it and by experiencing and developing an attention to nature while enveloped in the poem’s rhythm, perhaps it could train the mind and body to pay attention when experiencing the rhythm of walking.

Overall, I have discussed a relationship to nature mostly as one of aesthetic appreciation, albeit one that is important for one’s general health. I do not discuss, for example, how this approach to nature – one that is detailed oriented, one that strives to know the names and habits of subjects in nature, and that lets nature alone when it needs to – works in an agricultural sense, where you cannot simply let the natural object alone as you can with bird nests, but are required to hone a relationship of give and take. Here, I suppose, is where Clare expressed his self-effacement in calling himself a fool, for “was People all to feel & think as I do the world could not be carried on.” In our current time, however, for our present state of the world in which we lose landscapes and creatures we are not even familiar with, I believe it would benefit us to think and feel as Clare does, to recall childhood freedoms and curiosities of the past in order to sustain a future. We should keep looking, develop an attentiveness that is spurred initially by nothing other than a desire to look because “how curious is the nest.”

The precariousness of Clare’s feelings, however, as in his self-conscious reflection above, complicates this seemingly simple solution. We cannot get

too close to nature at the risk of unnecessary exposure and mass exploitation, but if we are totally alienated from it, then we cannot know or understand what we lose. To read Clare, then, is to more deeply feel the extreme multi-valence of this relationship that needs work to understand. In America, people's relationship to nature is generally one outside of participation, as developed by the Transcendentalist concept of an untouched wilderness and the subsequent installation of national parks, an approach to nature which disrupted and still disrupts the more productively involved relationship that the Indigenous people of America had developed with nature. We now have a distanced understanding of our natural surroundings that only damages our own health. As only a small example, seasonal allergies become more aggressive with every passing year because of a disproportionate number of male trees to female trees, causing an overabundance of pollen in the air. Meanwhile in England, the country praised for extensive footpaths and historic home of a great walking culture, the ongoing Right to Roam movement seeks to open more of the countryside to the public, since in reality, "92% of the countryside and 97% of rivers are off limits to the public" (righttoroam.org.uk). The Right to Roam homepage states: "In all but one tenth of the English landscape, to wander off the footpath, to swim in a river, to explore and educate ourselves about our countryside, can leave us branded a trespasser and expelled from the land." It seems that in some ways, not much has changed from Clare's times. Once, on his misattestation of being a poacher in Burghley Park, Clare wrote, "what terryfying rascals these wood keepers & gamekeepers are they make a prison of the forrests & are its joalers" (qtd. in "John Clare: The Trespasser" 97). These trespass laws emphasise the notion that being in nature is a criminal activity.

This paper's discussion of the tension between touching or not touching

14. "Arborists often claim that all-male plants are "litter-free" because they shed no messy seeds, fruits or pods. In the 1949 USDA Yearbook of Agriculture, which focused on trees and forests, this advice was given to readers: 'When used for street plantings, only male trees should be selected, to avoid the nuisance from the seed'" (scientificamerican.com). This practice continues today.

and the difficulty of compromising a love of nature that wants to be close to it, paired with our potentially harming it, led to a discussion of human vulnerabilities and what one's own exposure looks like in various communities. I have discussed both how Clare's poetry works for us as readers and what his poetry tells us about how he understood his relationship with nature and with community. In reading and understanding more about Clare's particular way of being amongst nature, in understanding that his "way of seeing and writing – often writing as speaking" was "a state of being, a condition of existence" (Williams 1), we can work towards our own states of being. By reading his poetry, we can germinate and generate existences in which we are alert to the habits and vulnerabilities of nature, their sounds and names, and we can create more developed senses of place for ourselves, but also, by allowing room for reading Clare's unsettledness, his flitting and skirting, we will be reminded not to settle into apathy or complacency but live with eyes and ears alert and loving.

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Free Indirect Discourse and Narrative Worlds

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In his classic study *Mimesis*, Erich Auerbach offers a loving analysis of reality in Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*. He takes as his central passage a description of dinner between Emma and Charles, where Emma's frustration with her restricted and meager existence comes to a head:

But it was above all at mealtimes that she could bear it no longer, in that little room on the ground floor, with the smoking stove, the creaking door, the oozing walls, the damp floor-tiles: and with the steam from the boiled beef, there rose from the depths of her soul other exhalations as it were of disgust. Charles was a slow eater; she would nibble a few hazel-nuts, or else, leaning on her elbow, would amuse herself making marks on the oilcloth with the point of her table-knife. (Flaubert 384)

What interests Auerbach in this description is its focalization on the subject. Flaubert shows Emma's world as she encounters it, not as it really is. The narrator describes does not describe the scene first and then provides Emma's judgments on it afterwards, in this way rendering her world. Such an approach would make the real world primary, with Emma's world constructed as a modulation of that reality. Instead, it is through Emma that the world comes into being. Suddenly Emma is primary, and the world is constituted through her experience: "the reader first sees Emma, who has been much in evidence in the preceding pages, and he sees the picture first through her;

such an approach would make the real world primary, with Emma's world constructed as a modulation of that reality. Instead, it is through Emma that the world comes into being. Suddenly Emma is primary, and the world is constituted through her experience: "the reader first sees Emma, who has been much in evidence in the preceding pages, and he sees the picture first through her; directly, he sees only Emma's inner state; he sees what goes on in the meal indirectly, from within her state, in light of her perception" (Flaubert 385). For Auerbach, this marks the tragic force of Flaubert's novel: "Each of them has a silly, false world, which cannot be reconciled with the reality of his situation, and so they both miss the possibilities life offers them" (390). These false experiential worlds are thrown into relief against the reality of the novel, and this wider, truer reality exposes the hollowness of the character's worlds.

Such is Auerbach's thesis, where the real world of the novel would be configured in a nestlike structure, containing and subtending every character-world, as a matrix in which these character-worlds could be encompassed and understood. Emma's world is posed in ironic contrast to the real world, but it also only exists as a subset of the narrative world. Georges Poulet famously frames the complex interactions between character-world and real-world as a kind of circularity. Building off Auerbach, he argues that Flaubert in *Madame Bovary* achieves a medial position between the objectivity of reality and the subjectivity of the character-world. Pure objectivity would treat characters as "merely an object among objects" (393). Pure subjectivity would attenuate narrative worlds to the inner experience of their characters. Poulet sees Flaubert as negotiating a third route, which nonetheless preserves the vital features of subjectivity and objectivity. He writes that, "for the first time in the history of the novel, human consciousness shows itself as it is, as a sort of core, around which sensations, thoughts and memories move in a perceptible space" (405). Poulet likens characters to "centers encompassed by their environments (405). The center can dilate or contract, thereby determining the breadth of the environment and the extent of a character's inner life

Thoughts and fantasies play out through the character's experience of their environment, as Emma's judgments and dispositions color the exemplary dinner-table scene. These thoughts are spatial, or exist in a perceptual space, in that they inform the character's perception of their environment. But this is not just a one-sided influence; the environment can also press in on the character. For instance, Emma's stifling environment represents a constant hedge on her fantasy, reducing her inner life and increasing her despair. The real world exists in its own right, and there is feedback loop between the center and the environment, the character-world and the real one.

Summarizing this dynamic, Poulet asserts that "there is in Madame Bovary an inner coherence, and this coherence is due to the fact that things, simultaneous or successive, are constantly fused together in the unity of a single perceptive mind, and that conversely this mind is kept from disappearing in the flux of its own consciousness by the objectivity of a world with which it is in constant touch" (393). The character creates a world for themselves, but this character-world is bounded by its interactions with the real world. Madame Bovary enlarges the character-world to near infinite size and shrinks it to nothing at all; this undulation is the dynamo of its narrative progression.

Where Auerbach focuses generally on the conflict between character-world and real world, Poulet proposes an impressionistic theory of the dynamics between the two. What are we to take from this? First, one might observe that each analysis functions according to a different principle of movement, despite their apparent complementarity. Auerbach's proposal is dialectic. There is the real world of the novel, given by narration. This will henceforth be called the narrator-world. Then there is the character-world, "that false reality" which is blinkered and limited compared to the narrator-world, but nonetheless given by narration (390). Finally, this character-world collapses into the true reality, in instances of irony which serve as the resonant points of the book. Per Auerbach, Flaubert never divulges the exact nature of this true reality, the way he does that of the character-world: "in

his book, the world consists of pure stupidity, which completely misses true reality, so that the latter should properly not be discoverable in it at all; yet it is there; it is in the writer's language, which unmasks the stupidity by pure statements" (390). The true reality is uncovered only through the impersonal language of the narrator, which reveals the incompleteness of the character-world. This impersonal language, to which Flaubert attributed mystical properties, exists within the true reality of things, but does not exhaust this reality by any means. Indeed, the true reality presented in the novel is a negation of the character-world, language which strikes to the marrow of existence and reveals the inadequacy of Emma's life, her surrounding social milieu. The dialectic would thus begin with a narrator-world, out of which is generated a character-world. The negation of the character-world would allow the narrator-world to be shadowed with implications of Flaubert's posited true reality.

If Auerbach's reading is dialectical, Poulet sees the conflict between narrator-world and character-world as far more binary. "The main point of Flaubert's novel is to create relation and order. This order is formal," Poulet writes (407). There is a fluctuation produced between character-world and the unavoidable features of a character's environment. In Poulet's reading, Flaubert's purpose is to transcribe "the extremely delicate relationship between objective and subjective," or between the two worlds (393). Where Auerbach sees these worlds as negating one another, generating through that negation a fuller sense of the real world, Poulet sees *Madame Bovary* as a representation of these worlds' collision and dynamics. Neither negates the other; both have content in virtue of their shared presence. This is the core of Poulet and Auerbach's nuanced disagreement.

The point of this discussion is not to argue any definitive interpretation of Flaubert or *Madame Bovary*, but to flesh out the way that character-worlds have been conceptualized in relation to the narrator-world. There is no adequate definition of fictional worlds which would capture the complexity of the above disagreement. The most prevalent definition today comes from the

“possible worlds theory,” which follows the lead of analytic philosophy and posits fictional worlds as possible worlds. Prominent theorist Marie-Laure Ryan defines a fictional world as “the semantic domain projected by the text” (Ryan 3). She introduces the term “textual actual world” for this reality. The textual actual world is, except for extreme literary experiments, always given by narration. Despite these exceptions, however, possible worlds theorists are generally comfortable identifying narration as the mechanism for producing textual actual worlds. Within these textual actual worlds, there are subworlds generated by characters. The experience of characters attains the status of a possible world, within the possible world of the text. Not as a possible world of its own right, but as possible subordinate to the narratively-given textual actual world. The character-world is just a subgroup of the narrative-world. Yet Poulet makes two shrewd observations which would problematize this neat system. First, the world of the character projects spatially into the narrator-world. This projection means that many key features of the narrator-world are given only through the character-world. Yet since characters lack the narrative authority to cement facts about the narrator-world, since the character-world is only a possible subset with limited validity, then how does this explain the influence of the character-world in shaping the textual actual world? The second point is less antagonistic, but more methodological. The character-world is distinguished in large part by its expressivity. The feeling and position of the character seem to demarcate the character-world, and the character-world is often only distinguishable from the narrator-world in virtue of this character’s Heideggerian being-in-the-world. Free indirect discourse would exemplify this point, since it is often only identifiable as distinct from narration due to a sense of the character’s mood or comportment, which opens the world slightly differently. This would segue into a more general methodological critique of scholarship on fictional worlds—the need for an investigation of the worldness of fictional worlds as such.

If we agree generally that a more plastic notion of world is required, then it might be of interest to return to Poulet’s point about the intersection

of subject and object. Subjectivity and objectivity are the conventional ways of parceling up one's experience with their environment. Flaubert's complication of the two would seem to be a first step, per Poulet, in a more authentic representation of the experience of characters in a world. After all, characters are but kernels which projects themselves into the surrounding world. A good way, then, of sketching out the mechanics of fictional worlds would be to dive into the literary techniques which seem to unlock the possibility of a more accurate understanding of worlds. But a more general narrative problem presents itself. How exactly are subject and object related in the text? It is no coincidence that Flaubert pioneers a new technique for representing the subjectivity of characters. This technique is free indirect discourse (FID). Flaubert uses FID frequently and systematically, and the technique is closely bound up with his intermingling of subject and object. Yet this runs counter to the received wisdom about FID. Despite its dual nature, as a mixture of narration and character subjectivity, scholarly treatments of FID limit the technique to a kind of speech-representation. FID channels the speech of its characters, or at worst, their verbalized thoughts. But this view of FID effaces the unique character of the technique. FID presents a rare instance where the character-world becomes the narrator-world. Recognizing this change-over provides a new path to considering the nature of fictional worlds.

I. What is Free Indirect Discourse?

Seeking a definition of free indirect discourse is the wrong way to begin. To describe the technique as such is to presuppose certain facts about it. First, that it is a discourse-category, a way of representing speech, or at least of representing verbal communication. Second, that insofar as it is a form of speech-representation, it is related to indirect discourse, in contrast to direct discourse. Third, that it is free, which is to say that there is an immense degree of technical variance in its usage. In descriptions of FID, this freedom often becomes the technique's defining characteristic. Its formal flexibility

means it defies any schematic description of its usage. This predictably makes defining FID a fraught task. How to pin down a technique which seems to have only trends, not rules? In their otherwise authoritative description of novelistic style, Leech and Short tiptoe around FID. It is, they write, “normally thought of as a freer version of an ostensibly indirect form. Its most typical manifestation is one where, unlike [indirect discourse], the reporting clause is omitted, but where the tense and pronoun selection are those associated with [indirect discourse]” (Leech 325). Free indirect discourse would thus be a version of indirect discourse, which maintains its third-person pronouns and past tense, while eliding the introductory clause (“he said,” etc).

Direct Discourse (DD): “I will take the train tomorrow.”

Indirect Discourse (ID): He said he would take the train the next day.

Free Indirect Discourse (FID): He would take the train tomorrow.

Yet this shortchanges the complexity of FID, even with simple examples like the ones above. To see why, let us take a more complicated passage from Robert Musil’s *The Man Without Qualities*. In this scene, the comic character General Stumm arrives unexpectedly at Diotima’s salon. He has been invited secretly to the event, not by her, and she is dismayed to see him there:

Yet there was nothing Diotima was so sure of as that she herself had not invited the General, unless she had taken to walking in her sleep or having fits of amnesia. It was an awkward moment. Here stood the little General, undoubtedly with an invitation in the breast coat pocket of his forget-me-not-blue uniform tunic, for a man in his position could not possibly be suspected of so outrageous a gamble as coming without being asked. (Musil, *MWQ* 368)

This is an example of FID. The narrator begins with an authoritative description of Diotima’s state of mind. But a different voice takes up the following lines. There are several irregular moments which give the transition away. First, the use of “here,” which implies a subjectivity within the scene, as opposed to the distance of a third-person narrator. Then there is the use of

uncharacteristic language (“so outrageous a gamble”) which suggests the polished diction of Diotima rather than Musil’s dry-witted narrator. Next, there is the speculative remark about the invitation’s presence, which must “undoubtedly” be in Stumm’s pocket. The focalization here assumes the invitation’s presence, because one way or another it has abdicated from the omniscient narratorial vantage which would allow knowledge of that presence. Finally, there is Diotima’s thought-pattern at work. The drawn-out verb clauses (“could not possibly be suspected”) and the rhetorical flourishes articulate Diotima’s inner turmoil. She knows she has not invited Stumm, but she is attempting to convince herself she might have. All these features make sense only as coming from Diotima, not the narrator. Yet the novelty of FID is that, despite all this, the narrator persists. Verb tenses are backshifted, indicating reported speech or thought, the mediation of a narrator rather than the immediacy of direct discourse. In *representing* the events at hand, the narrator seems to *present* Diotima’s experience and subjectivity.

This intermingling of narrator and character subjectivity becomes the sticking point for FID scholarship. And, in conceptualizing FID as a form of speech-representation, there is a broad tendency to simplify the dynamics of this interaction. Yet it is not hard to bear out the overlooked complexities. Take, for example, Roy Pascal’s attempt at an unproblematic baseline definition of FID: “the narrator, though preserving the authorial mode throughout..yet places himself, when reporting the words or thoughts or a character, directly into the experiential field of the character, and adopts the latter’s perspective in regard to both time and place” (Pascal 9). Already though, there are snags in this explanation. For one, what does the “experiential field” of a character entail? One might argue this is merely a metric of expressivity. Whereas typical narration describes what a character thinks or feels, FID seems to capture the force of that feeling, its expressivity. While not incorrect, this interpretation lends itself to a reductive notion of FID, since it ignores other strange aspects of the technique which would figure into a character’s experiential field. Pascal hints at these aspects when

he notes the adoption of a character's perspective in time and place. Deictics like "here" and "now" require an experiential context to be meaningful, a felt sense of place and temporality. In channeling the experience of Diotima, the narrator channels her spatial and temporal deixis. But the narrator also adopts her idiom, her thought pattern, her value judgments, her capacity for knowledge. For a moment, the narrator inhabits Diotima in a fundamental manner which cannot be reduced to any of these factors individually. It is in this holism, this irreducibility, that the difficulty of conceptualizing FID lies.

The typical account of FID reduces the technique's inhabitation to merely a kind of speech-representation, thereby deforming the technique. As noted above, FID allows for an identification of position, a subjectivity situated in space and time, whereas indirect discourse takes distance from such localization. Where indirect discourse might say "there" or "the next day," FID uses "here" or "tomorrow." From where does this positionality come? Many linguistic and semantic accounts of FID see deixis as an inheritance from direct discourse. Direct discourse possesses a positionality, the "here" and "now" of its speaker. This positionality is preserved in FID and lost in indirect discourse (with occasional exception). But the 'here' and 'now' deixis of FID comes from a kind of quotation. The narrator does not take up the character's position, but quotes the character's judgment, which includes "here" and "now" deixis. Thus, there is no inhabitation in FID, or at least no different inhabitation than in any other kind of quotation. FID has expressivity because it is a quotation of the character's self-expression. Nothing more than that. But if FID is a form of quotation, it is certainly not equivalent with direct discourse. According to linguistic accounts, which see FID as a form of speech-representation, direct discourse is primary. Indirect discourse and FID are merely transformations or derivations of direct discourse. FID continues to possess the deixis of direct discourse, whereas indirect discourse mostly does not. The presence of deixis in one and not the other is merely a contingent feature of linguistic development; FID might still quote the deixis of direct discourse, but it is always indirect and secondary.

The goal, then, is to disprove the view of FID as speech-representation. In doing so, a wider foundation for FID will be required, one which is more amenable for considering fictional worlds. The problem with FID as speech-representation is that it snubs the interaction between narrator and character. This interaction singles out FID and is the substance of the technique, rather than an incidental formal feature. But such a rebuttal is difficult, since there are two credible methodologies which describe FID as speech-representation. This is the linguistic approach and the semantic approach. The linguistic approach defines FID as a unique linguistic construction, locating its differentia in definite grammar rules. Direct discourse is primary, the base form of speech-representation from which indirect discourse and FID are generated using systematic grammar rules. But can one really rely on a filiation from direct discourse? Early linguists stressed the likeness of indirect discourse and FID to the point that the techniques largely converged. Otto Jespersen groups indirect discourse and FID together as “indirect speech,” in contrast to “direct speech” (DD). From direct speech (DD), one shifts person, tense and mood to produce indirect speech. Within the category of indirect speech, Jespersen identifies dependent speech (ID) and represented speech (FID), with the distinction between them being the word-order of questions and requests. Since the linguistic approach needs consistent grammatical markers, it often focuses on questions and requests, since the most profound grammatical difference between indirect discourse and FID is their word order in questions and requests (Jespersen 290-292).

Indirect Discourse (ID): He asked where his car was.

Free Indirect Discourse (FID): Where was his car?

Another early grammarian, Hendrik Poutsma, also introduces FID in terms of questions, referring to the construct as the ‘reported question.’ He is less sure of FID’s cotermination with indirect discourse than Jespersen, remarking that the technique “is, in a manner, intermediate between direct

and indirect speech” (Poutsma 630). But the grounds for this intermediacy are not linguistic, and Poutsma cites Jespersen’s system of linguistic derivation approvingly.

Such linguistic approaches to FID set the technique as an indirect speech form. But linguistics also fails to capture the *je ne sais quoi* of FID, since grammatical differences between indirect discourse and FID are sparse. Jespersen is aware that his approach is far from exhaustive – he can only define the technique by taking textual examples from Thackeray – but he lacks the right methodological apparatus to pursue FID. Thus, even the most sympathetic use of the linguistic approach would have to agree acknowledge that it is preliminary and sketchy. A stronger rebuttal of the linguistic approach can be given, however; not just that it is incomplete, but that it is fundamentally flawed. First, it commits the reference fallacy, meaning that linguistic theories of FID see the technique as a reference to something which does not exist. There is no original direct discourse utterance in the text, which FID then transforms and describes. The utterance would exist only in FID. The second rebuttal owes to the presence of a formal fallacy. By understanding FID as a variation on direct discourse, or as an allomorph of indirect discourse, one overlooks the unique effect of the technique. Voloshinov points out this exact critique: “[FID] is not a simple mechanical mixture or arithmetical sum of two forms but a completely new, positive tendency in active reception of another person's utterance, a special direction in which the dynamics of the interrelationship between reporting and reported speech moves” (142). There is conflict between the narrator who frames the utterance and the speaker who is quoted, and Voloshinov argues that this semantic interaction is not adequately described in linguistic treatments, since it is not itself linguistic.

In contrast to the linguistic approach, the semantic approach seeks to understand FID in terms of its meaning, as the confluence of narrator and character, with the meaning of the technique determined by the outcome of that balance. This semantic approach begins with Swiss linguist Charles

Bally, who notes that “FID is a *form of thought*, and the grammarians take as their basis grammatical forms” (Cohn, “Early Discussions” 507). Bally’s point is that FID must be understood as the interaction between a quoted character and a quoting narrator, on the level of semantic meaning rather than syntactical indicia. The narrator would frame the character’s voice in narrative language. The exact balance of this relationship changes frequently. For some theorists the narrator is absent, leaving only the character’s speech. Or the narrator is present merely as a mechanical feature, framing the character but not contributing content. Or the narrator influences the character’s speech in the production of a dual voice. Or there is no character speaking at all, and FID operates as a complicated bit of ventriloquism. But what does not change is the constitution of this balance. The semantic approach always situates FID as an embattled result of narrator and character interaction, and even theories which omit one party expend a great deal of rationalization explaining how that party drops out.

Brian McHale sees the shift to a semantic approach as an across-the-board solution for the fallacies plaguing the linguistic approach. The semantic approach avoids the reference fallacy by not positing an original direct discourse form, and it avoids the formal fallacy by letting FID’s effects be understood in their own right, as a mediating zone between narratorial and character expression. This zone allows for special use of irony, sympathy, polyvocality, etc., in a way not available to other techniques. Yet is it true that the semantic approach is a catch-all solution? Or does the approach instead reinscribe similar fallacies in more technically insulating language?

In her semantics-oriented treatment of FID, Dorrit Cohn offers a litmus test for detecting the technique: “a simple transposition of grammatical person and tense will ‘translate’ [FID] into an interior monologue. Such translations can actually be applied as a kind of litmus test to confirm the validity of a reader’s apprehension that a narrative sentence belongs to a character’s, rather than to a narrator’s, mental domain” (Cohn, *Transparent Minds* 100-101). Guided by this litmus, FID becomes a peripheral form of

interior monologue. The mind of the character is constituted in interior monologue, and one can verify FID by approximating it to this original direct form of thought. The same fallacy remains. Or consider Stephen Ullmann's description of FID in *Madame Bovary*: "Free indirect style is reported speech masked as narrative. It means a break in continuity and a certain shock to the reader" (Ullmann 117). The narrative function of FID is a mere disguise. FID is really quotation, to the point that it actually represents an interruption to narration. Again, though, this would seem to undercut the role of narration in FID. If there was not a narrative function in FID, why go through the trouble to use the mask of narration? Cohn and Ullmann offer typical accounts which agree with the general consensus of the semantic approach. Both these accounts and the semantic approach as a whole still encode similar fallacies to that of the linguistic approach.

Yet there is a path forward which does not play into such weaknesses. That path requires shedding a core belief about FID — that it is discourse — while still maintaining its status at the vector of narrator and character interaction. More precisely, one must discard the discursive idea that FID is a quotation of a character's mental or verbal language. There are two positions on FID's status as quotation. The strong position argues that the language of FID is the character's unadulterated speech; the character provides matter enclosed in narrative form. Cohn stumps for this strong position. "[FID] reproduces verbatim the character's own mental language," she writes (Cohn, *Transparent Minds* 14). In contrast, there is the weak position, which sees narrative influence in the formulation and selection of a character's thoughts. This would be Ullmann's view, when he writes, "the author is not committed to an exact reproduction of words or thoughts" (Ullmann 117). The narrative aspect of FID means it is not a verbatim quotation, but an approximation, like indirect discourse.

Neither of these positions is truly tenable, and their contradiction will be borne out with three counterexamples. In justification for her strong position, Cohn cites a passage from Mann's *The Magic Mountain*, where Hans Castorp critiques a whimsical song:

This kind of sentimental ditty might very well satisfy and please some young man who had quite legitimately, peacefully, and optimistically “given his heart,” as the saying goes, to some healthy little goose down there in the flatlands... But for him and his relationship with Madame Chauchat — the word “relationship” must be charged to his account, we refuse to take responsibility for it—this kind of ditty was decidedly inappropriate. (Cohn, *Transparent Minds* 119-120)

Cohn notes that this is FID, but in an unusual move, the personalized narrator intrudes at the end and denounces the word choice of the FID passage. The narrator would not call Castorp’s connection a “relationship.” That denotation comes from Castorp alone. Thus, Cohn reasons, the language of FID comes wholly from the character, and narratorial intrusions exist only as a stage or clarification for such character-language. While Cohn’s reading is convincing in this particular case, it cannot be extrapolated into a universal characteristic of FID. One finds a decisive counterexample in Musil’s *The Man Without Qualities*, when Ulrich’s mistress Bonadea considers their relationship:

Bonadea felt like a seventy-year-old woman sitting on a garden bench outside her house. She was getting old. Her children were growing up. The eldest was already twelve. It was certainly disgraceful to follow a man one didn't even know very well into his house, just because he had eyes that looked at one like a man behind a window. One notices, she thought, little details about this man one doesn't like and that could be a warning. One could, in fact—if only there were something to hold one back at such times!—break it off, flushed with shame and perhaps even flaming with anger; but because this doesn't happen, this man grows more and more passionately into his role. And one feels oneself very clearly like a stage set in the glare of artificial light; what one has before one is stage eyes, a stage mustache, the buttons of a costume being unbuttoned, and the whole scene from the first entrance into the room to the first horrible moment of being sober again all takes place inside a consciousness that has stepped outside one's head and papered the walls with pure hallucination. Bonadea did not use precisely these words—her thought was only partly verbal anyway—but even as she was trying to visualize it she felt herself at the mercy of this change in consciousness. (Musil, *MWQ* 279)

The anatomy of the passage is threefold. First there is a sentence of narration, which establishes Bonadea’s feelings. Then, after the first sentence, the passage shifts into FID. Bonadea considers her aging, that her children are at

this moment growing up, that the present age of her children is already upon her. Already is deixis, calling upon Bonadea's temporality. These statements, while FID, are textured similarly to narration. The next sentence ("It was certainly disgraceful") shades more into Bonadea's distinct mental language, still as FID. Afterwards, the paragraph becomes interior monologue, evidenced by the change from past to present tense. But what is salient in this passage is its final line, a return to narration. The narrator says that the above sequence—both its FID and interior monologue—is not verbatim quotation of Bonadea. Moreover, Bonadea's thought "was only partly verbal anyway." The narrator channels Bonadea's subjectivity and offers an impressionistic embellishment of its imagery and language. Bonadea's subjectivity requires this narratorial intervention because it is not itself some speech prepared for quotation; it must be put into words by the narrator. Musil is firm on this point, that character subjectivities are not verbalized already in a settled reproducible form. On a similarly fragile reflection later on, Musil writes, "if such a curiously mixed state of mind must be called thinking, it was of a kind that cannot possibly be put into words, because the chemistry of its darkness is instantly ruined by the luminous influence of language" (993). So too is the case with Bonadea, who is swept up in murky feelings and semi-awarenesses which must be represented in language but are not themselves linguistically constructed and available for quotation. This nonlinguistic thought would seem to require the narrator's involvement for its expression, hence falsifying the strong position on FID as speech representation.

Despite this blow to its counterpart, the weak position appears to be intact. These may very well be quoted thoughts, which the narrator simply enhances, much like indirect speech. And while this interpretation works for the above exchange, there are many examples of FID which cannot be explained even by the weak position. And, most shockingly, there are examples of FID which report dialogue, which include quotation, and yet which nonetheless falsify the weak position.

Virginia Woolf's *Mrs Dalloway* contains an excellent example of the latter. While chatting with her old friend Hugh Whitbread, Clarissa Dalloway is suddenly and inexplicably overcome with worry about her hat:

Not the right hat for the early morning, was that it? For Hugh always made her feel, as he bustled on, raising his hat rather extravagantly and assuring her that she might be a girl of eighteen, and of course he was coming to her party to-night, Evelyn absolutely insisted, only a little late he might be after the party at the palace to which he had to take one of Jim's boys,—she always felt a little skimpy besides Hugh; schoolgirlish; but attached to him, partly from having known him always... (Woolf 6).

Woolf's use of FID is dynamic and precise, and it interchanges with other techniques in representing Clarissa's mind. Clarissa's first appraisal of the hat ("not the right hat") is typical FID. Notable however is the question at the end. Clarissa is not asking whether it is the right hat, but why she is worried about the hat. The thrust of this passage is Clarissa's self-reflection about why she thought of her appearance, which segues into why Hugh makes her nervous. Such reflection is not out of place for Clarissa, who spends a great deal of her mental energy remembering the past and analyzing her peers. At first glance, the next sentence ("For Hugh always") would seem to return to narration, before grading into Hugh's FID. But, prior context informs the reader that this is still Clarissa's FID, a continuation of her self-analysis. There are textual cues to back this up. The opening 'for' is Clarissa's rhetorical maneuver, an indication that her subjectivity persists. The judgment of Hugh's gesticulation as "rather extravagant" is Clarissa's also. The trickiness of identifying this sentence as FID lies in the presence of "Hugh always made her feel." Such introductory language is typical of a narrator bridging into a character's mind, but character's themselves do not usually think in this metareferential level. Clarissa does, and hence a careful attunement to the surrounding context is required. For this though, what then to make about Hugh's FID, when he expresses his plans for later in the day? Undoubtedly Hugh is speaking to Clarissa, but his words are not reported by the narrator in FID. Instead, Clarissa is listening to Hugh, and her

audition of his speech is recorded in FID. The FID is not quoting Hugh but capturing Clarissa's reception of Hugh's speech. This strikes one as incredibly unlikely, but becomes more apparent in considering Hugh's first statement ("assuring her that she might be a girl of eighteen"). Hugh obvious is not saying this to Clarissa in the park. It is how Hugh makes Clarissa feel as she listens to him. The next exchange ("of course he was coming to her party") again is not an outright quotation of Hugh, but Clarissa's understanding of what Hugh has said. She is an overwhelmed listener, put off-balance by Hugh. His speech becomes garbled for her, overlong, with needlessly complicated syntax which, moreover, becomes more and more complicated as it goes on. As she listens, Clarissa is losing the thread of the conversation. And the abrupt em dash signals that Clarissa is no longer listening, that she has broken off from the conversation and returned to her self-reflection. Thus, this section does not merely quote Hugh's speech, but instead employs FID to register Clarissa's listening. In doing so, Woolf presents immediately the disordered state of Clarissa's thoughts, even though it is not Clarissa speaking. Her listening is inflected by her affective state. There is nonverbal mental activity portrayed here, despite the FID's basis in speech representation. Hugh may not be speaking, but his speech is indelibly shaped by nonverbal aspects of Clarissa's perception. Thus it is the case that the weak position fails here, since the weak position allows only for a narratorial paraphrase of an original character voice. There are subtleties to Clarissa's listening, the pace of her thought and understanding, that do not originate in any kind of speech-act or verbalized thinking, and yet which nonetheless color her FID.

Another more common use of FID contradicts the weak position. One finds an instructive example of it in D. H. Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers*. The Morel family has just gotten word that their oldest son, William, is dead. His brother Paul heads to the coal mine to inform his father of the news. As he waits at the top of the mine, Paul anxiously thinks over the situation:

Paul did not realize William was dead; it was impossible, with such a bustle going on. The puller-off swung the small truck on to the turntable, another man ran with it along the bank down the curving lines. “And William is dead, and my mother’s in London, and what will she be doing?” the boy asked himself, as if it were a conundrum. He watched chair after chair come up, and still no father. At last, standing beside a wagon, a man’s form! The chair sank on its rests, Morel stepped off. (Lawrence 170)

Readers and critics will agree that there is FID in this passage, but the extent of its usage is contested. The passage begins with plain old narration (“Paul did not realize William was dead”). Already though, there is something off here. For one, Paul does know his brother is dead; his mother has told him so and he confirms the fact later on. Instead, Paul cannot square his brother’s death with the activity of the mine. There is an incongruity between the two—his brother’s life ended and the mine’s activity unending—which shocks Paul. This incongruity serves as a key for the passage, since Paul pairs the mine’s bustle with William’s death. Observing the mine becomes a proxy action for contemplating William’s fate. Accordingly, Paul’s vision is weighted with deep psychological import. A second irregularity appears after the semicolon (“it was impossible”). What was impossible? “It” takes as its antecedent not the preceding phrase, the potentiality of Paul’s realization, whether he can come with William’s death or not. Such an antecedent would be dictated by the strict niceties of grammar. No, “it” takes as its antecedent William’s death. Paul is thinking that it is impossible William has died, with the mine so busy. That slight grammatical discontinuity—the sudden semicolon and the new antecedent—signals a jump to FID. It is worth noting stylistically that Lawrence often uses semicolons in this way, to tee up a change in focalization mid-sentence.

The following line (“the puller-off swung the small truck”) is the real site of controversy. Is this FID or not? Isolated from context, it might easily pass as narration. But in situ, it is clearly FID, the channeling of Paul’s immediate experience within his environment. The sentence is ungrammatical, since two independent clauses are connected merely by a

comma, without a conjunction. However, as a reflection of Paul's thought, this fragmented construction works to present the bustle of the mine. FID channels Paul's sight. It sees the world through Paul's eyes.

This reading is reinforced in the following sentence by Paul's quoted thought ("and William is dead"). Since the sentence begins with 'and,' it ought to serve as the continuation of an ongoing mental process. That process is Paul's observation. Recall that the mine is a way for Paul to think through William's death. This quoted affirmation of William's death is then a continuation and rejoinder to Paul's observation of the bustling mine above. Paul touches on this realization and then leaps back to mine, where his father will soon emerge to rescue him. In the next line ("he watched chair after chair"), "chair after chair" comes from Paul's angst in waiting, and "still no father" is the attitude and thought-process only of a young boy, not of the narrator. This is FID again, but it is exceedingly unlikely that Paul himself is verbalizing these descriptions. They come through his perception, tensed by his affective state. Finally, "a man's form!" arrives at the mouth of the mine. Paul is not thinking such a phrase, which would be bizarre in context. He is struck with a nonverbal surprise at the man's appearance, which animates him even before he can recognize his father. FID is channeling Paul's surprise in visually perceiving his father. This visual perception is nonverbal.

In this example, the world of *Sons and Lovers* is presented through Paul's eyes, and the manner of this presentation is immediate. It offers his experience of the world, not just a narratorial description. Paul Hernadi coins this type of FID as substitutionary perception. He explains that, "since the narrator in such cases substitutes his words for a character's speech, thought, or sensory perception, the most adequate term suggested so far for this type of literary discourse seems to me substitutionary narration" (Hernadi 191). These three sources—speech, thought, and perception—count as a canon of the fictional mind, and each has their own corresponding type of FID: substitutionary speech, substitutionary thought, and substitutionary perception. Lawrence's passage classifies as substitutionary perspective, or the

narrator substituting his language for the perceptual experience of the character. The advantages of this substitution mean that FID can encompass nonverbal mental operations like perception. Some housekeeping would still be useful though to iron out certain elements of Hernadi's conceptualization. Hernadi falls closest to the weak view on FID. At times, he refers to its channeling of the character experience as quotation. But the possibility of a nonverbal or non-semiotic "quotation" seems to extend beyond the validity of the term. And Hernadi is also not in line with the weak view, since he places tremendous emphasis on the narratorial function of FID. This will be examined in due time.

Taking stock of these arguments, one sees that neither the strong nor weak position on FID as speech-representation is wholly viable. The strong position is outright false, since the narrator is involved in the formulation of FID. The weak position is complicated greatly, if not disproved. FID can be used to present nonverbal mental functions such as perception. Accordingly, it is untrue to say that FID is a form of speech-representation.

What are the stakes of this conclusion? If FID is not a form of speech-representation, how does it function? An adequate definition of FID would need to account for character speech and thought, placement in space and time, and perception of the surrounding environment. It would need to channel the character-world. The character-world is not simply a character's environment, but a totality of significations and relationships in which the character lives. The character has a given emotional attunement to their environment, and this mood textures their experience of these relationships. In FID, the narrator channels the character-world by adopting the character's mood and positionality within an environment, the character's way of being-in-the-world. This is the thesis of "world" that Poulet, a phenomenological critic, is driving toward in his reading of *Madame Bovary*. One where characters, like people, are environed in worlds, where the neat subject-object distinction does not quite hold, since worlds are opened in virtue of a character, and a character exists insofar as they exist in a world.

In his book *Joyce's Voices*, Hugh Kenner posits the Uncle Charles principle. This principle is Kenner's way of handling FID, and it has remarkable parallels to the kind of world-based approach advocated above. Kenner takes as his basis a line from Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*: "Every morning, therefore, Uncle Charles repaired to his outhouse but not before he had greased and brushed scrupulously his back hair and brushed and put on his top hat" (qtd. Kenner 16-17). Wyndham Lewis criticizes Joyce's passage. In Lewis's opinion, "repair" is overly cliché, and its selection by Joyce reveals a lack of proficiency in Joyce's writing. But Kenner points out that 'repair' is Uncle's Charles's idiom. "Uncle Charles has notions of semantic elegance, akin to his ritual brushing of his hat... If Uncle Charles spoke at all of his excursions to what he calls the outhouse, he would speak of 'repairing' there" (Kenner 17). Kenner coins from this insight the Uncle Charles principle: "the narrative idiom need not be the narrator's" (Kenner 18). That is to say, "the Uncle Charles Principle entails writing about someone much as that someone would choose to be written about" (Kenner 21). The narrator, in representing figural life, adopts the relations and perspectives of the character. The use of repair is symptomatic of Charles's worldview, of a lifetime of acculturation. It is not a quote from Charles's speech, but an inhabitation of Charles's mood and comportment, Charles's world. Kenner's treatment of the Uncle Charles Principle has attracted attention for certain unusual spatial aspects. Kenner writes of Charles that "a word he need not even utter is there like a gnat beside him, for us to perceive in the same field of attention in which we note how 'scrupulously' he brushes his hand" (Kenner 17). Charles's language seems to buzz around him in the narrative as another way the story might be told. It is noteworthy as well that Kenner identifies Charles's language as coplanar with his actions. Both Charles's interaction with his environment and his comportment combine to form a robust character-world. Joyce's narrator can dip into that character-world, with a movement Kenner likens to gravity, a gravitational attraction.

With the Uncle Charles Principle, Kenner offers a supporting theory of FID as world-channeling. Each character has a world, and Joyce pivots between these worlds. Charles's world is not just what he does, but how he thinks, how he relates to himself and others, the mood in which he approaches his environment. These attributes are not just facts, either, but have an experiential heft. It is not enough to say that Charles is scrupulous; his world in its constitution is inflected by that scrupulosity. Kenner has the right idea here. It is clear that FID is the channeling of a character's world, since more conservative definitions fail to adequately describe the technique. This channeling has immense consequences. The conventional approach to FID sees it either as an ironical or sympathetic (lyrical) maneuver. McHale notes that "FID may serve as a vehicle for lyric fusion with the character or ironic distancing from him" (McHale 275). However, this rubric of effects remains concentrated on the character-world however. Either the reader feels the character-world is silly and misguided, or empathizes and identifies with it, theorists argue. But there are two wrinkles to this limited use which should occasion caution. First, as McHale admits, "there has been a failure among stylisticians to push the analysis of irony and empathy in FID beyond merely naming these functions without specifying how FID actually gives rise to and sustains irony and empathy" (McHale 275). Second, there is empirical evidence that FID actually does not induce identification in readers the same way theorists believed it might. Keith Oatley theorized that FID was a valuable tool for constructing a theory of mind and identifying with the minds of others. Recently, however, Fletcher and Monteroso have found "no evidence that the readers of the FID-enriched samples had identified with the protagonists" (Fletcher 94). By focusing only on the character-world, these ambiguous discussions of FID's use and effects are half-formed. If FID means channeling the character-world, then it is from the narrator-world which this channeling occurs. Does FID have an effect on the constitution of the narrator-world? It is in this that utility and innovation of FID really lies.

II. FID and Multiple Worlds

It is odd how often early descriptions of free indirect discourse characterize the technique in terms of subjectivity and objectivity. These are already loaded terms, and their usage in early criticism reflects a great deal of conceptual uncertainty. Subjectivity and objectivity can be both ontological and attitudinal. As attitudes, they represent dispositions toward information. One can treat facts and perspectives objectively by presenting them as they are, with a high degree of verisimilitude. Or one can treat facts subjectively by adding one's own feelings and interpretations. Then, there is the ontological sense, the evasive subject and object. Subjectivity is a kind of consciousness, an awareness both of one's inner state and one's outer environment. It is experiential. Objectivity is the status of objects, things that lack subjectivity. It is often designated privatively; objects are things without experience. This brief gloss does not pretend to exhaust the philosophical complexity of the issue, but merely to prepare one for the different and inconsistent ways in which the terms are used by early critics.

Free indirect discourse is traditionally understood as a making-objective-of-the-subject. That is to say, the technique attempts to narrate subjectivity objectively, as subjectivity really is. This means capturing the experiential quality of subjectivity. Flaubert, who first identifies free indirect discourse, falls into this category. He conceives of the novel as "scientific and impersonal," and this objectivity informs his approach: "one should, by an effort of the spirit, transport oneself into the characters, not draw them to oneself" (Cohn, *Transparent Minds* 114). Writers should capture the essence of characters through inhabiting those characters, rather than through commenting on them. But, as the spiritual nature of the task implies, Flaubert's objectivity is far from the Zolaesque naturalist variety. Flaubert believed that, through the mystic experience of an object, one could discover that object essentially and objectively. In the context of literary characters this meant "an imaginative self-submergence in the object, participation in the imagined character's experience, and communication of this intuitive

experience” (Pascal 98). Flaubert is then suggesting that the narrator hollow himself, use narration only as a vehicle for the presentation of a character’s subjective experience.

Charles Bally thinks about free indirect discourse in far more practical terms, but roughly within the same schema. Describing speech-representation generally in his paper on free indirect discourse, Bally explains that “the narrator objectively reproduces words or thoughts without adding anything of his own; the reader has the very clear impression that the narrator (e.g., Zola) is absolutely distinct from the subject (e.g., Pierre), serves him simply as ‘voice-carrier,’ without mixing his personality with that of the subject, without trying to substitute himself for him” (Cohn, “Early Discussions” 509). The narrator objectively reproduces the ‘voice’ of the subject, verbatim, Bally says. The reproduction is objective, in that it is unadulterated by any narrative subjectivity. The narrator again serves merely as a conveyance. Narration may be necessary, Flaubert and Bally seem to agree, but it should be discreet and objective.

Similar accounts of free indirect discourse proliferate, but they share the common features of embracing character subjectivity and of subordinating narration. A few years after Bally, Etienne Lorck denies the role of narration entirely. Lorck is an adherent of the Vossler school of linguistics, a philological movement which sought to understand the soul of language. He identifies FID as the prototypical form of an imaginative and irrational language which focuses on experience rather than practical communication. FID for Lorck would offer only character’s experience, with no narratorial intervention whatsoever. This would conjure up the character’s life in a pure mystically-tinged aesthetic experience. If FID played a narrative role, then it would not be *l’art pour l’art*, experience for its own sake. Instead, it would fulfill a functional purpose in narration. Although later accounts play down the eccentricity of Lorck’s early foray, they do maintain an emphasis on making-objective-the-subjective. Both the strong and weak view on FID as speech representation, for example, see the technique as a vessel for the character experience.

This view of FID as an objective presentation of the subjective character experience aligns with Auerbach's view on the relation between narrator-world and character-world. With the narrator-world as an established basis, the character-world can be projected and expressed. Its expression may be enabled mechanically by narration, but its content is of the character-world and has a validity limited to that world. Furthermore, the boundaries of the character-world are cordoned off by returns to the narrator-world, which gives character experience of FID its proper, subordinated place. Yet, is there more to the story? Another great literary talent, Marcel Proust, comments on Flaubert's use of FID at roughly the same time Bally does. Proust remarks that it "completely changes the appearance of things and beings, like a newly placed lamp, or a move into a new house" (Cohn, *Transparent Minds* 114). Scholars have been quick to commend Proust's perspicacity in noticing FID so early, but they have neglected the heft of his observation. Proust recognizes more than the fact that FID lets a character come brings characters into existence with newfound force. Instead, FID seems to render the world of novels with a new vigor. Just as FID makes the subjective into an object, so too does it render the objective subjective. That is to say, FID has an invaluable role of creating subjectivized narrative worlds, or narrator-worlds where subjectivity is an essential part of their constitution. This is not a wholly new thesis; there is a small cadre of theorists who have proposed a similar function for FID over the years. None fully presents this aspect of the technique, but three in particular have sharp insights to contribute: Eugen Lerch, Paul Hernadi, and Roy Pascal.

Eugen Lerch was a German literary critic in the early twentieth century, and one of the first respondents to Charles Bally's initial formulation of FID. Yet unlike his contemporaries, Lerch acknowledges two scales on which one could measure the technique. One scale, like that of Bally, sees FID as intermediate between direct and indirect discourse. This intermediacy comes in the form of FID's expressivity. It is more expressive than indirect discourse but does not reach the same crescendo as direct discourse. Lerch

calls this “less than direct speech,” and it is perfectly in line with semantic approaches to FID as speech representation (Cohn, “Early Discussions” 514). But the real value of FID comes in its other modality, the function in which it is “more than indirect speech” (Cohn, “Early Discussions” 514). This is its authority. Authority refers to the reality-claim of a technique. Narration has complete authority, since what is narrated is real in the fictional world. Direct discourse and indirect discourse have a reduced authority. What they communicate is real in the character-world, but does not have an unconditional reality in the narrator-world. It is in this sense that they have a lessened claim to reality, and thus a minimized authority. Lerch’s point is that the narrative function in FID gives the technique a narratorial authority. He terms FID *Rede als Tatsache* [speech as fact]. Lerch continues that “it serves on occasion to express more than direct speech: namely, that what is reported is not merely stated but that it is really so” (Cohn, “Early Discussions” 513). The narrative role of FID means that its reports take on an additional authority and become constitutive descriptions for the narrator-world: “what is reported as a fact is more real than what is merely said, more real than what is said in direct speech” (Cohn, “Early Discussions” 512). Lerch’s idea, although not perfectly correct, represents a tremendous breakthrough in FID scholarship, and it is inexplicable that more theorists did not engage with his proposal. Consider the famous opening of Woolf’s *Mrs Dalloway*: “For Lucy had her work cut out for her. The doors would be taken off their hinges; Rumpelmayer’s men were coming” (Woolf 3). This is Clarissa Dalloway’s assessment of what must be done for her party tonight. And yet the FID formulation does not hold the limited validity of direct discourse. It takes on a narrative reality; the reader takes as fact that Lucy is busy, that the doors will be taken off and the workmen will arrive. These become component features of the narrator-world, through the presence of the narrator in FID.

As mentioned above, it cannot be said that Lerch solves the problem. For one, sometimes FID is used to present character conclusions which are later contradicted by the narrator-world. And secondly, more generally, is it

really the case that every FID expression becomes unconditionally valid narrative fact? Or does the use of FID instead represent a change in the reality-claim of narration itself? To find an answer to these questions, it is helpful to consult Paul Hernadi again. Hernadi's focus on substitutionary perception allows him to approach the narrative role of FID in a way other critics are unable to. This is because description is so often given through FID. This description may be from the lens of a character, and yet it takes on a narrative validity that surpasses the conditional validity of direct discourse. Discussing descriptions in *Herzog*, Hernadi writes that these environmental features "really 'exist' for the reader insofar as he has become aware of Herzog's fictive sensory, emotive, and rational response to those things" (Hernadi 191). Thus, FID accomplishes an effect much like that remarked above in *Madame Bovary*; it opens narrative worlds from the character's vantage. Unlike Lerch, Hernadi is not convinced that these narrative worlds are always wholly factual. Discussing *Madame Bovary*, he points out that "through the free indirect mode of quotation the narrator may also empathize with a character's view of the fictional reality" (Hernadi 194). The implication would be that the narrator-world still provides an ultimate check on the character-world. Whereas Lerch overstates the case, arguing that FID always presents facts in the narrator-world, Hernadi argues that FID presents a character-world always subject to verification by a narrator-world. The subtlety Hernadi misses is that, with advent of FID, the narrator-world is in large part constituted by the character-world.

In Coetzee's novel *Elizabeth Costello*, there are a number of uses of FID which shed light on the narrator-world's constitution as character-world. Elizabeth's son, John, accompanies her to a university for an honorary ceremony. She is exhausted after the travel, and John considers her in her hotel room: "she made no move to unpack. If he leaves her now, what will she do? Lie down in her raincoat and shoes" (Coetzee 3). This is John's speculation in FID, but it becomes narratively constitutive. Lacking counterevidence, the reader takes Elizabeth to be tired, likely to lie down in

bed and give up on preparations. Far from just quoting John's thoughts, this FID takes on a reality-claim in the narrator-world. Another example from the novel's end is more illuminating. Elizabeth is frantically attempting to change her address for a conference, since the writer she critiques is in attendance. She wants the hotel concierge to make a copy of it for her: "He takes the wad of paper from her, glances at the heading. The hotel caters to many conferences, he must be used to distraught foreigners rewriting their lectures in the middle of the night" (Coetzee 164). Elizabeth's FID begins with "the hotel caters to many conferences." Elizabeth has never been to this hotel, has been staying there just a short amount of time and largely confined to her room. She has no way of knowing the hotel caters to many conferences. It is nothing but her placating assumption. Yet, in FID, the reader takes it as a narratorial description, licensed as part of the narrator-world. One acknowledges that it is merely Elizabeth's assumption, but the narrator-world is not some underpinning reality which fact-checks the character-world. Instead, it is the accretion of character-worlds. These worlds do not have a lesser participation because they are less true. The innovation of FID is that it forges intersubjective narrator-worlds, where the plot of the novel is the connection of disparate worlds rather than their unification under or correspondence to one overarching narrator-world. Roy Pascal makes an interesting argument which says as much in *The Dual Voice*. He points out that Dickens, Balzac and Stendhal rarely ever use FID: "their rich, extravagant imaginations cannot, like Flaubert's, subject themselves to the characters they create. And one might say of Dickens, too, that his imagination cannot brook a rival; he, not a character, has to be the medium of description if all potentialities are to be uncovered" (Pascal 67). Pascal presents here an odd, almost antagonistic argument, a rivalry between author and character. His point is that the character-worlds of FID encroach on the narrator-world. Narrative action is no longer concentrated under one godlike unifying narrator who builds the master world, but with FID it is now dispersed through the various character-worlds that FID introduces.

Robert Musil describes just this effect in his most famous short story, “Tonka.” Musil takes as his *idée fixe* the possibility of narration. His conclusion is that, in the modern world, such a unity is no longer possible. There is no longer any global narrative which can unite the world, either in real life or fictionally. Musil articulates this conclusion in a stunning paragraph in “Tonka,” written entirely in FID:

He rubbed his eyes. And then look round again. But it was not his eyes. It was the things. The fact was that belief in them had to be there before they themselves could be there; if one did not look at the world with the world’s eyes, the world already in one’s own gaze, it fell apart into meaningless details that live as sadly far apart from each other as the stars in the night-sky. He only needed to look out of the window to see how the world of, say, a cab-driver waiting in the street below was suddenly intersected by the world of a clerk walking past. The result was something slashed open, a disgusting jumble, an inside-out and side-by-side of things on the street, a turmoil of focal points moving along their tracks, and around each of them there extended a radius of complacency and self-confidence, all aids to walking upright in a world where there was no such thing as above and below. Volition, cognition, and perception were like a tangled skein. One noticed this only when one tried to find the end of the thread. But perhaps there was some other way of going through the world, other than following the thread of truth? (Musil, *Five Women* 110)

The student protagonist of “Tonka” is confronting the intersubjective nature of the narrative world. “Tonka” is written almost entirely in FID, and these character perspectives overlap to create a world which is lush but also deeply ambiguous. There is no godlike narrator-world to serve as a key for ordering each element of the character-world. Musil and his student come to the solution that such organization (“the thread of truth”) is not even desired. Instead, one should achieve a kind of aesthetic play between these character-worlds. FID fulfills a vital role in all this, since it lets character-worlds come into being in their own right, while also endowing them with narratorial authority. The consequence of this is a subjectivization of the narrator-world. There is no longer a single consciousness which holds novels together and which can be cited as a polestar for orientation and comparison.

In his discussion of FID, Voloshinov makes an unusual distinction. He gives an example of FID wherein “the author shares a complete solidarity in values and intonations with his hero” (Voloshinov 139). He acknowledges that every categorization of FID heretofore would label the passage as a typical example of FID. Yet Voloshinov dissents. This is not FID, he argues, since the narrator and character are in complete consonance. The passage “still lacks any interference between the author’s speech and the character’s speech,” and subsequently it is not FID. It is this speech interference which is the essence of FID. Voloshinov explains that speech interference is a “simultaneous participation in two speech-acts, each differently oriented in its expressivity” (136). The acts imply different contexts and infuse each word with a plurality of intonations. FID is a consequence of speech-interference; it is a moment when the author’s speech intersects with the character’s speech in a gnarled tangle, where both discourses persist and neither wholly accommodates the other. This, in Voloshinov’s view, accounts for the grammatical and stylistic eccentricities of FID. Each word in FID carries a plural accent, an unresolved dialogism which is still at odds with itself.

Given the analysis above, Voloshinov’s emphasis on speech-acts alone is no longer viable. Yet there is something to be said for the principle of conflict in his characterization. Other techniques see the intermingling of FID as a harmonious addition. Two voices come together and fuse into one, or if such fusion is impossible, then one constituent (either character or narrator) yields to the other, becoming a mask or conveyance for it. Voloshinov alone depicts FID as a battle between two subjectivities, where neither wholly tames the intonation of the other. This results in a rich dialogism that other theorists are unable to capture.

It is also an apt description of the conflict between worlds in FID, as developed above. FID represents the obsolescence of an omniscient narrative context, to which all character-worlds would defer. Now these character-worlds stand in equal stead with the possibility of a narrator-world. In stories like “Tonka,” this produces a lavish play of intonation, where every word is

accented with both character and narrator perspectives. These accents are often in conflict with one another, existing simultaneously and antagonistically in the same phrases. When the student protagonist professes his love of Tonka to his family, they object at once. They point out that she is common, that she works at a draper's shop. The reader knows from earlier that this draper's shop is rumored for its debauchery. The essence of their critique is given in FID: "what they meant was that people had to have learned something, had to have principles, had to be conventional and have the right manners" (Musil, *Five Women* 86). This FID functions from three perspectives. It carries the intonation of the student, his family, and the narrator. The student's family is hinting at not just Tonka's commonness, but the dissolution she may well have participated in at the draper's shop. It expresses their critique, the staid familial outlook on the world. The quote also presents the student in FID. He believes Tonka is virginal and pure, and thus in his interpretation of their meaning, is eager to make it a pure social critique, to bowdlerize its sexual implications. Finally there is the narrator's intonation, which gives authority to the multiple character-worlds and in doing so affirms the absence of a synthesizing narrator-world. What results is an aesthetic play between three worlds, one where Tonka is common and profligate, one where Tonka is virginal and pure, and a narrator-world which establishes the fundamental ambiguity of Tonka's essence. The multiple intonations of FID in "Tonka" produce through their interaction a nest of contradictory character-worlds which are each accorded validity. The aesthetic effect of such a structure is one of play, dialogism, and ambiguity.

"Tonka" is perhaps an extreme example of the use of FID in fiction, but it takes to a maximum the effects of FID's usage. FID legitimizes character-worlds, giving them constitutive authority in narration. This results in intersubjective narratives, in fictional worlds which are heterogeneous and thus ideal for ontological and aesthetic play.

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